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INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP 
 
CHAPTER 8 (2d ed) 
 
INNOVATION, IP RIGHTS, AND ANTICOMPETITIVE 
EXCLUSION 
 
CONTINENTAL PAPER BAG COMPANY v. EASTERN PAPER 
BAG COMPANY 
210 U.S. 405 (1908) 
 
[Justice McKenna gave this statement of the case:] 
This is a bill in equity to restrain the infringement of letters patent No. 
558,969, issued to William Liddell for an improvement in paper bag 
machines, for making what are designated in the trade as self-opening 
square bags. The claims in suit do not include mechanism for making a 
complete bag, but only mechanism for distending one end of a tucked or 
bellows-folded paper tube made by other mechanism, and folding it down 
into a form known in the art as the ‘diamond fold.’ This fold is flattened and 
pasted by other mechanism and forms a square bottom to the bag.  
The allegation of the answer as to the jurisdiction of the court is as 
follows: 
‘The defendant says, on information, advice, and belief, that a court of 
equity has no jurisdiction to grant any prayer of the bill of complaint, even 
if the said Liddell patent, No. 558,969, were valid, and even if the 
defendant’s paper bag machines were to be held to infringe that patent; 
because the said patent, No. 558,969, is a mere paper proposition which the 
complainant has never put into effect or use, and because it is contrary to 
equity to suppress a useful and established business, like that which the 
defendant is prosecuting with its paper bag machines, at the request of a 
complainant which simply owns one paper bag machine patent that has 
never been employed by that complainant in any way in any paper bag 
machinery, and because the complainant in this case has a plain, adequate, 
and complete remedy at law for any infringement which may have been 
done upon Liddell letters patent, No. 558,969.’ 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1946379 
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Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court: 
The defense of want of invention in the Liddell machine is not urged 
here, because it is said that the decision of that question depends upon 
mechanical comparisons, too numerous and complicated to be conveniently 
made by a bench of judges, and because, though the Liddell patent 
approaches closely the prior art, it ‘perhaps covers a margin of 
differentiation sufficient, though barely sufficient, to constitute invention.’ 
Th[e] point of law, it is further said, has been formulated in a decision 
of this court as follows: ‘Where the patent does not embody a primary 
invention, but only an improvement on the prior art, and defendant’s 
machines can be differentiated, the charge of infringement is not sustained.’ 
Counsel for respondent do not contend that the Liddell invention is primary 
within the definition given of that term by petitioner. Their concession is 
that it is ‘not basic, in the sense of covering the first machine ever produced 
to make self-opening square bags by machinery.’ They do contend, 
however, that it is one of high rank, and, if it be given a ‘fair construction 
and scope, no matter whether we call it basic, primary, or broad, or even 
merely entitled to be construed as covering obvious mechanical equivalents, 
the question of infringement of the claims in suit by petitioner’s machine 
becomes mechanically, and from a patent-law standpoint, a simple one, in 
spite of slight differences of operation, and of reversal of some of the 
moving parts.’ The lower courts did not designate the invention as either 
primary or secondary. They did, however, as we shall presently see, decide 
that it was one of high rank and entitled to a broad range of equivalents. It 
becomes necessary, therefore, to consider the point of law upon which 
petitioner contends the question of infringement depends….. 
If the invention is broad or primary in its character, the range of 
equivalents will be correspondingly broad, under the liberal construction 
which the courts give to such inventions.’ And this was what was decided in 
Kokomo Fence Mach. Co. v. Kitselman, 189 U.S. 8 (1903), Cimiotti 
Unhairing Co. v. American Fur Ref. Co., 198 U.S. 399 (1905), and 
Computing Scale Co. v. Automatic Scale Co. 204 U. S. 609 (1907). It is 
from the second of those cases, as we have seen, that the citation is made 
which petitioner contends the point of law upon which infringement 
depends is formulated; but it was said in that case: ‘It is well settled that a 
greater degree of liberality and a wider range of equivalents are permitted 
where the patent is of a pioneer character than when the invention is simply 
an improvement, maybe the last and successful step, in the art theretofore 
partially developed by other inventors in the same field.’ 
It is manifest, therefore, that it was not meant to decide that only pioneer 
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patents are entitled to invoke the doctrine of equivalents, but that it was 
decided that the range of equivalents depends upon and varies with the 
degree of invention…. We start, then, with the proposition that the Eastern 
Company may invoke for the Liddell patent the doctrine of equivalents; but, 
without deciding now how broadly, we proceed to the consideration of the 
question of infringement. Invention is conceded to the Liddell machine, as 
we have seen, by the Continental Company. The concession, however, is 
qualified by the assertion that it covers only a ‘margin of differentiation’ 
from the prior art. The circuit court and the circuit court of appeals had a 
higher estimate of it. The circuit court said that the nature of its invention 
was ‘clear . . . [was] disconnected from what precedes it by such a hiatus 
that, if the claims are as extensive as the invention, there is no difficulty so 
far as concerns the application to the case of the rules with reference to 
equivalents.’ And answering the contention that it was the twentieth in the 
line of patents in its branch of the arts, and that it should be limited to the 
details described in its specifications, it was said that there was ‘such hiatus 
between them and what appears on the face of the Liddell patent that they 
have no effect either in narrowing or broadening the alleged Liddell 
invention.’ The circuit court of appeals affirmed the decree of the circuit 
court. It was less circumstantial than the circuit court in describing the 
invention. It said, however, after stating the claims, that their breadth 
‘would imperil the patent, were the real invention less broad; but the 
defendant [the Continental Company] has not pointed out, and we have 
been unable to find, any operative combination of a rotary cylinder and a 
forming plate oscillating thereon earlier than the patent in suit. If, therefore, 
the patent is valid, it has a wide scope, and the mechanical arrangement 
used by the defendant is fairly within its terms.’ The lower courts, therefore, 
found that the invention was a broad one, and that the machine used by the 
Continental Company was an infringement. To decide the question of 
invention an examination of the prior art was necessary, and a consideration 
of what step in advance of that art, if any, the Liddell patent was. To decide 
the question of infringement a comparison of the Liddell machine with the 
machine used by the Continental Company was necessary and a 
determination of their similarity or difference.  
The bill alleges the infringement of claims 1, 2, and 7….  Claim 1 is as 
follows: ‘In a paper bag machine, the combination of a rotating cylinder 
provided with one or more pairs of side-folding fingers adapted to be 
moved toward or from each other, a forming plate also provided with side-
forming fingers adapted to be moved toward of from each other, means for 
operating said fingers at definite times during the formative action upon the 
bag tube, operating means for the forming plate adapted to cause the said 
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plate to oscillate about its rear edge upon the surface of the cylinder during 
the rotary movement of said cylinder, the whole operating for the purpose 
of opening and forming the bottom of the bag tube, and means to move the 
bag tube with the cylinder.’ 
‘The pith of . . . [the] invention,’ the circuit court said, ‘is the 
combination of a rotating cylinder with means for operating the forming 
plate in connection therewith, limited, however, to means which cause the 
plate to oscillate about its rear edge.’ The court expressed the opinion that 
the invention extended to every means by which that result could be 
attained, and rejected the contention of the Continental Company, that the 
invention was no broader than the details described in the specification. The 
court said that it was unable to see upon what the proposition could be 
based. And further said that there was nothing in the prior art which either 
broadened or narrowed the Liddell invention. ‘If any of . . . [the nineteen 
patents which had been put in evidence]’ the court added, ‘pointed out any 
form of combining the forming plate with a rotating cylinder, they would, 
of course, narrow what Liddell could claim; but they have nothing of that 
kind.’ And, speaking of the claims and their limitation by the description, it 
was said: ‘Nothing in the manner in which the claims are expressed adopts 
as an element the detailed description contained in the specification. So far 
as the details of that description are concerned, they come within the 
ordinary rule of the preferable method.’… 
The discussion thus far brings us to two propositions: That infringement 
is not averted merely because the machine alleged to infringe may be 
differentiated from the patented machine, even though the invention 
embodied in the latter be not primary; and, second, that the description does 
not necessarily limit the claims…. 
It may be well before considering these contentions to refer again to the 
view which the circuit court and the circuit court of appeals had of Liddell’s 
patent. The circuit court said that the ‘pith’ of the invention ‘is the 
combination of a rotating cylinder with means for operating the forming 
plate in connection therewith, limited, however, to means which cause the 
plate to oscillate about its rear edge on the surface thereof,’ and 
distinguished the invention from the prior art, as follows: ‘Aside from the 
cylinder and the forming plate oscillating about its rear edge, everything in 
these claims [the claims of the patent] is necessarily old in the arts.’ It was 
this peculiar feature of novelty, it was said, which clearly distinguished it 
from all that went before it. This conclusion was in effect affirmed by the 
circuit court of appeals. The latter court said that the folding of the bottoms 
of S. O. S. paper bags had been accomplished in the prior art ‘both by a 
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folding plate reciprocating upon a plane, and by the operation of fingers 
upon a cylinder. The folding plate and the cylinder had never been 
combined. The complainant urges with much probability that the reason 
why they had not been combined lay in the difficulty of operating a pivoted 
folding from upon the surface of a cylinder. Two circles external to each 
can be in contact at but one point, while, in order that the folding plate may 
operate, its end, as it moves upon a pivot, must remain for some distance in 
contact with the surface of the revolving cylinder. The problem may be 
solved by causing the pivot or axis of the folding plate to yield away from 
the cylinder, or by causing the surface of the cylinder to be depressed away 
from the folding plate. The patent in suit adopts the first device, the 
defendant’s machine the second, and the crucial question before the court is 
this: Under all the circumstances of the case, is the second method, as 
compared with the first, within the doctrine of equivalents?’ 
The court, as we have seen, concluded, from the character of the Liddell 
patent, that ‘the second method,’ that is, the method of the Continental 
Company’s machine, was ‘within the doctrine of equivalents.’… 
The next contention of the petitioner is that a court of equity has no 
jurisdiction to restrain the ‘infringement of letters patent the invention 
covered by which has long and always and unreasonably been held in 
nonuse . . . instead of being made beneficial to the art to which it belongs.’ 
It will be observed that it is not urged that nonuse merely of the patent takes 
jurisdiction from equity, but an unreasonable nonuse….. 
Judge Aldrich, in his dissenting opinion in the court of appeals, 
excluded the cases as authoritative for a different reason than counsel 
expresses. The learned judge said: 
‘Simple nonuse is one thing. Standing alone, nonuse is no efficient 
reason for withholding injunction. There are many reasons for nonuse 
which, upon explanation, are cogent; but when acquiring, holding, and 
nonuse are only explainable upon the hypothesis of a purpose to abnormally 
force trade into unnatural channels,-a hypothesis involving an attitude 
which offends public policy, the conscience of equity, and the very spirit 
and intention of the law upon which the legal right is founded,-it is quite 
another thing. This is an aspect which has not been considered in a case like 
the one here.’ 
Respondent attacks the conclusion of Judge Aldrich and that of 
petitioner, and insists that there is nothing in the record to show that the 
nonuse of the patent was either unreasonable or sinister. A very strong 
argument is presented by respondent. Its counsel pointedly say that ‘there is 
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no record evidence at all on the subject or character of complainants’ 
[respondents’] use or nonuse,’ and points out that neither the assignments of 
error on appeal to the circuit court of appeals nor the petition for rehearing 
in that court presented the question that the injunction should be denied on 
the ground of mere nonuse or unreasonable nonuse. Let us see what the 
courts say and what petitioner says. The circuit court says: 
‘We have stated that no machine for practical manufacturing purposes 
was ever constructed under the Liddell patent. The record also shows that 
the complainant, so to speak, locked up its patent. It has never attempted to 
make any practical use of it, either itself or through licenses, and, 
apparently, its proposed policy has been to avoid this. In this respect it has 
not the common excuse of a lack of means, as it is unquestioned that the 
complainant is a powerful and wealthy corporation. We have no doubt that 
the complainant stands in the common class of manufacturers who 
accumulate patents merely for the purpose of protecting their general 
industries and shutting out competitors.’ 
 …  But petitioner has given its explanation of the purpose of 
respondent. Quoting Judge Aldrich, that the patent in suit has been 
‘deliberately held in nonuse for a wrongful purpose,’ petitioner asks, ‘What 
was that wrongful purpose? It was the purpose to make more money with 
the existing old reciprocating Lorenz & Honiss machines and the existing 
old complicated Stilwell machines than could be made with new Liddell 
machines, when the cost of building the latter was taken into account. And 
this purpose was effective to cause the long and invariable nonuse of the 
Liddell invention, notwithstanding that new Liddell machines might have 
produced better paper bags than the old Lorenz & Honiss machines or the 
old Stilwell machines were producing.’ 
But, granting all this, it is certainly disputable that the nonuse was 
unreasonable, or that the rights of the public were involved. There was no 
question of a diminished supply or of increase of prices, and can it be said, 
as a matter of law, that a nonuse was unreasonable which had for its motive 
the saving of the expense that would have been involved by changing the 
equipment of a factory from one set of machines to another? And even if 
the old machines could have been altered, the expense would have been 
considerable. As to the suggestion that competitors were excluded from the 
use of the new patent, we answer that such exclusion may be said to have 
been of the very essence of the right conferred by the patent, as it is the 
privilege of any owner of property to use or not use it, without question of 
motive…. 
The right which a patentee receives does not need much further 
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explanation. We have seen that it has been the judgment of Congress from 
the beginning that the sciences and the useful arts could be best advanced 
by giving an exclusive right to an inventor. The only qualification ever 
made was against aliens, in the act of 1832. That act extended the privilege 
of the patent law to aliens, but required them ‘to introduce into public use in 
the United States the invention or improvement within one year from the 
issuing thereof,’ and indulged no intermission of the public use for any 
period longer than six months. A violation of the law rendered the patent 
void. The act was repealed in 1836. It is manifest, as is said in Walker on 
Patents, § 106, that Congress has not ‘overlooked the subject of nonuser of 
patented inventions.’ And another fact may be mentioned. In some foreign 
countries the right granted to an inventor is affected by nonuse. This policy, 
we must assume, Congress has not been ignorant of nor of its effects. It has, 
nevertheless, selected another policy; it has continued that policy through 
many years. We may assume that experience has demonstrated its wisdom 
and beneficial effect upon the arts and sciences. 
From the character of the right of the patentee we may judge of his 
remedies. It hardly needs to be pointed out that the right can only retain its 
attribute of exclusiveness by a prevention of its violation. Anything but 
prevention takes away the privilege which the law confers upon the 
patentee. If the conception of the law that a judgment in an action at law is 
reparation for the trespass, it is only for the particular trespass that is the 
ground of the action. There may be other trespasses and continuing wrongs 
and the vexation of many actions. These are well-recognized grounds of 
equity jurisdiction, especially in patent cases, and a citation of cases is 
unnecessary. Whether, however, as case cannot arise where, regarding the 
situation of the parties in view of the public interest, a court of equity might 
be justified in withholding relief by injunction, we do not decide. 
Decree affirmed. 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1.  If the doctrine of equivalents should have a broad application to pioneer 
patents, as the court suggests, shouldn’t a corollary be that it ought to have a 
very narrow application to a narrow patent or, particularly in this case, a 
patent that is not even being practiced?  On the doctrine of equivalents and 
patent scope, see Chapter 1. 
  
2.  The Paper Bag Court held that a holder of a valid patent is not obligated 
to license its right to a competitor, even if the right is not being used.  
Further, whether the patent creates a market monopoly is irrelevant.  And 
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finally, in this case the patentee did not develop the enforced patent 
internally, but acquired it from another for the purpose of taking the 
alternative technology out of the market altogether.  Is that consistent with 
the purpose of the Patent Act? 
 
Congress apparently supported the Paper Bag principle when it 
enacted the Patent Misuse Reform Act in 1988.  The statute provides: 
 
(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or 
contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or 
deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by 
reason of his having … (4) refused to license or use any rights to the 
patent…  
 
35 U.S.C. §271 (d)(4).  Note that the statute does not distinguish between 
used and unused patents, or between internally developed patents and those 
acquired from others.   Does this provision create an antitrust immunity as 
well? Antitrust law does not impose an obligation to use or license 
intellectual property either.  See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 
U.S. 386, 432-33 (1945) (“a patent owner is not in the position of a quasi-
trustee for the public . . . [it] has no obligation to use it or grant it to 
others”).   But see the Kodak decision, infra.  See also CHRISTINA 
BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: 
PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION, Ch. 11 (2011), which 
argues that if a monopolist acquires a patent from an outside source the 
acquisition should be limited to a nonexclusive license.  That would give 
the monopolist the opportunity to keep its technology up to date by 
practicing the patent, but it would not permit the monopolist to shut the 
technology down by denying access to others. 
 
4,  For additional commentary on the Paper Bag case, see Eduwardo M. 
Penalver & Oskar Livak, The Right Not to Use in Property and Patent Law 
(Cornell Legal Studies Res. P. # 12-62, Oct. 16, 2012, available at 
 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2162667. 
 
WALLACE v. IBM Corp. 
467 F.3d 1104 (7
th
 Cir. 2006) 
 
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. 
Does the provision of copyrighted software under the GNU General 
Public License (“GPL”) violate the federal antitrust laws? Authors who 
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distribute their works under this license, devised by the Free Software 
Foundation, Inc., authorize not only copying but also the creation of 
derivative works-and the license prohibits charging for the derivative work. 
People may make and distribute derivative works if and only if they come 
under the same license terms as the original work. Thus the GPL propagates 
from user to user and revision to revision: neither the original author, nor 
any creator of a revised or improved version, may charge for the software or 
allow any successor to charge 
One prominent example of free, open-source software is the Linux 
operating system, a derivative of the Unix operating system written by 
AT&T in the 1960s and now available without cost. (UNIX® is a trademark 
of The Open Group, but the source code to many variants of AT & T’s 
work is freely available.) Linux is one of many modern derivatives of Unix-
which is not itself under the GPL. Thus Apple Computer, which uses the 
Berkeley Software Distribution variant of Unix as the foundation for the 
Mac OS X operating system, is entitled to charge for its software. Linux, 
initially the work of Linus Torvalds, is maintained by a large open-source 
community. International Business Machines offers Linux with many of its 
servers, or customers can install it themselves. IBM has contributed code to 
the Linux project and furnishes this derivative work to anyone else with an 
interest. Red Hat, Inc., sells media (such as DVDs), manuals, and support 
for the installation and maintenance of Linux. The GPL covers only the 
software; people are free to charge for the physical media on which it comes 
and for assistance in making it work. Paper manuals, and the time of 
knowledgeable people who service and support an installation, thus are the 
most expensive part of using Linux. 
Daniel Wallace would like to compete with Linux-either by offering a 
derivative work or by writing an operating system from scratch-but 
maintains that this is impossible as long as Linux and its derivatives are 
available for free. He contends that IBM, Red Hat, and Novell have 
conspired among themselves and with others (including the Free Software 
Foundation) to eliminate competition in the operating system market by 
making Linux available at an unbeatable price. Under the GPL, which 
passes from user to improver to user, Linux and all software that 
incorporates any of its source code will be free forever, and nothing could 
be a more effective deterrent to competition, Wallace maintains. … 
Although antitrust law serves the interests of consumers rather than 
producers, the Supreme Court has permitted producers to initiate predatory-
pricing litigation. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993); Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith 
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Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). This does not assist Wallace, however, 
because his legal theory is faulty substantively. 
Predatory pricing is a three-stage process: Low prices, followed by the 
exit of producers who can no longer make a profit, followed by monopoly 
prices. The law’s worry is the final period in which the survivor (or cartel of 
survivors) recoups losses incurred during the low-price period. When exit 
does not occur, or recoupment is improbable even if some producers give 
up the market, there is no antitrust problem. So the Court held in both 
Brooke Group and Matsushita. …   Either prices will stay low (reflecting 
efficient production and enduring benefits to consumers) or the practice will 
be self-deterring (because the predator loses more during the low-price 
period than it gains later, and consumers are net beneficiaries). When 
monopoly does not ensue, low prices remain-and the goal of antitrust law is 
to use rivalry to keep prices low for consumers’ benefit. Employing 
antitrust law to drive prices up would turn the Sherman Act on its head. 
Wallace does not contend that software available for free under the GPL 
will lead to monopoly prices in the future. How could it, when the GPL 
keeps price low forever and precludes the reduction of output that is 
essential to monopoly? … 
Software that is not maintained and improved eventually becomes 
obsolete, and the lack of reward may reduce the resources devoted to 
maintenance and improvement of Linux and other open-source projects. If 
that occurs, however, then proprietary software will enter or gain market 
share. People willingly pay for quality software even when they can get free 
(but imperfect) substitutes. Open Office is a free, open-source suite of word 
processor, spreadsheet and presentation software, but the proprietary 
Microsoft Office has many more users. Gimp is a free, open-source image 
editor, but the proprietary Adobe Photoshop enjoys the lion’s share of the 
market. Likewise there is a flourishing market in legal treatises and other 
materials, plus reference databases such as LEXIS and Westlaw, even 
though courts give away their work (this opinion, for example, is not 
covered by copyright and may be downloaded from the court’s web site and 
copied without charge). And so it is with operating systems. Many more 
people use Microsoft Windows, Apple OS X, or Sun Solaris than use Linux. 
IBM, which includes Linux with servers, sells mainframes and 
supercomputers that run proprietary operating systems. The number of 
proprietary operating systems is growing, not shrinking, so competition in 
this market continues quite apart from the fact that the GPL ensures the 
future availability of Linux and other Unix offshoots. 
It does not help to characterize people who accept the GPL as 
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“conspirators.” Although the antitrust laws forbid conspiracies “in restraint 
of trade,” 15 U.S.C. § 1, § 26, the GPL does not restrain trade. It is a 
cooperative agreement that facilitates production of new derivative works, 
and agreements that yield new products that would not arise through 
unilateral action are lawful. 
Nor does it help to call the GPL “price fixing.” Although it sets a price 
of zero, agreements to set maximum prices usually assist consumers and 
therefore are evaluated under the Rule of Reason. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 
522 U.S. 3 (1997). Intellectual property can be used without being used up; 
the marginal cost of an additional user is zero (costs of media and paper to 
one side), so once a piece of intellectual property exists the efficient price of 
an extra copy is zero, for that is where price equals marginal cost. Copyright 
and patent laws give authors a right to charge more, so that they can recover 
their fixed costs (and thus promote innovation), but they do not require 
authors to charge more. No more does antitrust law require higher prices. 
Linux and other open-source projects have been able to cover their fixed 
costs through donations of time; as long as that remains true, it would 
reduce efficiency and consumers’ welfare to force the authors to levy a 
charge on each new user. 
Wallace does not contend that Linux has such a large market share, or 
poses such a threat to consumers’ welfare in the long run, that evaluation 
under the Rule of Reason could lead to condemnation. A “quick look” is all 
that’s needed to reject Wallace’s claim. See, e.g., California Dental 
Association v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999); National Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n v. University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Ball Memorial 
Hospital, Inc. v. Mutual Hospital Insurance, Inc., 784 F.2d 1325 (7
th
 Cir. 
1986) (unless a firm with market power can increase its profits by curtailing 
output, the practice is lawful under the Rule of Reason). The GPL and open-
source software have nothing to fear from the antitrust laws. 
AFFIRMED. 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1.  How can a software company make a profit when it offers a product for 
free? Software is typically expensive to develop but very inexpensive to 
distribute once it has been developed. 
 
A great deal of free software, such as that in Wallace, is sold in “two-
sided” markets in which the seller earns its revenue from a different product 
that is bundled with the software.  That was the point missed in his 
complaint:  IBM was not “giving away” software: it was providing the open 
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source software at no additional charge to users of its computer systems.  
See CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT 
RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION, Chs. 11 & 
12 (2011). 
 
The business model adopted by free software is based on a product that 
offers a very low price, a large installed base, and adaptability. A customer 
of free software is able to modify and adapt the software to its individual 
needs. Additionally, a business also assumes that by offering the software 
for free, it will be able to increase the sales of complementary products and 
services that it already charges its customers. 
 
For example, Symbian and Android are operating systems for 
cellphones that are bundled with the phones themselves.  Symbian was 
developed for more traditional phones, although its features have expanded 
over time. Android, which was developed by Google, is used in 
“smartphones.”  The software license allows each manufacturer to design a 
mobile phone device of its choosing. Additionally, the manufacturers are 
able to update the devices with new features or applications.  
 
2.  The law of predatory pricing generally requires a plaintiff to show that a 
price is “below cost” and that the predatory could reasonably anticipate that 
its investment in below cost pricing would be followed by a “recoupment” 
period after the rival has been excluded.  Further, this anticipated 
recoupment must be sufficiently large to pay off the investment in predation 
after being discounted for the time value of money and the likelihood that 
the scheme will fail.  See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993); and Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-
Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc., 549 U.S. 312 (2007) (predatory 
buying). See also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE 
LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §§ 8.2-8.7 (4
th
 ed. 2011).  As 
Judge Easterbrook observes, there can be no post-predation “recoupment” if 
the price of the product can never rise above zero; nothing will ever be 
recouped. 
 
What about the price, however?  Was it “below cost,” given that IBM 
was not simply giving away software.  Rather it was bundling the software 
with a computer hardware system?  It was additionally required by the 
license agreement to make its variation of the software available to others.  
How does one measure the “price” of the software in these circumstances?  
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What if IBM’s overall profits from making computers and open source 
software to run them were positive? 
 
2.  Some patent licensing agreements contain provisions known as 
“grantbacks.” This provision stipulates that the licensee is required to 
convey back to the licensor the right to use those improvements. Could this 
provision produce an anticompetitve effect?  According to the Justice 
Department and the Federal Trade Commission, which have issued antitrust 
Guidelines for intellectual property licensing, grantbacks can be 
anticompetitive “if they substantially reduce the licensee’s incentives to 
engage in research and development and thereby limit rivalry in innovation 
markets.” Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property § 
5.6 (1995).
1
 But grantbacks can be competitively harmless if they are 
nonexclusive. See Binks Mfg. c. Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp., 281 F.2d 
252, 259 (7th Cir. 1960). Courts evaluate grantbacks under antitrust’s rule 
of reason, which requires proof of market power and competitive harm. See 
Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 646-
48 (1947). The Antitrust-IP Guidelines provide that factors considered in 
the rule of reason analysis are “the likely effects [of grantbacks] in light of 
the overall structure of the licensing arrangement and conditions in the 
relevant markets.” Id. at §5.6. Other factors include: (1) relevant market 
power and relevant market’s competition in the technology, (2) scope and 
duration of the grantbacks, (3) whether the grantback is royalty free and 
whether improvements are sublicensed free, and (4) the extent to which an 
pooling arranging in conjuction with grantbacks impede competition and 
innovation. 
 
IMAGE TECHNICAL SERVICES, INC. v. EASTMAN 
KODAK CO. 
125 F.3d 1195 (9
th
 Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1094 (1998) 
 
BEEZER, Circuit Judge: 
Plaintiffs-Appellees Image Technical Services, and ten other 
independent service organizations (“ISOs”) that service Kodak photocopiers 
and micrographic equipment sued the Eastman Kodak Co. (“Kodak”) for 
violations of the Sherman Act. The ISOs alleged that Kodak used its 
monopoly in the market for Kodak photocopier and micrographic parts to 
create a second monopoly in the equipment service markets. A jury verdict 
awarded treble damages totaling $71.8 million…. 
                                                 
1
 Available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm. 
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 This appeal raises questions relating to the application of antitrust 
principles upon a finding that a monopolist unilaterally refused to deal with 
competitors. We also address overlapping patent and copyright issues and 
their significance in the antitrust context. 
Kodak manufactures, sells and services high volume photocopiers and 
micrographic (or microfilm) equipment. Competition in these markets is 
strong. In the photocopier market Kodak’s competitors include Xerox, IBM 
and Canon. Kodak’s competitors in the micrographics market include 
Minolta, Bell & Howell and 3M. Despite comparable products in these 
markets, Kodak’s equipment is distinctive. Although Kodak equipment may 
perform similar functions to that of its competitors, Kodak’s parts are not 
interchangeable with parts used in other manufacturers’ equipment. 
Kodak sells and installs replacement parts for its equipment. Kodak 
competes with ISOs in these markets. Kodak has ready access to all parts 
necessary for repair services because it manufactures many of the parts used 
in its equipment and purchases the remaining necessary parts from 
independent original-equipment manufacturers. In the service market, 
Kodak repairs at least 80% of the machines it manufactures. ISOs began 
servicing Kodak equipment in the early 1980’s, and have provided cheaper 
and better service at times, according to some customers. ISOs obtain parts 
for repair service from a variety of sources, including, at one time, Kodak. 
As ISOs grew more competitive, Kodak began restricting access to its 
photocopier and micrographic parts. In 1985, Kodak stopped selling copier 
parts to ISOs, and in 1986, Kodak halted sales of micrographic parts to 
ISOs. Additionally, Kodak secured agreements from their contracted 
original-equipment manufacturers not to sell parts to ISOs. These parts 
restrictions limited the ISOs’ ability to compete in the service market for 
Kodak machines. Competition in the service market requires that service 
providers have ready access to all parts. 
Kodak offers annual or multi-year service contracts to its customers. 
Service providers generally contract with equipment owners through multi-
year service contracts. ISOs claim that they were unable to provide similar 
contracts because they lack a reliable supply of parts. Some ISOs contend 
that the parts shortage forced them out of business. 
In 1987, the ISOs filed this action against Kodak, seeking damages and 
injunctive relief for violations of the Sherman Act. The ISOs claimed that 
Kodak both: (1) unlawfully tied the sale of service for Kodak machines with 
the sale of parts in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, and (2) 
monopolized or attempted to monopolize the sale of service for Kodak 
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machines in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act. 
… Before closing arguments, the ISOs withdrew their § 1 tying and 
conspiracy claims. The remaining § 2 attempted monopolization and 
monopolization claims were submitted to the jury. A unanimous verdict 
awarded damages to the ISO’s totaling $71.8 million after trebling…. 
After accepting the verdict, the district court crafted a ten year 
injunction requiring Kodak to sell all parts to ISOs on “reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory terms and prices.” The injunction required Kodak to sell: 
(1) all parts for Kodak equipment; (2) all parts described in Kodak’s Parts 
Lists; (3) all parts of supply items that are field replaceable by Kodak 
technicians; (4) all service manuals and price lists; and (5) all tools or 
devices “essential to servicing Kodak equipment.” 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolies, attempts to form 
monopolies, as well as combinations and conspiracies to do so. 15 U.S.C. § 
2.  The ISOs presented evidence in support of two § 2 theories: attempted 
monopolization and monopolization. They alleged, and the jury concluded, 
that Kodak used its monopoly over Kodak photocopier and micrographic 
parts to attempt to create and actually create a second monopoly over the 
service markets. 
To prevail on a § 2 attempt claim, the ISOs were required to establish: 
“(1) a specific intent to control prices or destroy competition; (2) predatory 
or anticompetitive conduct directed at accomplishing that purpose; (3) a 
dangerous probability of achieving ‘monopoly power,’ and (4) causal 
antitrust injury.” … The requirements of a § 2 monopolization claim are 
similar, differing primarily in the requisite intent and the necessary level of 
monopoly power. … 
To demonstrate market power by circumstantial evidence, a plaintiff 
must: “(1) define the relevant market, (2) show that the defendant owns a 
dominant share of that market, and (3) show that there are significant 
barriers to entry and show that existing competitors lack the capacity to 
increase their output in the short run.”  
We begin with the relevant market determination. The relevant market 
is the field in which meaningful competition is said to exist….. 
 [Kodak] argues that because no two parts are interchangeable, the 
relevant markets for parts consist of the market for each individual part for 
Kodak photocopiers and each single part for Kodak micrographics 
equipment. Under Kodak’s theory there are not two relevant parts markets, 
but thousands of individual “part” markets. Kodak contends that the ISOs 
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY                             Chapter 8, Page 17 
Hovenkamp                                                                        Oct. 2013 
 
should have been required to demonstrate that they could not obtain 
particular nonpatented parts and that the failure to obtain that particular part 
resulted in a Kodak monopoly over service. We reject Kodak’s market 
definition. 
Kodak’s market definition focuses exclusively on the interchangeability 
of the parts although ignoring the “commercial realities” faced by ISOs and 
end users. … 
The “commercial reality” faced by service providers and equipment 
owners is that a service provider must have ready access to all parts to 
compete in the service market. As the relevant market for service “from the 
Kodak equipment owner’s perspective is composed of only those 
companies that service Kodak machines,” id., the relevant market for parts 
from the equipment owners’ and service providers’ perspective is composed 
of “all parts” that are designed to meet Kodak photocopier and 
micrographics equipment specifications. The makers of these parts “if 
unified by a monopolist or a hypothetical cartel, would have market power 
in dealing with” ISOs and end users. Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1436 (quoting 
Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, ¶ 518.1b, at 534 (Supp.1993)) 
(defining relevant “market”)…. 
….  The second element of a § 2 monopoly claim, the “conduct” 
element, is the use of monopoly power “to foreclose competition, to gain a 
competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor.” … 
Kodak’s chief complaint with the monopoly power jury instructions lies 
with Jury Instruction No. 29. That Instruction, entitled “Monopolization-
Monopoly Conduct,” states in relevant part: 
[a] company with monopoly power in a relevant market has no general 
duty to cooperate with its business rivals and may refuse to deal with 
them or with their customers if valid business reasons exist for such 
refusal. It is unlawful, however, for a monopolist to engage in conduct, 
including refusals to deal, that unnecessarily excludes or handicaps 
competitors in order to maintain a monopoly. 
(emphasis added). Kodak argues that this instruction lacks objective 
standards and improperly includes within the prohibited activities a lawful 
monopolist’s “aggressive” competition. 
Specifically, Kodak challenges Instruction No. 29’s “unnecessarily 
excludes or handicaps competitors” language. Kodak says that this language 
is based on a form of “monopoly leveraging” that we previously rejected in 
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 543 (9th  
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Cir.1991). In Alaska Airlines we did reject the Second Circuit’s holding in 
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2nd Cir. 1979). 
Berkey Photo recognized liability under § 2 of the Sherman Act on a theory 
of monopoly leveraging involving a firm which used “its monopoly power 
in one market to gain a competitive advantage in another, albeit without an 
attempt to monopolize the second market.” 603 F.2d at 275. In Alaska 
Airlines, we held that “monopoly leveraging” could not exist as a basis for § 
2 liability in the absence of the defendant using its monopoly in one market 
to monopolize or attempt to monopolize the downstream market. 948 F.2d 
at 547. We characterized Berkey Photo ‘s downstream monopoly 
requirement “to gain a competitive advantage” as too “loose.” Alaska 
Airlines, 948 F.2d at 546. 
Kodak accuses the district court of incorporating Berkey Photo’s 
repudiated language into the court’s instructions. We disagree. Instruction 
No. 29 required the jury to find that Kodak’s monopoly conduct be 
undertaken “in order to maintain a monopoly” in the downstream market. 
Berkey Photo ‘s watered-down standard does not go this far. Instruction No. 
29 makes clear that the monopolies at issue are Kodak’s alleged service 
monopolies and the Instruction required the jury to find that Kodak acted in 
furtherance of maintaining its service monopolies. Instruction No. 29’s 
“unnecessarily excludes or handicaps competitors” language does not come 
from Berkey Photo, but from the jury instruction endorsed by the Supreme 
Court in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 
597 (1985)…. 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits a monopolist’s unilateral action, 
like Kodak’s refusal to deal, if that conduct harms the competitive process 
in the absence of a legitimate business justification…. 
The Supreme Court began its analysis in Aspen Skiing with a discussion 
of the “right to refuse to deal,” a right the Court characterized as highly 
valued but not “unqualified.” Id. at 601. The Court, quoting extensively 
from Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 155 (1951), held 
that the right to refuse to deal was “neither absolute nor exempt from 
regulation” and when used “as a purposeful means of monopolizing 
interstate commerce” the exercise of that right violates the Sherman Act. 
Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 602. Thus “the long recognized right ... [to] freely 
[ ] exercise [one’s] own independent discretion as to parties with whom he 
will deal” does not violate the Sherman Act “[i]n the absence of any 
purpose to create or maintain a monopoly.” Id. (quoting Lorain Journal, 
342 U.S. at 155) (emphasis in the original) (citations omitted). In Aspen 
Skiing, the Court noted that a defendant’s refusal to deal was evidence of 
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its’ intent “relevant to the question whether the challenged conduct is fairly 
characterized as ‘exclusionary’ or ‘anticompetitive’-to use the words in the 
trial court’s instructions-or ‘predatory,’ to use a word that scholars seem to 
favor.” 
Next, the Court reasoned that a monopolist’s refusal to deal was not 
limited to the specific facts of Lorain Journal, but also covered the Aspen 
Skiing defendant-monopolist’s election “to make an important change in a 
pattern of distribution that had originated in a competitive market and had 
persisted for several years.”…. 
 Jury Instructions Nos. 28 and 29 here covered the requirements set 
forth in Aspen Skiing.  Like the Supreme Court in Aspen Skiing, we are 
faced with a situation in which a monopolist made a conscious choice to 
change an established pattern of distribution to the detriment of competitors. 
Id. at 603. Although the service market prior to Kodak’s parts policy had 
not “originated in a competitive market and persisted for several years,” id., 
the ISO service market had existed for three years and was growing rapidly 
before Kodak implemented its parts policy. Our case is factually 
distinguishable from Aspen Skiing in several respects: here there are no 
readily comparable competitive markets; ISO profits were not halved after 
the imposition of the anticompetitive policies; and there are two markets at 
issue, rather than only one. Further, unlike most essential facilities cases 
and this case, Aspen Skiing did not involve the effects of a supplier’s refusal 
to deal with its customers in order to control a downstream market…. [W]e 
believe the Supreme Court, in Aspen Skiing, endorsed a more general 
application of § 2 principles to refusal to deal cases. See Data General, 36 
F.3d at 1183-84 (plaintiff alleging § 2 refusal to deal claim “need not tailor 
its argument to a preexisting ‘category’ of unilateral refusals to deal.”). The 
district court’s Jury Instruction No. 29 was proper….. 
Our conclusion that the ISOs have shown that Kodak has both attained 
monopoly power and exercised exclusionary conduct does not end our 
inquiry. Kodak’s conduct may not be actionable if supported by a legitimate 
business justification. When a legitimate business justification supports a 
monopolist’s exclusionary conduct, that conduct does not violate § 2 of the 
Sherman Act. A plaintiff may rebut an asserted business justification by 
demonstrating either that the justification does not legitimately promote 
competition or that the justification is pretextual. See Kodak, 504 U.S. at 
483-84 (citing Kodak, 903 F.2d at 618). Kodak asserts that the protection of 
its patented and copyrighted parts is a valid business justification for its 
anticompetitive conduct and argues that the district court’s erroneous jury 
instructions made it impossible for the jury to properly consider this 
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justification…. 
 The ISOs’ evidence suffices to support the jury’s rejection of Kodak’s 
business justifications, as the record reflects evidence of pretext. The ISOs 
presented evidence that: (1) Kodak adopted its parts policy only after an 
ISO won a contract with the State of California; (2) Kodak allowed its own 
customers to service their machines; (3) Kodak customers could distinguish 
breakdowns due to poor service from breakdowns due to parts; and (4) 
many customers preferred ISO service.Kodak also attacks the district 
court’s business justifications instructions for their failure to properly detail 
Kodak’s intellectual property rights. Kodak argues that the court failed to 
instruct the jury that Kodak’s numerous patents and copyrights provide a 
legitimate business justification for Kodak’s alleged exclusionary conduct. 
Kodak holds 220 valid United States patents covering 65 parts for its high 
volume photocopiers and micrographics equipment, and all Kodak 
diagnostic software and service software are copyrighted. The jury 
instructions do not afford Kodak any “rights” or “privileges” based on its 
patents and copyrights: all parts are treated the same. In Jury Instruction No. 
37, the court told the jury: 
[i]f you find that Kodak engaged in monopolization or attempted 
monopolization by misuse of its alleged parts monopoly ... then the fact 
that some of the replacement parts are patented or copyrighted does not 
provide Kodak with a defense against any of those antitrust claims. 
In Jury Instruction No. 28, the court stated, over Kodak’s objection, that: 
[s]uch [exclusionary] conduct does not refer to ordinary means of 
competition, like offering better products or services, exercising 
superior skill or business judgment, utilizing more efficient technology, 
or exercising natural competitive advantages. 
Kodak proposed to include “exercising lawful patents and copyrights” 
amongst the list of non-exclusionary conduct in Instruction No. 28, but the 
district court rejected that language. 
Kodak’s challenge raises unresolved questions concerning the 
relationship between federal antitrust, copyright and patent laws. In 
particular we must determine the significance of a monopolist’s unilateral 
refusal to sell or license a patented or copyrighted product in the context of 
a § 2 monopolization claim based upon monopoly leveraging. This is a 
question of first impression. 
We first identify the general principles of antitrust, copyright and patent 
law as we must ultimately harmonize these statutory schemes in responding 
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to Kodak’s challenge. 
Antitrust law seeks to promote and protect a competitive marketplace 
for the benefit of the public. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 
1, 58 (1911); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2nd Cir. 
1981). The Sherman Act, the relevant antitrust law here, prohibits efforts 
both to restrain trade by combination or conspiracy and the acquisition or 
maintenance of a monopoly by exclusionary conduct. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2. 
Patent law seeks to protect inventions, while inducing their introduction 
into the market for public benefit. SCM Corp., 645 F.2d at 1203. Patent 
laws “reward the inventor with the power to exclude others from making, 
using or selling [a patented] invention throughout the United States.” Id.  
Meanwhile, the public benefits both from the faster introduction of 
inventions, and the resulting increase in market competition. Legally, a 
patent amounts to a permissible monopoly over the protected work. See 
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 135 (1969). 
Patent laws “are in pari materia with the antitrust laws and modify them pro 
tanto (as far as the patent laws go).” Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 
24 (1964). 
Federal copyright law “secure[s] a fair return for an author’s creative 
labor” in the short run, while ultimately seeking “to stimulate artistic 
creativity for the general public good.” Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. 
Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (internal quotations omitted). The 
Copyright Act grants to the copyright owner the exclusive right to distribute 
the protected work. 17 U.S.C. § 106. This right encompasses the right to 
“refrain from vending or licensing,” as the owner may “content [itself] with 
simply exercising the right to exclude others from using [its] property.” 
Data General, 36 F.3d at 1186 (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 
123, 127 (1932)); see Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228-29 
(1990)(“nothing in the copyright statutes would prevent an author from 
hoarding all of his works during the term of the copyright.”) 
Clearly the antitrust, copyright and patent laws both overlap and, in 
certain situations, seem to conflict. This is not a new revelation. We have 
previously noted the “obvious tension” between the patent and antitrust 
laws: “[o]ne body of law creates and protects monopoly power while the 
other seeks to proscribe it.” United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 
648 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted). Similarly, tension 
exists between the antitrust and copyright laws. See Data General, 36 F.3d 
at 1187. 
Two principles have emerged regarding the interplay between these 
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laws: (1) neither patent nor copyright holders are immune from antitrust 
liability, and (2) patent and copyright holders may refuse to sell or license 
protected work. First, as to antitrust liability, case law supports the 
proposition that a holder of a patent or copyright violates the antitrust laws 
by “concerted and contractual behavior that threatens competition.”… 
Case law also supports the right of a patent or copyright holder to refuse 
to sell or license protected work. ….  We find no reported case in which a 
court has imposed antitrust liability for a unilateral refusal to sell or license 
a patent or copyright. Courts do not generally view a monopolist’s 
unilateral refusal to license a patent as “exclusionary conduct.” See Data 
General, 36 F.3d at 1186 (citing Miller Insituform, Inc. v. Insituform of 
North America, 830 F.2d 606, 609 (6th Cir. 1987)) (“A patent holder who 
lawfully acquires a patent cannot be held liable under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act for maintaining the monopoly power he lawfully acquired by 
refusing to license the patent to others.”)….. 
This basic right of exclusion does have limits. For example, a patent 
offers no protection if it was unlawfully acquired. Data General, 36 F.3d at 
1186 (citing SCM Corp., 645 F.2d at 1208-09). Nor does the right of 
exclusion protect an attempt to extend a lawful monopoly beyond the grant 
of a patent. See Mercoid, 320 U.S. at 665. Section 2 of the Sherman Act 
condemns exclusionary conduct that extends natural monopolies into 
separate markets. Much depends, therefore, on the definition of the patent 
grant and the relevant market. 
The relevant market for determining the patent or copyright grant is 
determined under patent or copyright law. See, e.g., id. at 666 (the patent’s 
grant “is limited to the invention which it defines.”). The relevant markets 
for antitrust purposes are determined by examining economic conditions. … 
Parts and service here have been proven separate markets in the antitrust 
context, but this does not resolve the question whether the service market 
falls “reasonably within the patent [or copyright] grant” for the purpose of 
determining the extent of the exclusive rights conveyed…. 
… [W]e adopt a modified version of the rebuttable presumption created 
by the First Circuit in Data General, and hold that “while exclusionary 
conduct can include a monopolist’s unilateral refusal to license a [patent or] 
copyright,” or to sell its patented or copyrighted work, a monopolist’s 
“desire to exclude others from its [protected] work is a presumptively valid 
business justification for any immediate harm to consumers.” Data General, 
36 F.3d at 1187. 
…  Given the interplay of the antitrust and intellectual property laws 
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discussed above, Kodak’s contention that its refusal to sell its parts to ISOs 
was based on its reluctance to sell its patented or copyrighted parts was a 
presumptively legitimate business justification. See Data General, 36 F.3d. 
at 1187. Kodak may assert that its desire to profit from its intellectual 
property rights justifies its conduct, and the jury should presume that this 
justification is legitimately procompetitive. 
Nonetheless, this presumption is rebuttable….  The Data General court 
noted that the presumption of legitimacy can be rebutted by evidence that 
the monopolist acquired the protection of the intellectual property laws in 
an unlawful manner. See 36 F.3d at 1188 (citation omitted). The 
presumption may also be rebutted by evidence of pretext. Neither the aims 
of intellectual property law, nor the antitrust laws justify allowing a 
monopolist to rely upon a pretextual business justification to mask 
anticompetitive conduct…. 
Kodak photocopy and micrographics equipment requires thousands of 
parts, of which only 65 were patented. Unlike the other cases involving 
refusals to license patents, this case concerns a blanket refusal that included 
protected and unprotected products…. From this evidence, it is more 
probable than not that the jury would have found Kodak’s presumptively 
valid business justification rebutted on the grounds of pretext.  
Kodak argues that the existence of some patented and copyrighted 
products undermines ISOs “all parts” theory. To the contrary, as discussed 
above, the “all parts” market reflects the “commercial realities” of the 
marketplace and the lack of identifiable separate markets for individual 
parts. The fact that Kodak did not differentiate between patented and 
nonpatented parts lends further support to the existence of these commercial 
realities. The jury accepted the “all parts” theory and found a scheme to 
monopolize the service market through Kodak’s conduct. We hold that the 
district court’s failure to instruct on Kodak’s intellectual property rights was 
harmless. 
Last, Kodak challenges the district court’s ten-year permanent 
injunction requiring Kodak to sell all parts to all ISOs at reasonable 
prices…. 
 [T]he injunction requires Kodak to sell all parts for Kodak equipment, 
whether or not Kodak manufactures those parts, and forbids Kodak from 
interfering with sales to ISOs by original-equipment manufacturers. 
Through these two provisions, the injunction allows the ISOs to choose 
between purchasing from Kodak, which must warehouse parts, or from 
individual suppliers. Because the ISOs have an alternative source for these 
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parts, the “no interference with [original-equipment manufacturers]” 
requirement is unnecessary and anticompetitive. It promotes free-riding by 
requiring Kodak to pay for keeping a massive inventory of parts for the 
ISOs….. 
Next, Kodak contends that the injunction imposes utility-like regulation 
of prices and deprives Kodak of its right to earn monopoly profits on its 
patented and copyrighted products. This requirement involves the court in a 
matter generally considered beyond our function, namely, direct price 
administration.  
….  Dropping the reasonableness element and requiring 
nondiscriminatory pricing will both end Kodak’s service monopoly and 
protect Kodak’s intellectual property rights. Kodak should be permitted to 
charge all of its customers, including end users (both self-servicers and 
those under service contracts with Kodak), service companies contracting 
with Kodak and ISOs, any nondiscriminatory price that the market will 
bear. We direct the district court to modify the injunction by deleting the 
requirement that prices “in any event, be reasonable.”…. 
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for further 
proceedings. 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1.  The Ninth Circuit’s Kodak opinion was on remand from the Supreme 
Court’s important and controversial decision five years earlier in Eastman 
Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Svces., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).  The Supreme 
Court held that although Kodak controlled only some 23% of the market for 
high speed photocopiers there could nevertheless be a relevant market for 
“Kodak” parts and service.  The Court reasoned that once Kodak’s 
customers had purchased their unit they were “locked in” and faced high 
“switching costs,” thus permitting them to be charged a monopoly price.  
As a result a relevant market limited to a single brand could be appropriate.  
Since a firm controls 100% of its own brand this could entail monopoly.  
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §3.3a (4
th
 Cir. 2011).  As the discussion 
there notes, while Kodak has never been overruled its recognition of single-
brand markets by nondominant firms has proven to be very controversial 
and courts often bend over backwards to avoid it. 
 
2.  Subsequent to the Ninth Circuit’s Kodak decision, the Federal Circuit 
also confronted the issue of a patent owner’s refusal to license its patent 
rights to others. In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust 
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Litigation, 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Xerox”). The Federal Circuit 
rejected the claim brought by an independent service organization ("ISO") 
that Xerox's refusal to sell patented replacement parts and copyrighted 
service manuals for its copiers violated the antitrust laws: 
 
[The plaintiff] relies on the Ninth Circuit’s holding … in Image 
Technical Services [``Kodak”] that ```while exclusionary conduct 
can include a monopolist’s unilateral refusal to license a [patent] or 
to sell its patented ... work, a monopolist’s `desire to exclude others 
from its [protected] work is a presumptively valid business 
justification for any immediate harm to consumers. 125 F.3d at 1218 
(citing Data General Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 
1147, 1187 (1st Cir.1994)). By that case, the Ninth Circuit adopted a 
rebuttable presumption that the exercise of the statutory right to 
exclude provides a valid business justification for consumer harm, 
but then excused as harmless the district court’s error in failing to 
give any instruction on the effect of intellectual property rights on 
the application of the antitrust laws. It concluded that the jury must 
have rejected the presumptively valid business justification as 
pretextual. This logic requires an evaluation of the patentee’s 
subjective motivation for refusing to sell or license its patented 
products for pretext. We decline to follow Image Technical Services. 
   
We have held that if a [patent infringement] suit is not 
objectively baseless, an antitrust defendant’s subjective motivation 
is immaterial.   Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1072. We see no more 
reason to inquire into the subjective motivation of Xerox in refusing 
to sell or license its patented works than we found in evaluating the 
subjective motivation of a patentee in bringing suit   To enforce that 
same right. In the absence of any indication of illegal tying, fraud in 
the Patent and Trademark Office, or sham litigation, the patent 
holder may enforce the statutory right to exclude others from 
making, using, or selling the claimed invention free from liability 
under the antitrust laws. We therefore will not inquire into his 
subjective motivation for exerting his statutory rights, even though 
his refusal to sell or license his patented invention may have an 
anticompetitive effect, so long as that anticompetitive effect is not 
illegally extended beyond the statutory patent grant. It is the 
infringement defendant and not the patentee that bears the burden to 
show that one of these exceptional situations exists and, in the 
absence of such proof, we will not inquire into the patentee’s 
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motivations for asserting his statutory right to exclude….  
  
The court further held that a patent owner’s subjective motivation for 
refusing to license its patents is irrelevant, except in three narrow instances: 
(1) where the patent owner procures the patent by fraud on the Patent and 
Trademark Office, (2) where the patent owner engages in "sham" patent 
litigation (that is, sues to enforce a patent knowing that the patent is invalid, 
or (3) where the patent owner engages in unlawful "tying.” Id. at 1326-27. 
Rather, the court must determine whether the patent holder was acting 
"within the scope of the statutory patent grant" regardless of whether those 
actions fall in multiplex antitrust markets. 
 
3. Suppose Alpha patents a device or technology that works exclusively 
with Beta's patented technology.  That may place the firms in a bilateral 
monopoly relationship.  But should that give Beta an antitrust duty to deal 
with Alpha?  In Eatoni Ergonomics, Inc. v. Research in Motion Corp., 2012 
WL 2348443 (2d Cir. June 21, 2012), the Second Circuit held that Research 
in Motion (RIM), the maker of the Blackberry smartphone, did not act 
unlawfully when it refused to incorporate the plaintiff's patented "reduced 
QWERTY" keyboard technology into its devices.  The parties had initially 
agreed to engage in joint development that might result in incorporation of 
Eatoni's technology, but RIM abandoned the efforts after making "a 
legitimate business judgment that the parties' proposed reduce QWERTY 
model was not viable."  The court observed: 
 
To the extent Eatoni argues that RIM's mobile phones offer the only 
platform compatible with its patented reduced QWERTY keyboard 
technology, we agree with the district court that § 2 does not obligate 
RIM to share its patented platform technology, from which RIM derives 
the lawful power to exclude others' use. Further, Eatoni's contention is 
belied by the amended complaint, which states that Eatoni has 
successfully applied its patent to a mobile phone platform other than 
RIM's. 
 
MICROSOFT CORP. V COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES 
(Case T-201/04 European Court of First Instance , Sep. 2007) 
 
[Microsoft was charged with abuse of a dominant position under 
European Competition law (Article 82, now Article 102 of the Treaty on the 
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Functioning of the European Union).  It allegedly failed to provide the 
operators of email or internet servers who used non-Microsoft operating 
systems satisfactory interconnection protocols, or instructions so that they 
could be fully compatible with networks that ran the Microsoft Windows 
operating system.  Microsoft had also developed a proprietary Microsoft 
server operating system in competition with these rivals. – ed.] 
Summary of the Judgment 
Article 82 EC deals with the conduct of one or more economic operators 
involving the abuse of a position of economic strength which enables the 
operator concerned to hinder the maintenance of effective competition on 
the relevant market by allowing it to behave to an appreciable extent 
independently of its competitors, its customers and, ultimately, consumers. 
Furthermore, whilst the finding of a dominant position does not in itself 
imply any criticism of the undertaking concerned, that undertaking has a 
special responsibility, irrespective of the causes of that position, not to 
allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on the common 
market.... 
4 In proceedings brought on the basis of Article 82 EC, the 
Commission may define the concept of ‘interoperability’ as the capacity for 
two software products to exchange information and to use that information 
mutually in order to allow each of those software products to function in all 
the ways envisaged, without being bound by the definition given by 
Directive 91/250 on the legal protection of computer programs, from which 
it does not depart. 
In that context, the Commission may determine the ‘degree of 
interoperability’ of software products by reference to what, in its view, is 
necessary, in the light of Article 82 EC, in order to enable developers of 
work group server operating systems competing with the dominant 
developer to remain viably on the market. Should it be established that the 
existing degree of interoperability does not enable those developers to 
remain viably on the market, it follows that the maintenance of effective 
competition on that market is being hindered. 
In requiring, by way of remedy, that an undertaking in a dominant 
position disclose the interoperability information, the Commission refers to 
a detailed technical description of certain rules of interconnection and 
interaction that can be used within the work group networks to deliver work 
group services. That description does not extend to the way in which the 
undertaking implements those rules, in particular, to the internal structure or 
to the source code of its products. 
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The degree of interoperability thus required by the Commission enables 
competing operating systems to interoperate with the dominant 
undertaking’s domain architecture on an equal footing in order to be able to 
compete viably with the latter’s operating systems. It does not entail making 
competitors’ products work in exactly the same way as its own and does not 
enable its competitors to clone or reproduce its products or certain features 
of those products. 
5      In a decision penalising the refusal by a dominant undertaking to 
provide competing undertakings with interoperability information of 
software products, the Commission may refrain from making a finding on 
the issue whether the dominant undertaking’s communication protocols or 
the specifications of those protocols are covered by intellectual property 
rights and assume that the undertaking is able to rely on such rights. Thus 
the Commission may proceed on the premise that the refusal to supply 
interoperability information might not be a mere refusal to supply a product 
or a service indispensable to the exercise of a specific activity but a refusal 
to license intellectual property rights. The Commission thus chooses the 
strictest legal test and therefore the one most favourable to the accused 
dominant undertaking. In such a situation, it is therefore necessary to 
ascertain whether the criteria which determine when an undertaking in a 
dominant position can be required to grant a licence relating to intellectual 
property rights are satisfied. 
6      Although undertakings are, as a rule, free to choose their business 
partners, in certain circumstances a refusal to supply on the part of a 
dominant undertaking may constitute an abuse of a dominant position 
within the meaning of Article 82 EC unless it is objectively justified. 
The refusal by an undertaking holding a dominant position to license a 
third party to use a product covered by an intellectual property right cannot 
in itself constitute an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of 
Article 82 EC. 
It is only in exceptional circumstances that the exercise of the exclusive 
right by the owner of the intellectual property right may give rise to such an 
abuse and that, accordingly, it is permissible, in the public interest in 
maintaining effective competition on the market, to encroach upon the 
exclusive right of the holder of the intellectual property right by requiring 
him to grant licences to third parties seeking to enter or remain on that 
market. 
The following circumstances, in particular, must be considered to be 
exceptional: in the first place, the refusal relates to a product or service 
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indispensable to the exercise of a particular activity on a neighbouring 
market; in the second place, the refusal is of such a kind as to exclude any 
effective competition on that neighbouring market; in the third place, the 
refusal prevents the appearance of a new product for which there is potential 
consumer demand. 
Once it is established that such circumstances are present, the refusal by 
the holder of a dominant position to grant a licence may infringe Article 82 
EC unless the refusal is objectively justified. 
Finally, in order that a refusal to give access to a product or service 
indispensable to the exercise of a particular activity may be considered 
abusive, it is necessary to distinguish two markets, namely, a market 
constituted by that product or service and on which the undertaking refusing 
to supply holds a dominant position and a neighbouring market on which 
the product or service is used in the manufacture of another product or for 
the supply of another service. The fact that the indispensable product or 
service is not marketed separately does not exclude from the outset the 
possibility of identifying a separate market. It is sufficient that a potential 
market or even a hypothetical market can be identified. Such is the case 
where the products or services are indispensable to the conduct of a 
particular business activity and where there is an actual demand for them on 
the part of undertakings which seek to carry on that business. It is decisive 
that two different stages of production are identified and that they are 
interconnected in that the upstream product is indispensable for supply of 
the downstream product. 
7      For the purposes of application of Article 82 EC to the refusal of a 
dominant undertaking to grant a licence in the market for work group server 
operating systems, the ‘interoperability information’ must be regarded as 
being ‘indispensable’, inter alia because the interoperability is of significant 
competitive importance in that market, even if their lack of availability 
leads to competition being eliminated only gradually and not immediately. 
8     As stated in the Commission Notice on the definition of the relevant 
market for the purposes of Community competition law, ‘[a] relevant 
product market comprises all those products and/or services which are 
regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of 
the products’ characteristics, their prices and their intended use’. Supply-
side substitutability may also be taken into account when defining markets 
in those situations in which its effects are equivalent to those of demand 
substitution in terms of effectiveness and immediacy. That means that 
suppliers are able to switch production to the relevant products and market 
them in the short term without incurring significant additional costs or risks 
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in response to small and permanent changes in relative prices. 
With respect to operating systems, the Commission may correctly find 
that there is a market for work group server operating systems which is 
separate from the market for client PC operating systems..... 
12     Although the burden of proof of the existence of the circumstances 
that constitute an infringement of Article 82 EC is borne by the 
Commission, it is for the dominant undertaking concerned, and not for the 
Commission, before the end of the administrative procedure, to raise any 
plea of objective justification and to support it with arguments and 
evidence. It then falls to the Commission, where it proposes to make a 
finding of an abuse of a dominant position, to show that the arguments and 
evidence relied on by the undertaking cannot prevail and, accordingly, that 
the justification put forward cannot be accepted. 
The mere fact that a product is covered by intellectual property rights 
cannot constitute objective justification to refuse to grant a licence. If the 
mere fact of holding intellectual property rights could in itself constitute 
objective justification for such a refusal, the exception established by the 
case-law could never apply..... 
15      In order to determine whether the conduct of the dominant 
undertaking constitutes abusive tying, the Commission is entitled to base its 
finding on the following factors: first, the tying and tied products are two 
separate products; second, the undertaking concerned is dominant in the 
market for the tying product; third, the undertaking concerned does not give 
customers a choice to obtain the tying product without the tied product; and 
fourth, the practice in question forecloses competition. The Commission 
also takes into account the fact that the tying is not objectively justified. 
 
1. The contested decision.... 
 
I –  Relevant product markets and geographic market 
 
24      The first market defined in the contested decision is the market 
for client PC operating systems. Operating systems are defined as ‘system 
software’ which controls the basic functions of the computer and enables 
the user to make use of the computer and run application software on it 
(recital 37 to the contested decision). Client PCs are defined as general-
purpose computers designed for use by one person at a time and capable of 
being connected to a network (recital 45 to the contested decision). 
25      As regards the second market, the contested decision defines 
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work group server operating systems as operating systems designed and 
marketed to deliver collectively ‘basic infrastructure services’ to relatively 
small numbers of client PCs connected to small or medium-sized networks 
(recitals 53 and 345 to the contested decision).... 
30      In the contested decision, the Commission finds that Microsoft 
has had a dominant position on the client PC operating systems market 
since at least 1996 and also on the work group server operating systems 
market since 2002 (recitals 429 to 541 to the contested decision). 
31    As regards the client PC operating systems market, the 
Commission relies essentially on the following factors to arrive at that 
conclusion: 
 Microsoft’s market shares are over 90% (recitals 430 to 435 to the 
contested decision); 
 Microsoft’s market power has ‘enjoyed an enduring stability and 
continuity’ (recital 436 to the contested decision); 
 there are significant barriers to market entry, owing to indirect 
network effects (recitals 448 to 464 to the contested decision); 
 those network effects derive, first, from the fact that users like 
platforms on which they can use a large number of applications and, 
second, from the fact that software designers write applications for 
the client PC operating systems that are the most popular among 
users (recitals 449 and 450 to the contested decision).... 
33      As regards the work group server operating systems market, the 
Commission relies, in substance, on the following factors: 
 Microsoft’s market share is, at a conservative estimate, at least 60% 
(recitals 473 to 499 to the contested decision); 
 the position of Microsoft’s three main competitors on that market is 
as follows: Novell, with its NetWare software, has 10 to 25%; 
vendors of Linux products have a market share of 5 to 15%; and 
vendors of UNIX products have a market share of 5 to 15% (recitals 
503, 507 and 512 to the contested decision); 
 the work group server operating systems market is characterised by 
the existence of significant entry barriers, owing in particular to 
network effects and to Microsoft’s refusal to disclose 
interoperability information (recitals 515 to 525 to the contested 
decision); 
 there are close commercial and technological links between the 
latter market and the client PC operating systems market (recitals 
526 to 540 to the contested decision). 
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34      Linux is an ‘open source’ operating system released under the 
‘GNU GPL (General Public Licence)’. Strictly speaking, it is only a code 
base, called the ‘kernel’, which performs a limited number of services 
specific to an operating system. It may, however, be linked to other layers 
of software to form a ‘Linux operating system’ (recital 87 to the contested 
decision). Linux is used in particular as the basis for work group server 
operating systems (recital 101 to the contested decision) and is thus present 
on the work group server operating systems market in conjunction with 
Samba software, which is also released under the ‘GNU GPL’ licence 
(recitals 506 and 598 to the contested decision). 
35    ‘UNIX’ designates a number of operating systems that share 
certain common features (recital 42 to the contested decision). Sun has 
developed a UNIX-based work group server operating system called 
‘Solaris’ (recital 97 to the contested decision). 
 
III –  Abuse of a dominant position 
 
A –  Refusal to supply and authorise the use of interoperability 
information 
 
36      The first abusive conduct in which Microsoft is found to have 
engaged consists in its refusal to supply its competitors with 
‘interoperability information’ and to authorise the use of that information 
for the purpose of developing and distributing products competing with 
Microsoft’s own products on the work group server operating systems 
market, between October 1998 and the date of notification of the contested 
decision (Article 2(a) of the contested decision). That conduct is described 
at recitals 546 to 791 to the contested decision.... 
39      A ‘protocol’ is defined as ‘a set of rules of interconnection and 
interaction between various instances of Windows work group server 
operating systems and Windows client PC operating systems running on 
different computers in a Windows work group network’ (Article 1(2) of the 
contested decision). 
40      In the contested decision, the Commission emphasises that the 
refusal in question does not relate to Microsoft’s ‘source code’, but only to 
specifications of the protocols concerned, that is to say, to a detailed 
description of what the software in question must achieve, in contrast to the 
implementations, consisting in the implementation of the code on the 
computer…. 
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569    First, the file shows that initially Microsoft supplied only client 
PC operating systems and that it was a relatively late entrant to the server 
operating systems market. It was only in the early 1990s that Microsoft 
began to develop a server operating system – it marketed its first system, 
‘Windows NT 3.5 Server’, in July 1992 – and it was only with ‘Windows 
NT 4.0’, released in July 1996, that it first encountered real commercial 
success (see, in particular, paragraph 50 of the response of 17 November 
2000 to the first statement of objections and paragraphs 50 and 56 of the 
application). 
570    It is apparent from the IDC data, as reproduced at recital 591 to 
the contested decision, that Microsoft’s market share, by units shipped, on 
the market for operating systems for servers costing under USD 25 000 
grew from 25.4% (24.5% by turnover) in 1996 to 64.9% (61% by turnover) 
in 2002, a leap of almost 40% in just six years.... 
575    Second, it is apparent from the file that, alongside the evolution of 
Microsoft’s position as described above, Novell experienced a continuous 
decline on the work group server operating systems market and in just a few 
years became a secondary player. At the time when Microsoft entered the 
server operating systems market, the leading product for the supply of work 
group services was Novell’s NetWare (see paragraph 56 of the application), 
which had been present on that market since the mid-1980s.... 
619    The Commission had even more reason to conclude that there was 
a risk that competition would be eliminated on that market because the 
market has certain features which are likely to discourage organisations 
which have already taken up Windows for their work group servers from 
migrating to competing operating systems in the future. Thus, as the 
Commission correctly states at recital 523 to the contested decision, it 
follows from certain results of the third Mercer survey that the fact of 
having an ‘established record as proven technology’ is seen as a significant 
factor by the large majority of IT executives questioned. At the time of the 
adoption of the contested decision, Microsoft, at a conservative estimate, 
held a market share of at least 60% on the work group server operating 
systems market (recital 499 to the contested decision). Likewise, certain 
results of that survey also establish that the factor ‘available skill-sets and 
cost/availability of support (in-house or external)’ is important for the 
majority of the IT executives questioned. As the Commission quite 
correctly states at recital 520 to the contested decision, ‘[that] means that 
the easier it is to find technicians skilled in using a given work group server 
operating system, the more customers are inclined to purchase that work 
group server operating system’ and, ‘[i]n turn, however, the more popular a 
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY                         Chapter 8, Page 34 
Hovenkamp                                                               Oct. 2013 
 
work group server operating system is among customers, the easier it is for 
technicians (and the more willing are technicians) to acquire skills related to 
that product’. Microsoft’s very high market share on the work group server 
operating system market has the consequence that a very large number of 
technicians possess skills which are specific to Windows operating systems. 
620    The Court therefore concludes that the circumstance that the 
refusal at issue entailed the risk of elimination of competition is present in 
this case.... 
1231 By way of remedy for the abusive refusal to supply the 
interoperability information, Article 5 of the contested decision orders 
Microsoft to disclose, within 120 days of notification of that decision, that 
information to any undertaking having an interest in developing and 
distributing work group server operating systems and to allow, on 
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, those undertakings to use the 
information in question to develop and distribute work group server 
operating systems. Microsoft is also required to ensure that the 
interoperability information disclosed is kept updated on an ongoing basis 
and in a timely manner. Last, Article 5 of the contested decision orders 
Microsoft, within 120 days of the date of notification of that decision, to set 
up an evaluation mechanism that will give interested undertakings a 
workable possibility of informing themselves about the scope and terms of 
use of the interoperability information.... 
1233 Article 7 of the contested decision, moreover, provides for the 
establishment of a suitable mechanism to assist the Commission in 
monitoring Microsoft’s compliance with the contested decision and 
including, in particular, the appointment of an independent monitoring 
trustee. Article 7 provides that that mechanism is to form the subject-matter 
of a proposal by Microsoft within 30 days of notification of the decision, 
while in the event that the Commission considers that the proposed 
mechanism is not suitable, it is to ‘retain the right to impose such a 
mechanism by way of a decision’. 
 
NOVELL V. MICROSOFT 
2013 WL 5303259, __ F.3d __ 
(10th Cir. Oct. 2, 2013) 
 
Gorsuch, Circuit Judge 
 
A straggler of a case, this one drags us back twenty years. To a time 
before the dot-com boom busted and boomed again, a time when Microsoft 
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was busy amassing a virtual empire—if sometimes in violation of the 
antitrust laws. Long since found liable for a rich diversity of antitrust 
misdeeds in the 1990s, this case calls on us to decide whether Microsoft 
back then committed still another, as-yet undetected antitrust violation—
this time at Novell's expense. 
 
Novell's suit against Microsoft finally found its way to trial in 2011 but 
the jury couldn't manage a verdict. Reviewing the record for itself after trial, 
the district court decided it could fairly admit of only one conclusion: 
Microsoft's conduct did not offend section 2 of the Sherman Act. So the 
district court entered judgment as a matter of law, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 50, a 
decision Novell now asks us to overturn but one we find we cannot. Novell 
complains that Microsoft refused to share its intellectual property with 
rivals after first promising to do so. But the antitrust laws rarely impose on 
firms—even dominant firms—a duty to deal with their rivals. With respect 
to Novell at least, Microsoft did nothing unlawful. 
 
* * * 
 
. . . . 
By the mid–1990s Microsoft had become the leading provider of Intel-
compatible personal computer operating systems. An operating system 
amounts to the computer's core software—software that allows the everyday 
user to take advantage of a computer's functions. . . .  
 
. . . On one hand, Microsoft had some incentive to cooperate with ISVs. 
After all, ISVs wrote applications for Microsoft's operating system; 
increasing the number of applications that could run on Microsoft's 
operating system meant increasing the utility of the operating system for 
users; and that meant more sales for Microsoft. On the other hand, 
Microsoft didn't just supply the operating system—it also competed with 
ISVs in the development and sale of applications for use on its Windows 
operating system. So, for example, by the mid–1990s, “office suites” 
containing applications for word processing, spreadsheets, and other 
everyday office tasks were all the rage and Microsoft began to offer its 
Microsoft Office suite (including Microsoft Word and Microsoft Excel) in 
competition with ISVs. Among the ISVs with whom Microsoft competed 
during this era was Novell. In the mid–1990s (and well before then), Novell 
produced WordPerfect—Microsoft Word's leading rival in word processing 
applications—and the company harbored ambitions to create an office suite 
of its own to rival Microsoft Office, one it called PerfectOffice. 
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. . . . 
 
As it was planning to roll out its Windows 95 operating system, the 
successor to Windows 3.0, Microsoft faced the questions whether and to 
what degree it should share its intellectual property with ISVs. Should it 
share a pre-release development version of the new operating system, and 
perhaps provide access to its internal workings, all to help ISVs develop 
applications ready for use by the public when the final version of Windows 
95 went on sale? The firm was torn. Doing so would help the marketing of 
Windows 95, allowing the company to boast a robust range of applications 
users could employ on the new operating system straight away. At the same 
time, helping ISVs develop and sell applications threatened to hurt 
Microsoft's own applications business, perhaps most especially its new 
office suite product, Microsoft Office. 
 
At first, Microsoft opted to share. Anticipating the release of Windows 
95 to the public sometime in 1995, in June 1994 it shared a beta, or test, 
version of the operating system with ISVs. At the same time, Microsoft also 
gave ISVs access to Windows 95's application programming interfaces 
(APIs). APIs allow programs to invoke the operating system's built-in 
abilities to perform certain functions; each API consists of a set of named 
procedures that automate particular tasks an application might need to 
perform. By publishing the names of the procedures in an API and 
providing information about how to invoke each one, Microsoft essentially 
permitted ISVs a shortcut—they could rely on Microsoft's APIs when 
writing their own code rather than having to design custom code to perform 
the same functions. 
. . . . 
Among the APIs Microsoft chose to share information about were 
namespace extensions (NSEs). NSEs are a subset of APIs that permit a user 
to see (and then open) documents affiliated not just with the current 
application but located in wildly different places on the computer or 
elsewhere. Familiar namespaces include the “Recycle Bin”—where a user 
might dispose of an unwanted document—and the “Desktop”—the 
computer's default screen that displays when the user starts up his computer. 
If a user wants to open a document on the Desktop, she might click the 
Desktop namespace icon on the left side of the file open dialog in the 
application she is currently running, and watch the contents of the Desktop 
appear on the right side of the window. With a double click, she might then 
open the document. NSEs thus provide something of a shortcut to places 
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outside the current application. 
 
Novell thought access to these NSEs particularly key. Not only would 
access to Microsoft's NSEs allow Novell to ensure users of its programs 
could access, say, the Desktop and Recycle Bin without having to leave 
WordPerfect. Access to Microsoft's NSEs would also allow Novell to create 
custom namespaces of its own. So, for example, Novell had in mind the 
possibility that someone in its WordPerfect program with the file open 
dialog screen open could access, say, items in Novell's email application or 
its ClipArt library, all for use in a WordPerfect document. Novell's hope 
was to use NSEs to help make its product so useful that users might be able 
to “live in” WordPerfect (or PerfectOffice) because they could open, 
modify, and search for their files across the computer all while remaining 
within the WordPerfect environment. 
 
[A]fter first choosing to share so much of its intellectual property with 
ISVs in the beta version distributed in June 1994, Microsoft reversed course 
in October, indicating to ISVs that they could no longer rely on the 
previously published APIs and that Microsoft would not guarantee the 
operability of the previously published APIs in the final version of 
Windows 95. The evidence suggests Microsoft did so because it concluded 
that—on balance—this move would prove profit maximizing for the firm. 
Withdrawing access to information about how to invoke APIs generally and 
NSEs in particular would make it harder for ISVs to produce applications 
for Windows 95 and in this way would marginally reduce the attractiveness 
of Microsoft's new operating system. But withdrawing access would also 
make Microsoft's own applications, including Microsoft Office, more 
immediately attractive to users. While ISVs could eventually develop work-
arounds to give users the same effective experience, without advance access 
to information about how to invoke Microsoft's APIs and NSEs, it would 
take them time to do so. All the while, Microsoft's applications would have 
a competitive advantage, being the first applications usable on Windows 95. 
In an October 3, 1994 email, Bill Gates, Microsoft's CEO, explained as 
much: “I have decided that we should not publish these [NSEs]. We should 
wait until we have a way to do a high level of integration [which] will be 
harder for the likes of Notes, WordPerfect to achieve, and which will give 
[Microsoft] Office a real advantage.” 
 
When Microsoft withdrew access to its NSEs, Novell contends its 
business suffered. . . . While Novell was able to achieve the same 
functionality for consumers, it took until May 1996, nine months after 
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Windows 95's public release, for it to roll out its own applications for 
Windows 95. That nine month delay, Novell argues, made all the 
difference. Where once it had a leading word processing program and hopes 
of a leading office suite, it contends the nine month delay gave Microsoft 
Office a huge leg up, one that it alleges was designed to be and proved to be 
a permanent advantage. 
 
* * * 
 
. . . It was after that trial in Utah Judge Motz entered judgment as a 
matter of law for Microsoft—and it is that result Novell now asks us to 
undo.  
 
* * * 
 
At this point, one might wonder: How did Microsoft's withdrawal of the 
NSEs help it maintain a monopoly in the operating systems market? 
Wouldn't the withdrawal of NSEs have prevented ISVs from writing 
applications for Windows 95, at least to some degree? And wouldn't this 
have hurt rather than helped Microsoft's sales of operating systems? 
Withdrawing NSEs may have helped Microsoft's competitive position 
against ISVs in selling applications, but any claim Novell might have 
involving an applications market was lost long ago. Novell has to show that 
withdrawing NSEs helped Microsoft maintain its dominant position in 
operating systems. How could it have done that? 
 
Novell offers two theories. 
 
First, Novell argues that—but for Microsoft's withdrawal of the NSEs—
it would have released PerfectOffice earlier and acquired a greater 
following for its products. This larger group of consumers—now freed from 
dependence on Microsoft office suite applications—would have proven 
more susceptible to the lure of other operating systems (like Linux) also 
capable of running Novell's applications. Put simply, Novell alleges that by 
delaying the release of WordPerfect, Microsoft was able to lock more 
people into using Microsoft Office, and because Microsoft Office could 
only run on a Windows operating system those consumers were then locked 
into using a Windows operating system too. 
 
Second, Novell explains that PerfectOffice was equipped with 
middleware—PerfectFit and AppWare—that permitted ISVs to write 
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applications directly for PerfectOffice rather than for the operating system. 
If PerfectOffice could perform more of the tasks traditionally performed by 
operating systems, more users would be more inclined to “live in” 
PerfectOffice rather than Windows. And because PerfectOffice was 
designed to work on other operating systems, these users too might be more 
easily enticed away from Windows. 
 
Could a rational trier of fact find Novell was a victim of unlawful 
monopolization under these theories? To prevail on a section 2 claim, a 
plaintiff generally must show the defendant possessed sufficient market 
power to raise prices substantially above a competitive level without losing 
so much business that the gambit becomes unprofitable. See United States v. 
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966). Then the plaintiff must show that 
the defendant achieved or maintained that market power through the use of 
anticompetitive conduct. See Verizon Commc'ns v. Law Offices of Curtis V. 
Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). Finally, a private plaintiff must show that its 
injuries were caused by the defendant's anticompetitive conduct. See 
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl–O–Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977); 3 
Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 501, at 85 (3d 
ed.2008). How do Novell's theories stack up against these standards? 
 
* * * 
 
. . . 
 
Though often the focus of section 2 disputes, questions of market 
definition and power aren't in play here. Microsoft doesn't dispute that in 
the 1990s a nationwide product market existed for Intel-compatible personal 
computer operating systems, as Novell alleges. Neither does Microsoft 
dispute it possessed market power in that market. . . .  
 
* * * 
 
With issues of market definition and power by the board, our focus turns 
to the next question in the sequence required to establish liability: Did 
Microsoft engage in anticompetitive conduct in violation of section 2 when 
it withdrew access to its NSEs from Novell and other ISVs? Or was this 
legally permissible competition? 
 
In earlier days, some courts suggested that a monopolist must lend 
smaller rivals a helping hand. If a monopolist so much as expanded its 
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facilities to meet anticipated demand, or failed to keep its prices high 
enough to permit less efficient rivals to stay afloat, it could find itself held 
liable under section 2. See, e.g., Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 430; Telex Corp. v. Int'l 
Bus. Machs. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 925 (10th Cir.1975) (rejecting district 
court's view that monopoly maintenance “need not be evidenced by 
predatory practices”). The Supreme Court and this one, however, have long 
and emphatically rejected this approach, realizing that the proper focus of 
section 2 isn't on protecting competitors but on protecting the process of 
competition, with the interests of consumers, not competitors, in mind. 
Forcing monopolists to “hold[ ] an umbrella over inefficient competitors” 
might make rivals happy but it usually leaves consumers paying more for 
less. Olympia, 797 F.2d at 375; see also Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411; 3 Areeda 
& Hovenkamp, supra, ¶ 651, at 107. 
 
So what exactly qualifies as anticompetitive conduct under section 2, 
properly understood? It's been said that anticompetitive conduct comes in 
too many forms and shapes to permit a comprehensive taxonomy. See 
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767–68 
(1984). But the question we often find ourselves asking is whether, based 
on the evidence and experience derived from past cases, the conduct at issue 
before us has little or no value beyond the capacity to protect the 
monopolist's market power—bearing in mind the risk of false positives (and 
negatives) any determination on the question of liability might invite, and 
the limits on the administrative capacities of courts to police market terms 
and transactions. See 3 Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra, § 651 a, at 96–97. 
With time and a gathering body of experience, courts have been able to 
adapt this general inquiry to particular circumstances, developing 
considerably more specific rules for common forms of alleged 
misconduct—like tying, Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 461–62; exclusive 
dealing, Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 69; or efforts to defraud or lie to regulators 
or consumers, Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 783–88 
(6th Cir.2002); Caribbean, 148 F.3d at 1087. 
 
As these common categories and the rules associated with them suggest, 
section 2 misconduct usually involves some assay by the monopolist into 
the marketplace—to limit the abilities of third parties to deal with rivals 
(exclusive dealing), to require third parties to purchase a bundle of goods 
rather than just the ones they really want (tying), or to defraud regulators or 
consumers. By contrast, and “as a general rule ... purely unilateral conduct” 
does not run afoul of section 2—“businesses are free to choose” whether or 
not to do business with others and free to assign what prices they hope to 
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secure for their own products. See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, 
555 U.S. 438, 448 (2009). Put simply if perhaps a little too simply, today a 
monopolist is much more likely to be held liable for failing to leave its 
rivals alone than for failing to come to their aid. See id.; 3 Areeda & 
Hovenkamp, supra, ¶ 658, at 183. 
 
Many antitrust values lie behind the boundary line the law sketches 
here. If the law were to make a habit of forcing monopolists to help 
competitors by keeping prices high, sharing their property, or declining to 
expand their own operations, courts would paradoxically risk encouraging 
collusion between rivals and dampened price competition—themselves 
paradigmatic antitrust wrongs, injuries to consumers and the competitive 
process alike. Forcing firms to help one another would also risk reducing 
the incentive both sides have to innovate, invest, and expand—again results 
inconsistent with the goals of antitrust.... 
 
Administrability considerations are also at play here. If forced sharing 
were the order of the day, courts would have to pick and choose the 
applicable terms and conditions. That would not only risk judicial 
complicity in collusion and dampened price competition. It would also 
require us to become “central planners,” a role for which we judges lack 
many comparative advantages and a role in which we haven't always 
excelled in the past. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407–08; 3B Areeda & 
Hovankamp, supra, ¶ 772, at 220. 
 
The bottom line, then, is that antitrust evinces a belief that independent, 
profit-maximizing firms and competition between them are generally good 
things for consumers. Just as courts have held particular forms of antitrust 
conduct per se illegal because experience teaches that they are almost 
always destructive of competition, so too courts have fashioned rules of 
presumptive legality for certain forms of conduct that experience teaches 
almost never harm consumers. Experience teaches that independent firms 
competing against one another is almost always good for the consumer and 
thus warrants a strong presumption of legality. Acknowledging as much in 
the form of a general rule gives a degree of predictability to judicial 
outcomes and permits reliance by all market participants, themselves goods 
for both the competitive process and the goal of equal treatment under the 
law. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407–8. 
 
Of course, most every rule proves over- or under-inclusive in some way. 
We often accept a degree of over- and under-inclusion as the price that must 
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be paid for the benefits associated with a clear rule of law. But rarely is the 
law so unsubtle that it fails to acknowledge and candidly account for at least 
a rule's most glaring exceptions. And certainly section 2 doctrine isn't so 
unsubtle. Though “rare,” liability can sometimes be assigned even when the 
monopolist engages in “purely unilateral” conduct. Pac. Bell Tel. Co., 555 
U.S. at 448. Predatory pricing presents a notable and easy example. Brooke 
Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222–23 
(1993). Refusals to deal supplies is another if somewhat more controversial 
example. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 
600–01 (1985); see also 3B Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra, ¶ 772. Essential 
facilities doctrine offers perhaps an even more controversial example still. 
Compare Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377–79 
(1973) (forebearer of essential facilities doctrine), with Trinko, 540 U.S. at 
411 (“We have never recognized such a doctrine.”). 
 
Our case revolves around the second of these exceptions to the general 
rule protecting unilateral conduct. Novell seeks to impose section 2 liability 
on Microsoft for refusing to deal with its rivals. Initially, Microsoft chose to 
share its internal NSE protocols with ISVs in an effort to spur them into 
writing software for Windows 95. Then Microsoft reversed course, 
choosing to keep its NSEs to itself. Normally, this sort of unilateral 
behavior—choosing whom to deal with and on what terms—is protected by 
the antitrust laws. Even a monopolist generally has no duty to share (or 
continue to share) its intellectual or physical property with a rival. Novell 
insists, however, that Microsoft had an affirmative duty to continue sharing 
its intellectual property and that the firm's decision to withdraw that 
assistance violated section 2. Predatory pricing appears nowhere in the case 
and Novell disclaims any reliance on essential facilities doctrine. So if a 
path to recovery lies anywhere for Novell, it lies through the narrow-eyed 
needle of refusal to deal doctrine. 
 
* * * 
 
Refusal to deal doctrine's high water mark came in Aspen. There, this 
court and the Supreme Court upheld a jury verdict finding liability when a 
monopolist (Aspen Skiing Company) first voluntarily agreed to a sales and 
marketing joint venture with a rival (Aspen Highlands) and then later 
discontinued the venture even when the evidence suggested the arrangement 
remained a profitable one. This result, however, falls “at or near the outer 
boundary of § 2 liability.” Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409. Since Aspen, the 
Supreme Court has refused to extend liability to various other refusal to 
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deal scenarios, emphasizing that Aspen represents a “limited exception” to 
the general rule of firm independence. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409. To invoke 
Aspen's limited exception, the Supreme Court and we have explained, at 
least two features present in Aspen must be present in the case at hand. 
 
First, as in Aspen, there must be a preexisting voluntary and presumably 
profitable course of dealing between the monopolist and rival.   Trinko, 540 
U.S. at 409; Four Corners, 582 F.3d at 1224–25; Christy Sports, 555 F.3d 
at 1197.... 
 
Second, as in Aspen, the monopolist's discontinuation of the preexisting 
course of dealing must “suggest[ ] a willingness to forsake short-term 
profits to achieve an anti-competitive end.” Id. In Aspen, the Supreme Court 
held, the evidence suggested that the parties' joint venture was profitable for 
all concerned and that Aspen Skiing Company (the monopolist) 
discontinued the arrangement simply to reduce the value of Aspen 
Highlands, force Highlands to sell, and in this way allow the monopolist to 
win control of all four ski mountains in Aspen. Much as in predatory 
pricing doctrine, the animating concern here is that a dominant firm may be 
able to forgo short-term profits longer than smaller rivals, and it may have 
an incentive to take on those losses to drive rivals from the market or to 
discipline them for having the audacity to try competition on the merits 
rather than abide as price-takers under the monopolist's umbrella. Giving up 
short-term profits in these particular circumstances may risk doing less to 
enhance competition and consumer interests than to entrench a dominant 
firm and enable it to extract monopoly rents once the competitor is killed 
off or beaten down. See Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 222–23; 3 Areeda & 
Hovenkamp, supra, ¶ 651, at 102–03. 
 
Of course, firms routinely sacrifice short-term profits for lots of 
legitimate reasons that enhance consumer welfare (think promotional 
discounts). Neither is it unimaginable that a monopolist might wish to 
withdraw from a prior course of dealing and suffer a short-term profit loss 
in order to pursue perfectly procompetitive ends—say, to pursue an 
innovative replacement product of its own. See 3 Areeda & Hovenkamp, 
supra, ¶ 651, at 102–03. To avoid penalizing normal competitive conduct, 
then, we require proof not just that the monopolist decided to forsake short-
term profits. Just as in predatory pricing cases, we also require a showing 
that the monopolist's refusal to deal was part of a larger anticompetitive 
enterprise, such as (again) seeking to drive a rival from the market or 
discipline it for daring to compete on price. Put simply, the monopolist's 
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conduct must be irrational but for its anticompetitive effect. See Aspen, 472 
U.S. at 597 (a refusal to deal with a competitor doesn't violate section 2 if 
“valid business reasons exist for that refusal”); 3B Areeda & Hovenkamp, 
supra, ¶ 772, at 223 (the refusal must be “irrational” but for its 
anticompetitive tendencies); see also Gregory J. Werden, Identifying 
Exclusionary Conduct Under Section 2: The “No Economic Sense” Test, 73 
Antitrust L.J. 413, 422–25 (2006). 
 
At this point, one might object: refusal to deal doctrine requires the 
monopolist to sacrifice short-term profits to be held liable, but surely a 
monopolist can find ways to harm competition while still making money. 
And that's undoubtedly right. Filing false papers with regulators and 
misleading consumers or others, for example, don't (necessarily) involve the 
short-term sacrifice of profits but can at least conceivably harm competition 
as much as profit-sacrificing maneuvers. As we have already seen, though, 
a rival is always free to bring a section 2 claim for affirmatively interfering 
with its business activities in the marketplace. See, e.g., Caribbean, 148 
F.3d at 1087; 3B Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra, ¶ 782 (discussing 
relationship between antitrust and business torts). Refusal to deal doctrine 
targets only a discrete category of section 2 cases attacking a firm's 
unilateral decisions about with whom it will deal and on what terms. It 
doesn't seek to displace doctrines that address a monopolist's more direct 
interference with rivals. … 
 
* * * 
 
There's no question that Novell can satisfy the first essential component 
of refusal to deal doctrine. A voluntary and profitable relationship clearly 
existed between Microsoft and Novell. Microsoft doesn't dispute that at first 
it freely offered its applications rivals, including Novell, access to its NSEs. 
Neither does Microsoft dispute that doing so was profitable enough, 
encouraging software companies to write for its new operating system and 
in that way making Windows more attractive to consumers. 
 
The difficulty is that Novell has presented no evidence from which a 
reasonable jury could infer that Microsoft's discontinuation of this 
arrangement suggested a willingness to sacrifice short-term profits, let alone 
in a manner that was irrational but for its tendency to harm competition. To 
the contrary, all the evidence suggests that Microsoft's decision came about 
as a result of a desire to maximize the company's immediate and overall 
profits. And, as we've seen, refusal to deal doctrine specifically and section 
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2 generally seek to protect, not penalize, such prosaic profit-maximizing 
(and presumptively pro-competitive) conduct by independently operating 
firms, even dominant firms. 
 
Within the operating systems market alone, it's not clear Microsoft lost 
or expected to lose revenues in the short term—or ever. By withdrawing 
NSEs, Microsoft may have handicapped the ability of ISVs to write for 
Windows 95. But as Novell acknowledges, ISVs had a reasonably strong 
incentive to write for Microsoft's operating system with or without access to 
Window's NSEs—given Microsoft's significant presence in the operating 
systems market (already about a 90 percent share before Windows 95). In 
fact, the record suggests that Microsoft's market share continued to grow 
even after the introduction of Windows 95 without shared NSEs (to at least 
95 percent). To be sure, Novell's CEO testified that Windows 95 would 
have done even better (to some unspecified degree) had Microsoft 
continued to provide access to NSEs. But Novell's own expert refused to 
opine on the question. And Novell's own theory of monopoly maintenance 
posits that Microsoft's withdrawal of the NSEs helped its position in the 
operating systems market by wedding consumers to Microsoft applications 
that themselves could run only on its operating system. Perhaps Novell 
would respond that this strategy only helped Microsoft in the long run after 
a period of forgone short-term profits—but here again Novell presents no 
evidence to support such a theory. 
 
Besides, even assuming Microsoft's conduct did suggest a willingness to 
forgo short-term profits in the operating systems market, that would still 
account for only part of the story. As we've seen, Microsoft also produced 
various applications and, by everyone's estimation, its withdrawal of the 
NSEs helped the firm win additional profits in that field. Indeed, Novell's 
theory in this lawsuit rests on the view that Microsoft's withdrawal of NSEs 
allowed it to win significant profits in the sale of office suite applications—
and to do so immediately. Put differently, even if Microsoft's decision to 
withdraw the NSEs ultimately made Windows 95 less successful, any losses 
in that market have to be considered in light of the acknowledged and 
immediate gains it achieved in the applications arena. Microsoft is an 
integrated firm with the goal of maximizing overall profits. And viewed 
overall, there's no evidence that Microsoft took any course other than 
seeking to maximize the company's net profits in the shortas [sic] well as 
long-term. 
 
Perhaps Novell might reply that we should disaggregate operating 
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systems from applications—that proof of a design to forgo short-term 
profits in one line of business (operating systems) should suffice without 
consideration of admittedly inevitable short-term gains in another 
(applications). Novell, however, never attempts the argument for itself—
and for good reason. It would be inconsistent with both the formal aspects 
and the reasoning behind Aspen and Trinko. In Aspen, the Supreme Court 
found that Aspen Skiing Company's conduct had no economic justification 
except its tendency to exclude a rival. Aspen, 472 U.S. at 608. Neither did 
the Court disaggregate profits from different lines of business in Trinko: in 
concluding that Verizon's behavior failed to show a willingness to sacrifice 
short-term profits, the Court didn't separately consider the wholesale and 
retail markets at play there. The point of the profit sacrifice test is to isolate 
conduct that has no possible efficiency justification. See id. Parsing profits 
from different product lines would defeat this project, holding firms liable 
for making moves that enhance their overall efficiency, if at the expense of 
a particular business line. It would risk as well returning us to a day when 
larger firms had to forgo immediate overall gains in order to subsidize a less 
efficient rival that happens to do business only in one particular product 
line. And it would present a serious administration challenge to say the 
least. After all, businesses have the ability “to recoup [their] investment[s]” 
in any number of ways. Christy Sports, 555 F.3d at 1194. And selling 
operating systems surely isn't the only way to recoup the costs of 
developing a new operating system—a company might just as easily recoup 
costs through the sale of applications designed for that operating system. 
All this courts would have to account for and police. 
 
When pressed at oral argument to point to evidence of Microsoft's 
willingness to sacrifice short-term profits, Novell contended that Mr. 
Gates's internal October 3, 1994 email did the trick. That email, however, 
indicates only a desire to keep NSEs from rivals “until we have a way to do 
a high level of integration [that] will be harder for the likes of Notes, 
WordPerfect to achieve, and which will give Office a real advantage.” 
J.A.1967. This may suggest a hard-nosed intent to undo rivals in the 
applications field, to assure Microsoft a leg up, but it doesn't suggest 
Microsoft intended to forgo profits. More nearly, it suggests just the 
opposite—a wish to increase the firm's immediate profits—and in this way 
it tends to show that Microsoft's conduct was hardly irrational but for its 
exclusionary tendencies. Maybe the e-mail suggests an uncharitable intent 
toward rivals, maybe even a wish to “hurt” or “destroy” them. But as we've 
seen, experience teaches that the process of firms investing in their own 
infrastructure and intellectual property and competing rather than colluding 
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normally promotes competition and consumer gains—and the intent to undo 
a competitor in this process should hardly surprise. “Competition,” after all, 
“is a ruthless process.” Ball Memorial, 784 F.2d at 1338. “Most 
businessmen don't like their competitors” and the antitrust laws aren't 
designed to be a guide to good manners. Olympia, 797 F.2d at 379.... 
 
* * * 
 
Still, that is not quite the end of the story. Unable to travel the hard road 
of refusal to deal doctrine, Novell seeks an escape route, trying to recast 
Microsoft's conduct as an “affirmative” act of interference with a rival 
rather than a “unilateral” refusal to deal. Novell says Microsoft 
“affirmatively” induced reliance on its intellectual property only then to pull 
the rug out from underneath it, raising Novell's cost of doing business in the 
process—and that, Novell says, should be enough to state a claim under 
section 2. Essentially Novell asks us to toy with the act-omission 
distinction, seeking to have us describe Microsoft's conduct as an 
“affirmative” act of interference rather than an “omission” of assistance, 
and to replace the profit sacrifice test with a raising rivals' cost test. 
 
Traditional refusal to deal doctrine is not so easily evaded. One could 
just as easily recast the monopolists' “withdrawals” of assistance in Aspen 
or Trinko as “affirmative” acts of interference with the plaintiff's efforts to 
win customers, ones that raised the rival's costs of doing business in the 
process. Indeed, in almost any case where a monopolist first shares and then 
withdraws its property—as in Aspen and Trinko—the dominant firm might 
be said to raise the rival's costs of doing business by forcing it to forgo 
reliance on the monopolist's facilities or intellectual property and compete 
on its own. That's the whole reason why competitors sue for refusals to 
deal—because they now have to incur costs associated with doing business 
another firm previously helped subsidize. Yet neither Trinko nor Aspen 
Skiing suggested this is enough to evade their profit sacrifice test, and we 
refuse to do so either. Whether one chooses to call a monopolist's refusal to 
deal with a rival an act or omission, interference or withdrawal of 
assistance, the substance is the same and it must be analyzed under the 




Novell seeks to evade refusal to deal doctrine in one final way. It 
charges Microsoft with acting deceptively when it withdrew the NSEs. 
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Microsoft gave pretextual technical reasons for withdrawing the NSEs, 
Novell says, when Microsoft's real reasons were competitive in nature. This 
act of deception, Novell submits, is actionable under the antitrust laws 
without regard to traditional refusal to deal doctrine. 
 
Business torts generally, and acts of fraud more particularly, can 
sometimes give rise to antitrust liability. At least when the defendant's 
deceptive actions—usually aimed at third parties in the marketplace—are so 
widespread and longstanding and practically incapable of refutation that 
they are capable of injuring both consumers and competitors. See, e.g., 
Caribbean, 148 F.3d at 1087; Conwood, 290 F.3d at 783; 3B Areeda & 
Hovenkamp, supra, ¶ 782b. Here, however, at least that last element is 
missing. Whatever other problems exist with Novell's theory, it falters when 
it comes to the antitrust injury requirement. 
 
Suppose Microsoft had admitted its “real” reasons for withdrawing the 
NSEs, as Novell says it should have. Novell and consumers still would have 
suffered the same alleged harm—the delayed release of PerfectOffice. 
Deception, then, wasn't the cause of Novell's injury or any possible harm to 
consumers—Microsoft's refusal to deal was. And that refusal to deal must 
be analyzed under the doctrine we've described. The antitrust laws don't 
turn private parties into bounty hunters entitled to a windfall anytime they 
can ferret out anticompetitive conduct lurking somewhere in the 
marketplace. To prevail, a private party must establish some link between 
the defendant's alleged anticompetitive conduct, on the one hand, and its 
injuries and the consumer's, on the other. Here, that essential element is 
missing: the conduct Novell complains about (deception) is divorced from 
the conduct that allegedly caused harm to it and to consumers (the refusal to 
deal). Even if Microsoft had behaved just as Novell says it should have, it 
would have helped Novell not at all. See Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 489. 
 
* * * 
At the end of the day it is clear to us, as it was to the district court, that 
Microsoft's conduct does not qualify as anticompetitive behavior within the 
meaning of section 2. The district court offered still other rationales for 
rejecting Novell's claim—ruling that Microsoft's conduct didn't harm 
competition in the operating systems market, and that Novell's delay in 
producing its Windows 95 software was really attributable to its own 
mismanagement and not Microsoft's withdrawal of the NSEs. We have no 
need to reach those alternative holdings or tangle with the parties' 
arguments over them. The district court's first and primary holding is 
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correct and sufficient to support the judgment. Novell's motion to seal 
portions of the joint appendix is granted. The judgment is affirmed. 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1. The European Competition provision on “Abuse of a Dominant 
Position” states: 
 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the 
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as 
incompatible with the internal market in so far as it may affect trade 
between Member States." 
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices 
or other unfair trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the 
prejudice of consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with 
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive 
disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the 
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or 
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject 
of such contracts. 
Contrast this with §2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §2, which 
condemns everyone “who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or 
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize.” 
 
Note: The United States Antitrust Law of Refusal to Deal 
 
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue of whether or 
not a firm violates antitrust laws by refusing to deal with a competitor in 
both Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 
(1985) and Verizon Commc'ns v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 
U.S. 398 (2004). 
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Aspen involved a dispute between two competing ski resorts: Ski Co., 
which owned three of the four mountains available for skiing in a 
geographic area, and Highlands Skiing, which owned the other mountain.
 
Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. 585, 589-601. The dispute arose when Ski Co. 
stopped participating in a joint ski pass that allowed skiers to purchase one 
pass and have access to all four mountains.
 
The Court held that “the absence 
of an unqualified duty to cooperate” did not mean this “may not have 
evidentiary significance” or that it “may not give rise to liability in certain 
circumstances.” Ski Co. was in violation of section 2 since Ski Co. was not 
able to provide a valid business justification for discontinuing its 
participation in the joint program. 
 
In its Trinko decision two decades later he Supreme Court severely 
limited the circumstances under which a defendant can violate §2 of the 
Sherman Act by refusing to deal.  The plaintiffs brought a class action suit 
alleging tthat Verizon refused to provide AT&T with access to its systems 
and support operations in a reasonable manner, thereby impairing AT&T’s 
ability to pro- vide competitive services.  The Court held that the refusal to 
deal did not violate pre-existing antitrust standards because it did “not 
believe that traditional antitrust principles justify adding the present case to 
the few existing exceptions from the proposition that there is no duty to aid 
competitors.” Additionally, the Court described Aspen as “at or near the 
outer boundary of § 2 liability”
 
and noted the Court was “very cautious” 
about recognizing exceptions to the general rule against requiring a firm to 
cooperate with its competitors. The Court further cautioned against antitrust 
intervention noting that “[u]nder the best of circumstances, applying the 
requirements of § 2 ‘can be difficult”’
 
and that the “cost of false positives 
counsels against an undue expansion of § 2 liability.” Id. at 414 (quoting 
U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). 
 
The European approach declared in the principal case appears to be 
significantly more interventionist than the United States position.  See also 
European Commission, Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement 
Priorities in Applying Article 82 EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary 
Conduct by Dominant Undertakings (2008). The Guidance  defines “abuse” 
as "a situation where effective access of actual or potential competitors to 
supplies or markets is hampered or eliminated as a result of the conduct of 
the dominant undertaking." 
 
One important qualification on Trinko, however, is that the 1996 
Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 251(c), requires virtually global 
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interconnection between the market dominating incumbent telephone 
carriers and the “competitive” carriers that want to hook into the telephone 
system.  As a result the competitive carrier in Trinko had already obtained 
full relief from the Federal Communications Commission and state 
telecommunications agencies, which held that Verizon was in violation of 
its interconnection obligations.  As a result, what the Supreme Court really 
decided was that the antitrust laws could not be used as an overlay to a 
regulatory system that was already in place in order to justify an award of 
treble damages to the plaintiffs. See the Talkamerica case, infra.  On the 
antitrust law of refusal to deal in regulated industries, see 3B PHILLIP E. 
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶787 (3d ed. 2007). 
 
ALLIED ORTHOPEDIC APPLIANCES, INC. V. TYCO HEALTH 
CARE GROUP, LP 
592 F.3d 991 (9
th
 Cir. 2010) 
 
SILVERMAN, Circuit Judge: 
Plaintiffs in this antitrust suit are a group of hospitals and other health 
care providers that purchased pulse oximetry sensors from Tyco Healthcare 
Group LP after November 2003. They allege that … by introducing 
OxiMax, a patented pulse oximetry system that is incompatible with generic 
sensors, Tyco unlawfully maintained its monopoly over the sensor market 
in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2. 
The district court … granted Tyco’s motion for summary judgment on 
the Section 1 and 2 claims…   We … agree that there is no Section 2 
violation; the undisputed evidence shows that the patented OxiMax design 
is an improvement over the previous design. Innovation does not violate the 
antitrust laws on its own, and there is no evidence that Tyco used its 
monopoly power to force customers to adopt its new product. Accordingly, 
we affirm the district court’s judgment on the merits … 
The pulse oximetry products at issue in this litigation include sensors 
and monitors. Sensors attach to a patient’s body. A monitor receives and 
interprets the signal from a sensor and then displays the patient’s level of 
blood oxygenation. Stand-alone monitors measure only blood oxygenation. 
Multi-parameter monitors measure various patient diagnostics in addition to 
blood oxygenation. Monitors are more expensive than sensors on a unit 
basis, but the volume of sensor sales is much larger than the volume of 
monitor sales. 
Tyco was an early entrant in the pulse oximetry market and was able to 
establish an installed base of monitors greatly exceeding that of its 
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competitors. Its technology was initially protected by its “R-Cal” patent, 
which prevented competitors from selling sensors compatible with its 
installed base of monitors. Tyco anticipated that upon expiration of the R-
Cal patent in November 2003, competitors would begin to produce generic 
sensors compatible with its installed base of monitors. It thus set about 
creating a new proprietary oximetry technology. 
Tyco’s plan matured into what became known as the “OxiMax 
Strategy.” Tyco created a new patented sensor design that contained a 
writable memory chip. Moving the digital memory chip from the monitor to 
the sensor allowed Tyco to add new features to the OxiMax sensors, such as 
the ability to store the patient’s oxygen saturation history in the sensor itself 
(the “sensor event reporting” feature) and the ability to inform a physician 
of possible causes of and solutions for signal interruption (the “sensor 
messaging” feature). 
The digital memory chip also allowed Tyco to move essential 
calibration coefficients from the monitors into the sensors themselves. 
Because the new OxiMax monitors do not contain any calibration 
coefficients, they are incompatible with generic sensors. However, OxiMax 
monitors are compatible with new types of sensors that Tyco develops. 
Previously, when Tyco introduced a new sensor, customers either had to 
buy a new monitor or reprogram their entire installed base of stand-alone 
and multiparameter monitors with the appropriate calibration coefficients. 
With the OxiMax system, customers can adopt new types of sensors 
without affecting their installed base of monitors because the necessary 
coefficients are contained in the sensors themselves. This reduces costs for 
customers and frees sensor designers from having to use the predefined 
coefficients programmed into the installed base of monitors. Moving the 
calibration coefficients into the sensors therefore facilitates the development 
and introduction of new types of sensors. 
Tyco launched OxiMax in March 2002 and notified equipment 
manufacturers that all remaining R-Cal boards were being discontinued in 
February 2003….  
…  The [district] court held that Tyco’s … introduction of OxiMax, 
both alone and in combination with its other business practices, was not 
unreasonably restrictive of competition under Section 2. The OxiMax 
design was a “superior and more sophisticated offering than the previous 
generation R-Cal system” and Tyco “did nothing to force OxiMax monitors 
on its customers.” Plaintiffs timely appealed the district court’s final 
judgment. We affirm…. 
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“There are three essential elements to a successful claim of Section 2 
monopolization: (a) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant 
market; (b) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power; and (c) 
causal ‘antitrust’ injury.” Cal. Computer Prods., Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Mach. 
Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 735 (9th Cir. 1979) (“ CalComp ”). For purposes of 
Tyco’s motion and this appeal, the parties agree that Tyco is a monopolist 
in the U.S. pulse oximetry sensor market. The focus of the dispute is 
whether Tyco unlawfully maintained its monopoly power in that market by 
introducing OxiMax. 
Plaintiffs contend that Tyco maintained its monopoly by (1) designing 
its new patent-protected OxiMax sensors to be compatible with its new 
OxiMax monitors and the installed base of R-Cal monitors, but designing 
its new OxiMax monitors to be incompatible with the old R-Cal sensors; 
and (2) allegedly forcing customers and OEMs to adopt the new OxiMax 
monitors by discontinuing its R-Cal monitors and implementing other 
exclusionary business practices. Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred 
in rejecting these arguments because it did not balance the benefits of 
Tyco’s alleged product improvement against its anticompetitive effects. 
They further argue that the district court impermissibly decided disputed 
issues of material fact regarding the sufficiency of Tyco’s innovation and 
the competitive effect of its overall OxiMax strategy. We agree with the 
district court. 
“Section 2 of the Sherman Act proscribes ‘monopolization’; it does not 
render unlawful all monopolies.” Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman 
Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 543 (9th Cir. 1983). “A monopolist, no less than 
any other competitor, is permitted and indeed encouraged to compete 
aggressively on the merits, and any success it may achieve solely through 
‘the process of invention and innovation’ is necessarily tolerated by the 
antitrust laws.” Id. at 544-45 (quoting Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak 
Co., 603 F.2d 263, 281 (2nd Cir. 1979)). Accordingly, “[a]s a general rule, 
courts are properly very skeptical about claims that competition has been 
harmed by a dominant firm’s product design changes.” United States v. 
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 65 (D.C.Cir.2001). 
However, changes in product design are not immune from antitrust 
scrutiny and in certain cases may constitute an unlawful means of 
maintaining a monopoly under Section 2. Foremost, 703 F.2d at 545. For 
example, in United States v. Microsoft, the plaintiffs showed that Microsoft 
harmed competition by integrating its Web browser, Internet Explorer, into 
the Windows 98 operating system. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 65-66. Microsoft 
provided no “procompetitive justification,” id. at 59, for having integrated 
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Internet Explorer into Windows. Having failed to show “that its conduct 
serve[d] a purpose other than protecting its operating system monopoly,” 
the D.C. Circuit held that Microsoft had violated Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act. 
In contrast, a design change that improves a product by providing a new 
benefit to consumers does not violate Section 2 absent some associated 
anticompetitive conduct. See CalComp, 613 F.2d at 735-36 (holding that a 
design change must not be “unreasonably restrictive of competition”). In 
CalComp, a manufacturer of peripheral computer devices argued that “IBM 
made design changes on certain of its CPUs, disk drives and controllers of 
no technological advantage and solely for the purpose of frustrating 
competition” from peripheral device manufacturers. Id. at 739. However, 
there was uncontroverted evidence that IBM’s changes allowed it to reduce 
manufacturing costs and prices to the consumer and also improved 
performance of the product. Id. at 744.  
CalComp … therefore stand[s] for the uncontroversial proposition that 
product improvement by itself does not violate Section 2, even if it is 
performed by a monopolist and harms competitors as a result. See IIIB 
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP ¶ 776a at 285-86 (3d ed. 2006) (“At the very least, 
as all courts recognize, product improvement without more is protected and 
beyond antitrust challenge.”). There is no violation of Section 2 unless 
plaintiff proves that some conduct of the monopolist associated with its 
introduction of a new and improved product design “constitutes an 
anticompetitive abuse or leverage of monopoly power, or a predatory or 
exclusionary means of attempting to monopolize the relevant market.” 
There is no room in this analysis for balancing the benefits or worth of a 
product improvement against its anticompetitive effects. If a monopolist’s 
design change is an improvement, it is “necessarily tolerated by the antitrust 
laws,” unless the monopolist abuses or leverages its monopoly power in 
some other way when introducing the product. To hold otherwise “would be 
contrary to the very purpose of the antitrust laws, which is, after all, to 
foster and ensure competition on the merits.” “Antitrust scholars have long 
recognized the undesirability of having courts oversee product design, and 
any dampening of technological innovation would be at cross-purposes with 
antitrust law.” United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 948 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998). 
To weigh the benefits of an improved product design against the 
resulting injuries to competitors is not just unwise, it is unadministrable. 
There are no criteria that courts can use to calculate the “right” amount of 
innovation, which would maximize social gains and minimize competitive 
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injury…. 
In this case, it is undisputed that by placing a digital memory chip in the 
sensor and moving the calibration coefficients from the monitor to the 
sensor, Tyco made its new OxiMax system incompatible with generic 
sensors and harmed generic sensor manufacturers. We must therefore 
decide whether there remains a genuine issue that the OxiMax sensor design 
provided some new benefit to consumers and thus constituted an 
improvement. 
First, the United States Patent and Trademark Office found the OxiMax 
sensor design to be sufficiently innovative over the prior art to deserve a 
patent…. Although, as the district court properly noted, there is not a per se 
rule barring Section 2 liability on patented product innovation, the existence 
of a patent on a new product design is some evidence that the change is an 
improvement over previous designs. After all, “the proper amount of gains 
to innovation are left to Congress, who has the authority to vary the terms of 
patent protections, the point in time from which the protections run, or the 
scope of patentable innovations.” IIIB AREEDA & HOVENKAMP ¶ 777d at 
311. 
Second, it is undisputed that Tyco’s new sensor design allows it to 
introduce new types of sensors without requiring its customers to purchase 
new monitors or reprogram their installed base of monitors. This added 
flexibility promotes the introduction of new types of sensors, such as Max-
Fast, and reduces costs for consumers of pulse oximetry equipment. It also 
allows new functions, such as sensor event reporting and sensor messaging, 
to be included in the sensors themselves.  
Tyco’s internal documents show that from the very earliest stages of its 
development of OxiMax, it aimed to produce a new technology that both 
served as “a new, flexible platform for future oximetry innovation” and 
added customer value by improving performance. To ensure that the new 
feature set enabled by OxiMax would help to differentiate its new sensors 
from generics, Tyco surveyed clinicians and initially received positive 
feedback. Plaintiffs focus on statements showing that Tyco hoped its new 
technology would constitute a barrier to entry for generic sensor 
manufacturers. However, even legitimate product improvement can have 
the effect of harming or even destroying competitors. 
Likewise, Plaintiffs mistakenly focus on documents showing that, 
sometime in 2001, Tyco began to realize that the sensor messaging and 
sensor event reporting features were less valuable than it initially believed 
and worried that the market would perceive its new technology as nothing 
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more than a way to lock out generics. These documents do not create a 
genuine issue of material fact about whether OxiMax represented an 
improvement over previous sensor designs. Since technological innovation 
“is accompanied by tremendous uncertainty as to cost, technical success, 
and eventual market success ... ex post realizations are rarely a useful 
indicator of ex ante expectations.” IIIB AREEDA & HOVENKAMP ¶ 775c at 
284. Evidence of an innovator’s initial intent may be helpful to the extent 
that it shows that the innovator knew all along that the new design was no 
better than the old design, and thus introduced the design solely to eliminate 
competition. But the documents here show that Tyco initially believed that 
clinicians would value the new feature set.… 
In sum, Plaintiffs have presented no evidence to refute that the patented 
OxiMax sensor design facilitates the introduction of new types of sensors 
with added capabilities at less cost to consumers. The district court properly 
concluded that Plaintiffs had not created a genuine issue of material fact on 
whether OxiMax was a genuine improvement. 
Tyco Did Not Use Its Market Power to Force Adoption of OxiMax 
Although it is undisputed that the OxiMax sensor design is an 
improvement over previous designs, Tyco may still have violated Section 2 
if any of its other conduct “constitutes an anticompetitive abuse or leverage 
of monopoly power, or a predatory or exclusionary means of attempting to 
monopolize the relevant market.” 
Plaintiffs argue that Tyco forced consumers to adopt OxiMax by 
discontinuing the older R-Cal technology. A monopolist’s discontinuation 
of its old technology may violate Section 2 if it effectively forces 
consumers to adopt its new technology. Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 287 n. 
39. Here, however, there was uncontroverted evidence that [other suppliers 
of pulse oximetry monitors and sensors effectively competed with Tyco]. 
Given all these alternatives, Tyco did not force consumers to purchase its 
OxiMax monitors simply by discontinuing its support of the R-Cal 
technology. 
Plaintiffs’ argument that Tyco could have made its monitors compatible 
with the old sensors also fails. Our precedents make clear that a monopolist 
has no duty to help its competitors survive or expand when introducing an 
improved product design.  The evidence shows that the OxiMax monitors’ 
incompatibility with R-Cal sensors was the necessary consequence of 
moving the calibration coefficients from the monitor into the sensor. Thus, 
the product improvement at issue in this case, not some associated conduct 
by Tyco, caused the incompatibility…. 
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In sum, Plaintiffs have provided no evidence that Tyco used its 
monopoly power to force consumers of pulse oximetry products to adopt its 
new OxiMax technology. Absent evidence of such compulsion, the only 
rational inference that can be drawn from some consumers’ adoption of 
OxiMax is that they regarded it to be a superior product. Berkey, 603 F.2d at 
287. The district court therefore properly concluded that Plaintiffs had 
failed to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding Tyco’s 
introduction of OxiMax and properly granted summary judgment on the 
Section 2 claim. 
AFFIRMED. 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1.  How much faith does the Ninth Circuit have in a court’s ability to assess 
whether a design change is anticompetitive?  As the court observed: 
 
[Weighing] the benefits of an improved product design against the 
resulting injuries to competitors is not just unwise, it is 
unadministrable. There are no criteria that courts can use to calculate 
the ‘right’ amount of innovation, which would maximize social 
gains and minimize competitive injury....The balancing test 
proposed by plaintiffs would therefore require courts to weigh as-
yet-unknown benefits against current competitive injuries. Our 
precedents and the precedents we have relied upon strongly counsel 
against such a test.  
 
Orthopedic Appliances, 592 F.3d at 1000. Why does this Court come to this 
conclusion? Does it present any contrary authority that supports a different 
holding? Is there any instance when an innovation can be held in violation 
of antitrust law? What if Tyco forced consumers to adopt the new 
technology?  More recently, the Northern District of California granted 
defendant Apple’s motion for summary judgment in a case involving an 
alleged anticompetitive effect of an innovation. The Apple iPod iTunes 
Antitrust Litigation, 5:05-cv-00037-JW (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2011). In relying 
on Orthopedic Appliances, Judge Ware held that software updates to iTunes 
4.7 constituted a “genuine improvement” and could not support an antitrust 
claim.  However, it denied summary judgment with respect to other design 
changes that appeared to produce incompatabilities with the plaintiff’s 
products but were not shown to be an improvement.  See the following note 
on software redesigns. 
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 By contrast, in C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1371 
(Fed.Cir.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1130 (1999), the Federal Circuit 
affirmed a jury verdict for the plaintiff in a case where the defendant 
redesigned its skin graft gun so as to make it incompatible with rivals’ 
generic disposable needles.  In this case there was no evidence that the gun 
represented a genuine product improvement.  Should the test be whether the 
product as measured after the fact ends up not being an improvement, or 
whether the defendant never intended for it to be an improvement to begin 
with but only to create an incompatibility with the products of rivals?  See 
CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT 
RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION, Ch. 11 
(2011).  For severe criticism of Bard, see Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, 
Anticompetitive Innovation and the Quality of Invention, 26 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. (2012). 
 
 See also In re Intel Corp., No. 9341, 2010 WL 4542454 (F.T.C. Nov. 
2, 2010). Intel is the dominant maker of central processing units (CPUs) for 
personal computers.  Rival firms built CPUs but also graphics processing 
units (GPUs) for computers that process a great deal of graphics.  When the 
rivals began building GPUs so as to take on some of the functions 
performed by CPUs, Intel allegedly attempted to limit interoperability 
between its CPU and its rivals’ GPUs, thereby reducing “future competition 
on both price and innovation” between Intel and its rivals.  The parties 
entered a consent decree which required Intel to support a standard interface 
between its CPUs and its rivals’ GPU.  For excellent commentary of the 
issues raised in both Intel and Microsoft, see William H. Page & Seldon J. 
Childers, Antitrust, Innovation, and Product Design in Platform Markets: 
Microsoft and Intel (Aug. 22, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1914737. 
2. Exclusionary Software Redesigns.  One reason for our very considerable 
tolerance of product redesigns is that they are costly and risky, as the 
defendant’s technology in the principal case almost certainly was.  A firm is 
highly unlikely to invest millions of dollars in a new product for the sole 
purpose of making a rival’s technology incompatible.  Suppose, however, 
that the product design involves nothing more than software code, which 
can cheaply be rewritten so as to eliminate compatibility with rivals’ 
produts.  See, e.g.. Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust Litig., No. C 05-00037 JW, 
2011 WL 2690511 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2011), in which the plaintiff class 
action accuse Apple of altering its iPod/iTunes software to prevent a rival’s 
products from playing on Apple’s hardware. The plaintiffs alleged that 
Apple’s software redesign served no procompetitive purpose and that Apple 
had yet to “allege some procompetitive justification other than merely 
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY                             Chapter 8, Page 59 
Hovenkamp                                                                        Oct. 2013 
 
foreclosing rivals.”  A similar issue was raised in United States v. Microsoft 
Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  See John M. Newman, 
Anticompetitive Product Design in the New Economy, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. (2012), who argues that our tolerance for anticompetitive design 
generally should be modified if the product is computer software – most 
particularly, software operating systems in which compatibility with the 
hardware, applications, or other products of rivals is essential.  Newman 
observes that (1) software updates are a “uniquely attractive method of 
foreclosing rivals,” and (2) software redesigns are “more easily analyzed 
than traditional, physical-product redesigns,” because experts can isolate 
specific sections of code to separate anticompetitive design elements from 
procompetitive innovations. An expert was used for this purpose in 
Microsoft, supra.  Courts should consider a defendant’s intent only in 
“ambiguous” cases—though Newman argues that “code-based product 
redesigns will rarely present a truly ‘ambiguous’ case.” 
3.  The grandparent of product redesign cases is Berkey Photo, Inc. v. 
Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).  Kodak simultaneously 
introduced a radically redesigned amateur camera, the 110 “Pocket 
Instamatic,” which used a film cartridge that dropped right into the camera, 
much easier than older technologies that required film to be strung onto a 
take up reel.  The new camera was a roaring success and significantly upset 
the market for older technologies, but until the two products could be re-
engineered by rivals the camera and film were compatible only with each 
other.  The plaintiff, a rival camera maker, could not reasonably attack the 
design itself, which was acknowledged to be a great technological 
improvement.  Rather, it argued that Kodak had a duty to ‘predisclose” its 
research plans so that rivals would have an opportunity to get on the market 
earlier with their own compatible products.  In rejecting that claim the court 
observed: 
[E]nforced predisclosure would cause undesirable consequences 
beyond merely encouraging the sluggishness the Sherman Act was 
designed to prevent. A significant vice of the theory propounded by 
Berkey lies in the uncertainty of its application. Berkey does not 
contend, in the colorful phrase of Judge Frankel [author of the district 
court’s opinion], that “Kodak has to live in a goldfish bowl,” disclosing 
every innovation to the world at large. However predictable in its 
application, such an extreme rule would be insupportable. Rather, 
Berkey postulates that Kodak had a duty to disclose limited types of 
information to certain competitors under specific circumstances. But it 
is difficult to comprehend how a major corporation, accustomed though 
it is to making business decisions with antitrust considerations in mind, 
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could possess the omniscience to anticipate all the instances in which a 
jury might one day in the future retrospectively conclude that 
predisclosure was warranted. And it is equally difficult to discern 
workable guidelines that a court might set forth to aid the firm's 
decision. For example, how detailed must the information conveyed be? 
And how far must research have progressed before it is “ripe” for 
disclosure? These inherent uncertainties would have an inevitable 
chilling effect on innovation. They go far, we believe, towards 
explaining why no court has ever imposed the duty Berkey seeks to 
create here. 
4.  In Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc., 697 
F.3d 387 (6th Cir. 2012), the Sixth Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal 
of Plaintiff Static Control Components, Inc.’s (“Static Control”) federal 
antitrust claims because it insufficiently alleged that it had standing to sue for 
damages. Static Control’s antitrust claims arise from conduct by Lexmark 
International, Inc. (“Lexmark”), a manufacturer of laser printers and toner 
cartridges, to prevent third parties from refilling used Lexmark toner 
cartridges and reselling them. To combat remanufacturers’ business model, 
Lexmark added microchips to its toner cartridges and printers such that a 
Lexmark printer would not work unless the toner cartridge had the microchip. 
Static Control figured out how to copy the microchips and sold the microchips 
to remanufacturers that refill and resell Lexmark toner cartridges. Upset with 
remanufacturers, Lexmark redesigned the microchips and initiated a 
“Prebate” program. Under the redesign, the new microchips disabled the 
cartridge once it ran out of toner. To reuse the cartridge, the microchip had 
to be replaced, but getting replacements was difficult because the company 
that produced them agreed to sell only to Lexmark. Under the Prebate 
program: 
 
Lexmark would sell new toner cartridges [to large customers] at an 
upfront discount of around 20% if the end user agreed to (1) a single-use 
license and (2) a restriction that the cartridge be returned to Lexmark for 
remanufacturing or recycling and not to a third-party remanufacturer. 
 
Lexmark eventually obtained several patents for its toner cartridges and 
sued Static Control for infringement. Static Control counterclaimed under 
the Sherman Act, alleging that Lexmark’s microchip redesign and Prebate 
program were anticompetitive. The district court granted Lexmark’s motion 
to dismiss, holding that Static Control lacked antitrust standing. The Sixth 
Circuit affirmed. 
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When bringing an antitrust claim for damages, a private plaintiff must 
establish that he has antitrust standing under the following five-factor 
balancing test: 
 
(1) the causal connection between the antitrust violation and harm to the 
plaintiff and whether that harm was intended to be caused; (2) the nature 
of the plaintiff's alleged injury including the status of the plaintiff as 
consumer or competitor in the relevant market; (3) the directness or 
indirectness of the injury, and the related inquiry of whether the 
damages are speculative; (4) the potential for duplicative recovery or 
complex apportionment of damages; and (5) the existence of more 
direct victims of the alleged antitrust violation. Southaven Land Co. v. 
Malone & Hyde, Inc., 715 F.2d 1079, 1085 (6th Cir. 1983) (citing 
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of 
Carpenters (“AGC”), 459 U.S. 519, 537–45 (1983)). No one factor 
controls. 
 
The Sixth Circuit found that Static Control’s allegations did not 
establish the first AGC factor. “Static Control alleges that Lexmark's 
anticompetitive chips “exclude competition, restrict output, and increase 
end-user prices in the relevant markets,” but the counterclaim never 
identifies any change in competition, output, or prices in the market for 
component parts or microchips as a result of Lexmark's conduct.” Static 
Control also lacked standing because Lexmark’s Prebate program was not 
intended to harm Static Control: 
 
As alleged, the Prebate Program targets only the market for 
remanufactured cartridges. No part of the Prebate Program relates to the 
market for microchips or components, even though the allegations 
support the Prebate Program’s incidental effects in the other markets. 
Static Control itself states that “Lexmark specifically launched its 
Prebate program to intimidate and to exclude competition from 
remanufacturers.” 
 
The Sixth Circuit also found that Static Control failed to establish 
standing because it did not satisfy the second AGC factor. 
 
[O]nly claimants who are competitors or consumers within the injured 
market have standing to sue. Southaven, 715 F.2d at 1086. However, 
claimants who are not direct players in the relevant market may 
nonetheless have standing if their injury is “‘inextricably intertwined’ 
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with the injury sought to be inflicted upon the relevant market or 
participants therein.” Id. 
 
Static Control also failed to establish the last three AGC factors, “which 
all relate to the directness of Static Control’s injuries relative to potentially 
more-direct victims.”  While Static Control’s injuries are a “byproduct” of 
Lexmark’s conduct, “The more-direct victims are the end users, who . . . 
had to pay more for their cartridges, . . . and the remanufacturers, who were 
unable to compete in the market for Lexmark-compatible toner cartridges 
after Lexmark’s Prebate program undercut their prices and reduced supply.”  
If Static Control had standing based on its indirect injuries, then there would 
be a “danger of duplicative recovery.” 
 
The Sixth Circuit also found insufficient Static Control’s allegations that 
Lexmark harmed competition by redesigning microchips. Under Eastman 
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992), Static 
Control might have had standing to pursue its claims if it had alleged that 
Lexmark maintained its monopoly on remanufactured cartridges by 
“making cartridge parts wholly unavailable.” 
 
Static Control does not specifically allege a tying scheme under § 1 of 
the Sherman Act, as was the case in Eastman Kodak, nor does Static 
Control allege any facts to suggest that the prices for parts increased as a 
result of being illegally tied to the market for cartridges. Static Control 
alleges that Lexmark continuously redesigned its microchips “to 
exclude competitors from the relevant markets, restrict output, and 
increase end-user prices.” 
 
Additionally, Static Control failed to allege how Lexmark’s redesigns 
harmed competition or who it competes with in the market for microchips.  
Absent these allegations, Static Control cannot establish that it has standing 
to pursue a claim based on Lexmark’s microchip redesign efforts. 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has 
jurisdiction over patent infringement suits in a well pleaded complaint. 28 
U.S.C. § 1338(a). However, in Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air 
Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002), the Supreme Court held that 
this exclusive jurisdiction extends to original claims but not to 
counterclaims.  In Static Control, Lexmark initially filed a copyright 
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infringement suit.  Then Static counterclaimed alleging misuse and antitrust 
violations, and only then did Lexmark file a counterclaim to the 
counterclaim alleging patent infringement.  So under the law that existed 
when Lexmark filed its lawsuit the appeal went to the regional Circuit, the 
Sixth.  Subsequently, however, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 
provided for exclusive Federal Circuit jurisdiction over “any civil action in 
which a party has asserted a compulsory counterclaim arising under[ ] any 
Act of Congress relating to patents.”   The amendment was explicitly made 
prospective only, however, “to any civil action commenced on or after the 
date of the enactment of this Act.” Pub.L. 112–29, § 19(b), (e), 125 Stat. 
333.  An action such as this one filed today would be appealed to the 
Federal Circuit. 
2.  Why didn’t the court dismiss the counterclaim because there is no 
relevant market for “Lexmark cartridges,” given that Lexmark is only one 
of many players in the market for computer printers, with a market share of 
under 15%?  
3.  The court observes the challenged practices were intended to increase 
the sale of cartridges supplied by Lexmark itself by making it much more 
difficult for consumers to use remanufactured cartridges.  So clearly a 
“target” of the practices was the remanufacturers.  But the microchips are 
used on the cartridges in a one-to-one ratio.  Wouldn’t Static Controls have 
exactly the same injury as the cartridge remanufacturers?  If so, why deny 
standing to Static?  Section four of the Clayton Act grants an antitrust suit 
to “anyone who shall be injured in his business or property” by an antitrust 
violation.  15 U.S.C. §15. 
DEALING OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE 1996 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT 
 
TALK AMERICA, INC. V. MICHIGAN BELL TELEPHONE CO. 
131 S.Ct. 2254 (2011) 
 
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, 
In these cases, we consider whether an incumbent provider of local 
telephone service must make certain transmission facilities available to 
competitors at cost-based rates. The Federal Communications Commission 
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(FCC or Commission) as amicus curiae contends that its regulations require 
the incumbent provider to do so if the facilities are to be used for 
interconnection: to link the incumbent provider’s telephone network with 
the competitor’s network for the mutual exchange of traffic. We defer to the 
Commission’s views and reverse the judgment below. 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996 Act), 110 Stat. 56, imposed 
a number of duties on incumbent providers of local telephone service in 
order to facilitate market entry by competitors. AT & T Corp. v. Iowa 
Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371 (1999). The incumbent local ex-change 
carriers (LECs) owned the local exchange networks: the physical equipment 
necessary to receive, properly route, and deliver phone calls among 
customers. Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 490 (2002). 
Before the 1996 Act, a new, competitive LEC could not compete with an 
incumbent carrier without basically replicating the incumbent’s entire 
existing network. 
The 1996 Act addressed that barrier to market entry by requiring 
incumbent LECs to share their networks with competitive LECs in several 
ways, two of which are relevant here. First, 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) requires 
incumbent LECs to lease “on an unbundled basis”— i.e., a la carte—
network elements specified by the Commission. This makes it easier for a 
competitor to create its own network without having to build every element 
from scratch. In identifying which network elements must be available for 
unbundled lease under § 251(c)(3), the Commission is required to consider 
whether access is “necessary” and whether failing to provide access would 
“impair” a competitor’s provision of service. § 251(d)(2). Second, § 
251(c)(2) mandates that incumbent LECs “provide ... interconnection” 
between their networks and competitive LECs’ facilities. This ensures that 
customers on a competitor’s network can call customers on the incumbent’s 
network, and vice versa. The interconnection duty is independent of the 
unbundling rules and not subject to impairment analysis. It is undisputed 
that both un-bundled network elements and interconnection must be 
provided at cost-based rates. 
These cases concern incumbent LECs’ obligation to share existing 
“entrance facilities” with competitive LECs. Entrance facilities are the 
transmission facilities (typically wires or cables) that connect competitive 
LECs’ networks with incumbent LECs’ networks. The FCC recently 
adopted a regulation specifying that entrance facilities are not among the 
network elements that § 251(c)(3) requires incumbents to lease to 
competitors on an unbundled basis at cost-based rates. See 47 CFR § 
51.319(e)(2)(i) (2005). 
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The specific issue here is whether respondent, Michigan Bell Telephone 
Company d/b/a AT & T Michigan (“AT&T”), must lease existing entrance 
facilities to competitive LECs at cost-based rates. The FCC interprets its 
regulations to require AT & T to do so for the purpose of interconnection. 
We begin by reviewing the Commission’s recent actions regarding entrance 
facilities and then explain the particular dispute that is before us today. 
… 
[In 2003, the FCC revised prior orders by stating that: (1) incumbent 
LECs are not obligated to provide cost-based unbundled access to entrance 
facilities under § 251(c)(3), and (2) entrance facilities are not subject to the 
unbundling requirement because they are not network elements.] 
 
[But in 2005 the D.C. Circuit questioned the Commission’s 
determination that entrance facilities are not network elements under § 
251(c)(3) and] the Commission responded. See Triennial Review Remand 
Order ¶¶ 136–141. The Commission re-treated from its view that entrance 
facilities are not network elements but adhered to its previous position that 
cost-based unbundled access to them need not be provided under § 
251(c)(3). Treating entrance facilities as network elements, the Commission 
concluded that competitive LECs are not impaired without access to them. 
Ibid. The Commission again emphasized that it “d[id] not alter the right of 
competitive LECs to obtain interconnection facilities pursuant to section 
251(c)(2).”  
In the wake of the Triennial Review Remand Order, AT & T notified 
competitive LECs that it would no longer provide entrance facilities at cost-
based rates for either backhauling or interconnection, but would instead 
charge higher rates. Competitive LECs complained to the Michigan Public 
Service Commission (PSC) that AT & T was unlawfully abrogating their 
right to cost-based interconnection under § 251(c)(2). The Michigan PSC 
agreed with the competitive LECs and ordered AT & T to continue 
providing entrance facilities for interconnection at cost-based rates. 
AT & T challenged the Michigan PSC’s ruling in the District Court, 
which, relying on the Triennial Review Remand Order, ruled in AT & T’s 
favor. The Michigan PSC and several competitive LECs, including 
petitioner Talk America, Inc., appealed…. 
Petitioners contend that AT & T must lease its existing entrance 
facilities for interconnection at cost-based rates. We agree. 
No statute or regulation squarely addresses whether an incumbent LEC 
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must provide access to entrance facilities at cost-based rates as part of its 
interconnection duty under § 251(c)(2).  
AT & T contends that [§ 251(c)(2)] makes clear that an incumbent LEC 
need not provide access to any facilities—much less entrance facilities—to 
provide interconnection. The company points out that § 251(c)(2) does not 
mention incumbent LECs’ facilities, but rather mandates only that 
incumbent LECs provide interconnection “for the facilities and equipment 
of any [competing] carrier.” In contrast, AT & T notes, § 251(c)(3) requires 
that incumbent LECs provide unbundled “access to [their] network 
elements.” 
We do not find the statute so clear. Although § 251(c)(2) does not 
expressly require that incumbent LECs lease facilities to provide 
interconnection, it also does not expressly excuse them from doing so. The 
statute says nothing about what an incumbent LEC must do to “provide ... 
interconnection.” § 251(c)(2). “[T]he facilities and equipment of any 
[competing] carrier” identifies the equipment that an incumbent LEC must 
allow to interconnect, but it does not specify what the incumbent LEC must 
do to make the interconnection possible.  
In the absence of any unambiguous statute or regulation, we turn to the 
FCC’s interpretation of its regulations in its amicus brief.  …[W]e defer to 
an agency’s interpretation of its regulations, even in a legal brief, unless the 
interpretation is “ ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation [s]’ 
” or there is any other “ ‘reason to suspect that the interpretation does not 
reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter in 
question.’”  
The Commission contends that its regulations require AT & T to 
provide access at cost-based rates to its existing entrance facilities for the 
purpose of interconnection. The Commission’s interpretation proceeds in 
three steps. First, an incumbent LEC must lease “technically feasible” 
facilities for interconnection. Second, entrance facilities are among the 
facilities that an incumbent must make available for interconnection, if 
technically feasible. Third, it is technically feasible to provide access to the 
particular entrance facilities at issue in these cases. 
The Commission first contends that an incumbent LEC must lease, at 
cost-based rates, any requested facilities for obtaining interconnection with 
the incumbent LEC’s network, unless it is technically infeasible to do so. 
Section 251(c)(2) mandates that an incumbent LEC provide 
interconnection, at cost-based rates, “at any technically feasible point within 
the carrier’s network.” The FCC has long construed § 251(c)(2) to require 
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incumbent LECs to provide, at cost-based rates, “any technically feasible 
method of obtaining interconnection ... at a particular point.” 47 CFR § 
51.321(a) (2010). 
The requirement in § 51.321(a) to provide a “method of obtaining 
interconnection,” the Commission argues, encompasses a duty to lease an 
existing facility to a competing LEC. When the Commission originally 
promulgated § 51.321(a), it explained that incumbent LECs would be 
required to “adapt their facilities to interconnection” and to “accept the 
novel use of, and modification to, [their] network facilities.”… 
Next, the Commission contends that existing entrance facilities are 
among the facilities that an incumbent LEC must lease for interconnection. 
According to the FCC, the Triennial Review Remand Order adopted a 
regulatory definition that reestablished that entrance facilities are part of an 
incumbent LEC’s network…. 
Finally, the FCC contends that providing access to the entrance facilities 
here for interconnection purposes is technically feasible. Under the 
Commission’s regulations, an incumbent LEC bears the burden of showing 
that a requested method or point of interconnection is technically infeasible. 
See 47 CFR §§ 51.305(e), 51.321(d); see also §§ 51.305(d), 51.321(c) 
(previously successful interconnection is “substantial evidence” of technical 
feasibility). AT & T does not dispute technical feasibility here.  
The FCC’s interpretation is not “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with 
the regulation[s].” …  Indeed, the Commission’s view on this question is 
more than reasonable; it is certainly not plainly erroneous. The Triennial 
Review Remand Order responded to the D.C. Circuit’s decision questioning 
the Commission’s earlier finding that entrance facilities are not network 
elements. It revised the definition of dedicated transport—a type of network 
element—to include entrance facilities…. 
Second, we are not persuaded by AT & T’s argument that the 
Commission’s views conflict with the definition of interconnection in § 
51.5. That regulation provides: “Interconnection is the linking of two 
networks for the mutual exchange of traffic. This term does not include the 
transport and termination of traffic.” AT & T focuses on the definition’s 
exclusion of “transport and termination of traffic.” An entrance facility is a 
transport facility, AT & T argues, and it makes no sense to require an 
incumbent LEC to furnish a transport facility for interconnection when the 
definition of interconnection expressly excludes transport. 
We think AT & T reads too much into the exclusion of “transport.” The 
regulation cannot possibly mean that no transport can occur across an 
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interconnection facility, as that would directly conflict with the statutory 
language. See § 251(c)(2) (requiring “interconnection ... for the 
transmission and routing of [local] telephone exchange service”). 
The better reading of the regulation is that it merely reflects that the 
“transport and termination of traffic” is subject to different regulatory 
treatment than interconnection. Compensation for transport and 
termination—that is, for delivering local telephone calls placed by another 
carrier’s customer—is governed by separate statutory provisions and 
regulations. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251(b)(5), 252(d)(2); 47 CFR § 51.701. The 
Commission explains that a competitive LEC typically pays one fee for 
interconnection—“just for having the link”—and then an additional fee for 
the transport and termination of telephone calls. Tr. of Oral Arg. 28; see 
also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 3, n. 1. Entrance facilities, at 
least when used for the mutual exchange of traffic, seem to us to fall 
comfortably within the definition of interconnection. See 597 F.3d, at 388 
(Sutton, J., dissenting) (noting that entrance facilities are “designed for the 
very purpose of linking two carriers’ networks” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
In sum, the Commission’s interpretation of its regulations is neither 
plainly erroneous nor inconsistent with the regulatory text. Contrary to AT 
& T’s assertion, there is no danger that deferring to the Commission would 
effectively “permit the agency, under the guise of interpreting a regulation, 
to create de facto a new regulation.”  Christensen v. Harris County, 529 
U.S. 576, 588 (2000). 
It is so ordered. 
[a concurring opinion by Justice Scalia is omitted; Justice Kagan did not 
participate] 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1.  As discussed earlier, in its Trinko decision the Supreme Court held the 
the antitrust laws compel dealing with a rival only in extreme situations. 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 251(c), goes much 
further.  Under it an incumbent carrier must provide interconnection to all 
competitive carriers.  The incumbent may charge market-based rates unless 
the FCC determines that this price would impair the competitor’s ability to 
offer its service to customers; then it must charge cost-based rates. 
 
Do these provisions create a more efficient and competitive 
teecommunications market that benefit consumers? If a dominant 
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incumbent is obligated to license its intercommunication equipment to 
smaller, local firms at a cost-based price, this will open the market to more 
firms, creating more “competition.”  But will this result in higher output and 
lower prices? Further, what incentive does a dominant firm have to invest in 
innovation or more efficient business practices when smaller firms will be 
able to benefit without contributing to the investment cost?   The 
interpretation of the antitrust laws in Trinko and the interconnection 
requirements in the 1996 Telecommunications Act reflect radically different 
approaches to this problem, do they not? 
 
“NET NEUTRALITY” AND RELATED OBLIGATIONS 
IMPOSED 
BY THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION 
 
COMCAST CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, V. FCC 
717 F.3d 982 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
 
WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 
Regulations of the Federal Communications Commission, adopted under 
the mandate of § 616 of the Communications Act of 1934 and virtually 
duplicating its language, bar a multichannel video programming distributor 
(“MVPD”) such as a cable company from discriminating against 
unaffiliated programming networks in decisions about content distribution. 
More specifically, the regulations bar such conduct when the effect of the 
discrimination is to “unreasonably restrain the ability of an unaffiliated 
video programming vendor to compete fairly.” 47 C.F.R. § 76.1301(c); see 
also 47 U.S.C. § 536(a)(3). Tennis Channel, a sports programming network 
and intervenor in this suit, filed a complaint against petitioner Comcast 
Cable, an MVPD, alleging that Comcast violated § 616 and the 
Commission's regulations by refusing to broadcast Tennis as widely (i.e., 
via the same relatively low-priced “tier”) as it did its own affiliated sports 
programming networks, Golf Channel and Versus. (Versus is now known as 
NBC Sports Network and was originally called Outdoor Life Network; for 
consistency with the order under review, we refer to it as “Versus.”) An 
administrative law judge ruled against Comcast, ordering that it provide 
Tennis carriage equal to what it affords Golf and Versus, and the 
Commission affirmed. See Tennis Channel, Inc. v. Comcast Cable 
Commc'ns, LLC, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 27 FCC Rcd. 8508 
(July 24, 2012) (“ Order”). 
 
Comcast poses a number of issues as to the meaning of § 616, including 
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an argument that the Commission reads it so broadly as to violate Comcast's 
free speech rights under the First Amendment. We need not reach those 
issues, as Comcast prevails with its third set of arguments—that even under 
the Commission's interpretation of § 616 (the correctness of which we 
assume for purposes of this decision), the Commission has failed to identify 
adequate evidence of unlawful discrimination. 
 
Comcast … argued that the Commission could not lawfully find 
discrimination because Tennis offered no evidence that its rejected proposal 
would have afforded Comcast any benefit. If this is correct, as we conclude 
below, the Commission has nothing to refute Comcast's contention that its 
rejection of Tennis's proposal was simply “a straight up financial analysis,” 
as one of its executives put it. Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 300. 
 
* * * 
 
Comcast, the largest MVPD in the United States, offers cable television 
programming to its subscribers in several different distribution “tiers,” or 
packages of programming services, at different prices. Since Versus's and 
Golf's launches in 1995, Comcast—which originally had a minority interest 
in the two networks, and now has 100% ownership—has generally carried 
the networks on its most broadly distributed tiers, Expanded Basic or the 
digital counterpart Digital Starter. Order ¶ 12; J.A. 1223–24. 
 
Tennis Channel, launched in 2003, initially sought distribution of its 
content on Comcast's less broadly distributed sports tier, a package of 10 to 
15 sports networks that Comcast's subscribers can access for an extra $5 to 
$8 per month. In 2005, Tennis entered a carriage contract that gave the 
Comcast the “right to carry” Tennis “on any ... tier of service,” subject to 
exclusions irrelevant here. Comcast in fact placed Tennis on the sports tier. 
 
In 2009, however, Tennis approached Comcast with proposals that 
Comcast reposition Tennis onto a tier with broader distribution. Order ¶¶ 
12, 33. Tennis's proposed agreement called for Comcast to pay Tennis for 
distribution on a per-subscriber basis. Tennis provided a detailed analysis—
which is sealed in this proceeding—of what Comcast would likely pay for 
that broader distribution; even with the discounts that Tennis offered, the 
amounts are substantial. Neither the analysis provided at the time, nor 
testimony received in this litigation, made (much less substantiated) 
projections of any resulting increase in revenue for Comcast, let alone 
revenue sufficient to offset the increased fees. 
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Comcast entertained the proposal, checking with “division and system 
employees to gauge local and subscriber interest.” J.A. 402. After those 
consultations, and based on previous analyses of interest in Tennis, 
Comcast rejected the proposal in June 2009. Tennis then filed its complaint 
with the Commission in January 2010, which led to the order now under 
review. By way of remedy, the ALJ ordered, and the Commission affirmed, 
that Comcast must “carry [Tennis] on the same distribution tier, reaching 
the same number of subscribers, as it does [Golf] and Versus.” Order ¶ 92. 
 
The parties agree that Comcast distributes the content of affiliates Golf 
and Versus more broadly than it does that of Tennis. The question is 
whether that difference violates § 616 and the implementing regulations. 
There is also no dispute that the statute prohibits only discrimination based 
on affiliation. Thus, if the MVPD treats vendors differently based on a 
reasonable business purpose (obviously excluding any purpose to 
illegitimately hobble the competition from Tennis), there is no violation. 
The Commission has so interpreted the statute, Mid–Atlantic Sports 
Network v. Time Warner Cable Inc., 25 FCC Rcd. 18099, ¶ 22 (2010), and 
the Commission's attorney conceded as much at oral argument, see Oral 
Arg. Tr. at 24–25; see also TCR Sports Broad. Holding L.L.P. v. FCC, 679 
F.3d 269, 274–77 (4th Cir.2012) (discussing the legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons for an MVPD's differential treatment of a non-
affiliated network). 
 
In contrast with the detailed, concrete explanation of Comcast's 
additional costs under the proposed tier change, Tennis showed no 
corresponding benefits that would accrue to Comcast by its accepting the 
change. Testimony from one of Comcast's executives identifies some of the 
factors it considers when deciding whether to move a channel to broader 
distribution: 
 
In deciding whether to carry a network and at what cost, Comcast Cable 
must balance the costs and benefits associated with a wide range of 
factors, including: the amount of the licensing fees (which is generally 
the most important factor); the nature of the programming content 
involved; the intensity and size of the fan base for that content; the level 
of service sought by the network; the network's carriage on other 
MVPDs; the extent of [most favored nation]
2
 protection provided; the 
                                                 
2
 A “most favored nation” provision grants the distributor “the right to be 
offered any more favorable rates, terms, or conditions subsequently offered or 
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term of the contract sought; and a variety of other operational issues. 
  
But neither Tennis nor the Commission offers such an analysis on either 
a qualitative or a quantitative basis. Instead, the best the Commission offers, 
both in the Order and at oral argument, is that Tennis charges less per 
“rating point” than does either Golf or Versus. Order ¶ 78 n. 243; Oral Arg. 
Tr. at 25–29. But those differentials are not affirmative evidence that 
acceptance of Tennis's 2009 proposal could have offered Comcast any net 
gain. Even if we were to assume arguendo that low charges per ratings point 
are the be-all and the end-all of assigning a network to a broadly accessible 
tier (and the record does not support such an assumption), the cost-per-
ratings-point evidence would at most show that (by this particular criterion) 
Tennis's gross cost is not as high as that of either Golf or Versus. It does not 
show any affirmative net benefit. As to the assumption about cost per 
ratings point, the sealed record suggests (consistent with Comcast's 
evidence about the factors guiding its tier placement decisions) that a very 
high price per rating point is by no means an absolute barrier to placement 
in a broadly available tier. J.A. 51, 1112. 
 
A rather obvious type of proof would have been expert evidence to the 
effect that X number of subscribers would switch to Comcast if it carried 
Tennis more broadly, or that Y number would leave Comcast in the absence 
of broader carriage, or a combination of the two, such that Comcast would 
recoup the proposed increment in cost. There is no such evidence.… 
 
Not only does the record lack affirmative evidence along these lines, 
there is evidence that no such benefits exist. [Evidence that no benefits for 
Comcast exist can be seen in a] natural experiment conducted in Comcast's 
southern division. There Comcast had in 2007 or 2008 acquired a 
distribution network from another MVPD that had distributed Tennis more 
broadly than did Comcast. When Comcast repositioned Tennis to the sports 
tier (a “negative repo” in MVPD lingo), thereby making it available to 
Comcast's general subscribers only for an additional fee, not one customer 
complained about the change. 
 
When we asked at oral argument about the absence of evidence of 
benefit to Comcast from the proposed tier change, Commission counsel 
                                                                                                                            
granted by a network to another distributor.”   Of course the record is very strong 
on the proposed increment in licensing fees, in itself a clear negative. The question 
is whether the other factors, and perhaps ones unmentioned by Comcast, establish 
reason to expect a net benefit. 
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pointed not to any such evidence but to the ALJ's remedy (affirmed by the 
Commission), which gave Comcast the alternative of narrowing the 
exposure of Golf and Versus (rather than broadening that of Tennis). Such a 
change was the Commission's alternative remedy for bringing the three 
networks to tiering parity. But the discriminatory act alleged by the 
Commission was Comcast's refusal to broaden its distribution of Tennis, not 
a refusal to narrow its distribution of Golf and Versus. The latter may make 
complete sense in terms of providing an evenhanded remedy. But evidence 
that such a change would have afforded Comcast a net benefit—for 
example, by generating incremental sports tier fees exceeding incremental 
losses from the removal of Golf and Versus from lower priced tiers—would 
in itself have little bearing on the lawfulness of Comcast's rejection of 
Tennis's actual proposal to extend distribution of the latter's content.... 
 
Without showing any benefit for Comcast from incurring the additional 
fees for assigning Tennis a more advantageous tier, the Commission has not 
provided evidence that Comcast discriminated against Tennis on the basis 
of affiliation. And while the Commission describes at length the 
“substantial evidence” that supports a finding that the discrimination is 
based on affiliation, Resp'ts' Br. at 25–31, none of that evidence establishes 
benefits that Comcast would receive if it distributed Tennis more broadly. 
On this issue the Commission has pointed to no evidence, and therefore 
obviously not to substantial evidence. See Guardian Moving & Storage Co., 
Inc. v. ICC, 952 F.2d 1428, 1433 (D.C.Cir.1992). 
 
* * * 
 




KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge, concurring:  
... 
As the Court's opinion explains, the FCC erred in concluding that 
Comcast discriminated against the Tennis Channel on the basis of 
affiliation. I join the Court's opinion in full. I write separately to point out 
that the FCC also erred in a more fundamental way. Section 616's use of the 
phrase “unreasonably restrain”—an antitrust term of art—establishes that 
the statute applies only to discrimination that amounts to an unreasonable 
restraint under antitrust law. Vertical integration and vertical contracts—for 
example, between a video programming distributor and a video 
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programming network—become potentially problematic under antitrust law 
only when a company has market power in the relevant market. It follows 
that Section 616 applies only when a video programming distributor 
possesses market power. But Comcast does not have market power in the 
national video programming distribution market, the relevant market 
analyzed by the FCC in this case. Therefore, as I will explain in Part I of 
this opinion, Section 616 does not apply here. 
 
Applying Section 616 to a video programming distributor that lacks 
market power not only contravenes the terms of the statute, but also violates 
the First Amendment as it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court. As I 
will explain in Part II of this opinion, the canon of constitutional avoidance 
thus strongly reinforces the conclusion that Section 616 applies only when a 
video programming distributor possesses market power. 
 
I 
Section 616 of the Communications Act requires the FCC to: 
 
prevent a multichannel video programming distributor from 
engaging in conduct the effect of which is to unreasonably restrain the 
ability of an unaffiliated video programming vendor to compete fairly by 
discriminating in video programming distribution on the basis of 
affiliation or nonaffiliation of vendors in the selection, terms, or 
conditions for carriage of video programming provided by such vendors. 
 
47 U.S.C. § 536(a)(3) (emphasis added); see 47 C.F.R. § 76.1301(c). The 
statutory text establishes that a Section 616 violation has two elements. 
First, the video programming distributor must have discriminated against an 
unaffiliated video programming network on the basis of affiliation. Second, 
the video programming distributor's discrimination must have 
“unreasonably restrain[ed]” the unaffiliated network's ability “to compete 
fairly.” 
Congress enacted Section 616 (over the veto of President George H.W. 
Bush) as part of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition 
Act of 1992, known as the Cable Act. The Cable Act included numerous 
provisions designed to curb abuses of cable operators' bottleneck monopoly 
power and to promote competition in the cable television industry. When 
the Act was passed, however, the video programming market looked quite 
different than it looks today. At the time, most households subscribed to 
cable in order to view television programming. And as Congress noted, 
“most cable television subscribers [had] no opportunity to select between 
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competing cable systems.” Cable Television Consumer Protection and 
Competition Act of 1992, Pub.L. No. 102–385, § 2(a)(2), 106 Stat. 1460, 
1460 (1992). Congress decided to proactively counteract the bottleneck 
monopoly power that cable operators possessed in many local markets. 
 
The Cable Act employs a variety of tools to advance competition. Some 
provisions directly prohibit practices that Congress viewed as 
anticompetitive in the market at the time. For example, the Act prohibits 
local franchising authorities from granting exclusive franchises to cable 
operators. See id. § 7(a), 106 Stat. at 1483. Similarly, the Act's “must-carry” 
provisions require cable operators to carry a specified number of local 
broadcast stations. See id. § 4, 106 Stat. at 1471. 
 
In other parts of the Act, Congress borrowed from antitrust law, 
authorizing the FCC to regulate cable operators' conduct in accordance with 
antitrust principles. For example, the Act requires the FCC, when 
prescribing limits on the number of cable subscribers or affiliated channels, 
to take account of “the nature and market power of the local franchise.” See 
id. § 11(c), 106 Stat. at 1488. Similarly, the Act allows rate regulation only 
of those cable systems that are not subject to effective competition. See id. § 
3, 106 Stat. at 1464. 
 
The provision at issue in this case, Section 616, incorporates traditional 
antitrust principles. Section 616 does not categorically forbid a video 
programming distributor from extending preferential treatment to affiliated 
video programming networks or lesser treatment to unaffiliated video 
programming networks. Rather, to violate Section 616, a video 
programming distributor must discriminate among video programming 
networks on the basis of affiliation, and the discrimination must 
“unreasonably restrain” an unaffiliated network's ability to compete 
fairly. 47 U.S.C. § 536(a)(3). 
 
The phrase “unreasonably restrain” is of course a longstanding term of 
art in antitrust law. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. 
PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007)(“[T]he Court has repeated time and again 
that § 1 outlaws only unreasonable restraints.”)..... 
 
When a statute uses a term of art from a specific field of law, we 
presume that Congress adopted “the cluster of ideas that were attached to 
each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken.” FAA 
v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1441, 1449 (2012)...; ANTONIN SCALIA & 
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BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 73 (2012) (where “a word is obviously transplanted from 
another legal source, ... it brings the old soil with it”) (internal quotation 
mark omitted); cf. FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 
1003, 1015(2013) (reading statute “in light of our national policy favoring 
competition”). 
 
From the “term of art” canon and Section 616's use of the antitrust term 
of art “unreasonably restrain,” it follows that Section 616 incorporates 
antitrust principles governing unreasonable restraints. 
 
So what does antitrust law tell us? In antitrust law, certain activities are 
considered per se anticompetitive. Otherwise, however, conduct generally 
can be considered unreasonable only if a firm, or multiple firms acting in 
concert, have market power. See Leegin Creative Leather Products, 551 
U.S. at 885–86. 
 
This case involves vertical integration and vertical contracts. Beginning 
in the 1970s (well before the 1992 Cable Act), the Supreme Court has 
recognized the legitimacy of vertical integration and vertical contracts by 
firms without market power..... See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Vertical 
Restraints: De Facto Legality Under the Rule of Reason, 60ANTITRUST 
L.J. 67, 76 (1991) (“Antitrust law is a bar to the use of vertical restraints 
only in markets in which there is no apparent interbrand competition to 
protect consumers from a potentially welfare-decreasing restraint on 
intrabrand competition.”); 3B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 756a, at 9 (3d ed.2008) (vertical 
integration “is either competitively neutral or affirmatively desirable 
because it promotes efficiency”).... 
 
Not surprisingly given its procompetitive characteristics, vertical 
integration and vertical contracts are common and accepted practices in the 
American economy: Apple's iPhones contain integrated hardware and 
software, Dunkin' Donuts sells Dunkin' Donuts coffee, Ford produces 
radiators for its cars, McDonalds sells Big Macs, Nike stores are stocked 
with Nike shoes, Netflix owns “House of Cards,” and so on. As Professors 
Areeda and Hovenkamp have explained, vertical integration “is ubiquitous 
in our economy and virtually never poses a threat to competition when 
undertaken unilaterally and in competitive markets.” 3B AREEDA & 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 755c, at 6. 
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Following the lead of the Supreme Court and influential academic 
literature on which the Supreme Court has relied in the antitrust field, this 
Court's case law has stated that vertical integration and vertical contracts are 
procompetitive, at least absent market power. See Cablevision Systems 
Corp. v. FCC, 649 F.3d 695, 721 (D.C.Cir.2011) (vertical integration is 
“not always pernicious and, depending on market conditions, may actually 
be procompetitive”); National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. FERC, 468 F.3d 
831, 840 (D.C.Cir.2006) (“We began by emphasizing that vertical 
integration creates efficiencies for consumers.”); Tenneco Gas v. 
FERC, 969 F.2d 1187, 1201 (D.C.Cir.1992) (“[A]dvantages a pipeline gives 
its affiliate are improper only to the extent that they flow from the pipeline's 
anti-competitive market power. Otherwise vertical integration produces 
permissible efficiencies that cannot by themselves be considered uses of 
monopoly power.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Cablevision 
Systems Corp. v. FCC, 597 F.3d 1306, 1325 (D.C.Cir.2010) (Kavanaugh, J., 
dissenting) (“At least unless a company possesses market power in the 
relevant market, vertical integration and exclusive vertical contracts are not 
anti-competitive; on the contrary, such arrangements are ‘presumptively 
procompetitive.’ ”) (quoting 11 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST 
LAW ¶ 1803, at 100 (2d ed.2005)). 
 
Now back to Section 616: Because Section 616 incorporates antitrust 
principles and because antitrust law holds that vertical integration and 
vertical contracts are potentially problematic only when a firm has market 
power in the relevant market, it follows that Section 616 applies only when 
a video programming distributor has market power in the relevant 
market. Section 616 thus does not bar vertical integration or vertical 
contracts that favor affiliated video programming networks, absent a 
showing that the video programming distributor at least has market power 
in the relevant market. To conclude otherwise would require us to depart 
from the established meaning of the term of art “unreasonably restrain” that 
Section 616 uses. Moreover, to conclude otherwise would require us to 
believe that Congress intended to thwart procompetitive practices. It would 
of course make little sense to attribute that motivation to Congress. 
 
How, then, did the FCC reach the opposite conclusion in this case? The 
short answer is that the FCC badly misread the statute. Contrary to the plain 
language of Section 616, the FCC stated that the term “unreasonably” 
modified “discriminating” not “restrain”—even though Section 616 says it 
applies only to discriminatory conduct that “unreasonably restrain[s]” the 
ability of a competitor to compete fairly. See Order¶¶ 43, 85–86. Because 
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the FCC did not read Section 616 as written, it did not recognize the 
antitrust term of art “unreasonably restrain” that is apparent on the face of 
the statute. That erroneous reading of the text, in turn, led the FCC to 
mistakenly focus on the effects of Comcast's conduct on a competitor (the 
Tennis Channel) rather than on overall competition. See id. ¶¶ 83–85. That 
was a mistake because the goal of antitrust law (and thus of Section 616) is 
to promote consumer welfare by protecting competition, not by protecting 
individual competitors. See, e.g., NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 
128, 135 (1998) (Sherman Act plaintiff “must allege and prove harm, not 
just to a single competitor, but to the competitive process, i.e., to 
competition itself”); Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 
(1993) (“The purpose of the [Sherman] Act is not to protect businesses from 
the working of the market; it is to protect the public from the failure of the 
market.”); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl–O–Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 
(1977) (“The antitrust laws ... were enacted for the protection 
of competition, not competitors.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 755c, at 6 
(“[E]ven competitively harmless vertical integration can injure rivals or 
vertically related firms, but such injuries are not the concern of the antitrust 
laws.”). 
 
It is true that Section 616 references discrimination against competitors. 
But again, the statute does not ban such discrimination outright. It bans 
discrimination that unreasonably restrains a competitor from competing 
fairly. By using the phrase “unreasonably restrain,” the statute incorporates 
an antitrust term of art, and that term of art requires that the discrimination 
in question hinder overall competition, not just competitors. 
 
In sum, Section 616 targets instances of preferential program carriage 
that are anticompetitive under the antitrust laws. Section 616 thus may 
apply only when a video programming distributor possesses market power 
in the relevant market. Comcast has only about a 24% market share in the 
national video programming distribution market; it does not possess market 
power in the market considered by the FCC in this case. See Order ¶ 
87. Therefore, the FCC erred in finding that Comcast violated Section 616. 
 
II 
To the extent there is uncertainty about whether the phrase 
“unreasonably restrain” in Section 616 means that the statute applies only in 
cases of market power or instead may have a broader reach, we must 
construe the statute to avoid “serious constitutional concerns.” Edward J. 
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DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades 
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 577 (1988); see also Solid Waste Agency of 
Northern Cook County v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 172 
(2001). That canon strongly supports limiting Section 616 to cases of 
market power. Applying Section 616 to a video programming distributor 
that lacks market power would raise serious First Amendment questions 
under the Supreme Court's case law.... 
 
To begin with, the Supreme Court has squarely held that a video 
programming distributor such as Comcast both engages in and transmits 
speech, and is therefore protected by the First Amendment. See Turner 
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994). Just as a 
newspaper exercises editorial discretion over which articles to run, a video 
programming distributor exercises editorial discretion over which video 
programming networks to carry and at what level of carriage. 
 
It is true that, under the Supreme Court's precedents, Section 616's 
impact on a cable operator's editorial control is content-neutral and thus 
triggers only intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny. See id. at 642–
43. But the Supreme Court's case law applying intermediate scrutiny in this 
context provides that the Government may interfere with a video 
programming distributor's editorial discretion only when the video 
programming distributor possesses market power in the relevant market. 
 
In its 1994 decision in Turner Broadcasting, the Supreme Court ruled 
that the Cable Act's must-carry provisions might satisfy intermediate First 
Amendment scrutiny, but the Court rested that conclusion on “special 
characteristics of the cable medium: the bottleneck monopoly power 
exercised by cable operators and the dangers this power poses to the 
viability of broadcast television.” Id. at 661. When a cable operator has 
bottleneck power, the Court explained, it can “silence the voice of 
competing speakers with a mere flick of the switch.” Id. at 656. In 
subsequently upholding the must-carry provisions, the Court reiterated that 
cable's bottleneck monopoly power was critical to the First Amendment 
calculus. See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 197–
207 (1997)(controlling opinion of Kennedy, J.). The Court stated that “cable 
operators possess[ed] a local monopoly over cable households,” with only 
one percent of communities being served by more than one cable 
operator.Id. at 197. 
 
… 
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[But since this Court decided Turner Broadcasting], the video 
programming distribution market has changed dramatically, especially with 
the rapid growth of satellite and Internet providers. This Court has 
previously described the massive transformation, explaining that cable 
operators “no longer have the bottleneck power over programming that 
concerned the Congress in 1992.” Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 579 F.3d 1, 8 
(D.C.Cir.2009); see also Cablevision Systems Corp. v. FCC, 597 F.3d 1306, 
1324 (D.C.Cir.2010) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“This radically changed 
and highly competitive marketplace—where no cable operator exercises 
market power in the downstream or upstream markets and no national video 
programming network is so powerful as to dominate the programming 
market—completely eviscerates the justification we relied on in Time 
Warner for the ban on exclusive contracts.”); Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical 
Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19 YALE J. ON 
REG. 171, 229 (2002) (“It thus appears that the national market for MVPDs 
is already too unconcentrated to support the conclusion that vertical 
integration could have any anti-competitive effects.”). 
 
In today's highly competitive market, neither Comcast nor any other 
video programming distributor possesses market power in the national 
video programming distribution market.... 
 
In light of the Supreme Court's precedents interpreting the First 
Amendment and the massive changes to the video programming distribution 
market over the last two decades, the FCC's interference with Comcast's 
editorial discretion cannot stand. In restricting the editorial discretion of 
video programming distributors, the FCC cannot continue to implement a 
regulatory model premised on a 1990s snapshot of the cable market. 
 
The Supreme Court's precedents amply demonstrate that the FCC's 
interpretation of Section 616 violates the First Amendment. At a minimum, 
the Supreme Court's precedents raise serious First Amendment questions 
about the FCC's interpretation of Section 616. Under the constitutional 
avoidance canon, those serious constitutional questions require that we 
construe Section 616 to apply only when a video programming distributor 
possesses market power.... 
 
TIME WARNER CABLE, INC. V. FCC 
2013 WL 4733668 (2d Cir. Sept. 4, 2013) 
RAGGI, Circuit Judge.  
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Time Warner Cable Inc. (“Time Warner”) and the National Cable & 
Telecommunications Association (“NCTA” and, collectively with Time 
Warner, the “Cable Companies”) petition for review of an August 1, 2011 
order of the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC” or 
“Commission”). …. Section 616(a)(3) and (5) and that part of the 2011 
FCC Order establishing the standard for demonstrating a prima facie 
violation of these statutory provisions (collectively, the “program carriage 
regime”) are intended to curb anticompetitive behavior by limiting the 
circumstances under which a distributor of video programming can 
discriminate against unaffiliated networks that provide such programming. 
The Cable Companies contend that, on its face, the program carriage regime 
violates their First Amendment right to free speech.... 
 
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we reject the Cable Companies' 
First Amendment challenge to the program carriage regime . . . .  
 
I. Background 
A. The Video Programming Industry 
[T]he video programming industry includes video programming 
vendors, multichannel video programming distributors (“MVPDs”), and 
online video distributors (“OVDs”)]. Video programming vendors are 
primarily programming networks, such as ESPN, Bravo, and CNN, which 
create or acquire video programming, such as television shows and movies, 
and which contract with MVPDs and OVDs to distribute that programming 
to consumers. MVPDs and OVDs are services that transmit video 
programming to subscribers for viewing on televisions, computers, and 
other electronic devices. MVPDs and OVDs generally do not alter the 
programming that they transmit; rather, once an MVPD or OVD acquires 
programming from networks, it functions as a “conduit for the speech of 
others, transmitting it on a continuous and unedited basis to [consumers].” 
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 629 (1994) (“Turner I ”). 
 
MVPDs include (1) cable operators, such as Time Warner and Comcast 
Corporation (“Comcast”), which transmit programming over physical cable 
systems; (2) direct broadcast satellite (“DBS”) providers, such as DISH 
Network and DIRECTV, which transmit programming via direct-to-home 
satellite; and (3) telephone companies, such as AT & T and Verizon, which 
transmit programming via fiber-optic cable. While MVPDs primarily 
transmit programming to televisions, increasingly, they also offer access to 
their programming through the Internet. MVPDs sometimes acquire 
ownership interests in the networks from which they obtain video 
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programming, and vice versa. Such networks are deemed “affiliated” with 
MVPDs, whereas networks without any shared ownership interests are 
deemed “unaffiliated.” The “geographic footprint [ ]” of an MVPD varies 
based on the type and size of the MVPD. Cable operators, for instance, 
operate in “discrete geographic areas defined by the boundaries of their 
individual systems,” and “[n]o cable operator provides nationwide coverage 
or statewide coverage.” Telephone companies are similarly limited by their 
physical systems. By contrast, DBS providers have “national footprints,” 
offering “service to most of the land area and population of the United 
States.” 
 
OVDs, like Hulu and Netflix, are relatively new services that transmit 
video programming to consumers via broadband Internet for viewing on 
television and other electronic devices. OVDs may offer programming for 
free, by subscription, on a rental basis, or for sale. “[A]n OVD's market 
generally covers the entire national broadband footprint.” 
 
Two markets in the video programming industry are relevant to this 
case. The first, which we will refer to as the “video programming market,” 
is the market in which programming networks and other video 
programming vendors compete with each other to have MVPDs and OVDs 
carry their video programming. The second market, which we will refer to 
as the “MVPD market,” consists of MVPDs and, to a lesser extent, OVDs 
competing to deliver video programming to consumers.  
 
B. The Cable Act 
[In 1992, Congress enacted the Cable Act to regulate the video 
programming industry. During this time, cable operators controlled 95% of 
the MVPD market because other MVPD systems like DBS, fiber-optic 
telephone, and OVDs either did not pose a significant competitive threat to 
cable operators or did not yet exist.]. Cable operators also generally did not 
compete against one another in any given locality… Thus, the country was 
effectively divided into numerous local cable monopolies, with few 
consumers having a choice of MVPDs. 
 
[C]able operators [also] exercised “bottleneck” control, a power that 
allowed them to prevent certain programming networks from reaching 
consumers in particular geographic areas. It is the “physical connection 
between the [subscriber's] television set and the cable network” that affords 
cable operators this power to “silence the voice” of a particular network 
“with a mere flick of the switch.” Turner I, 512 U.S. at 656 (observing that 
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“simply by virtue of its ownership of the essential pathway for cable speech, 
a cable operator [could] prevent its subscribers from obtaining access to 
programming it [chose] to exclude”); see generally 3B P. Areeda & H. 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶¶ 771a, 772a (3d ed.2008) (discussing 
bottleneck control and essential facilities doctrine in antitrust context). 
 
Concerns about cable operators' anticompetitive market power informed 
Congress's enactment of the Cable Act. [T]he Act sought to promote the 
availability to the public of diverse views through cable television, to 
protect consumer interests where cable operators were not subject to 
effective competition, and to ensure that cable operators did not have undue 
market power vis-à-vis programming networks and consumers. Toward 
these ends, the Cable Act imposed various restrictions on cable operators 
and other MVPDs and directed the FCC to establish further regulations. The 
focus of this appeal is certain statutory restrictions on MVPDs dealings with 
programming networks and the FCC regulations promulgated thereunder, 
namely, the program carriage regime… 
 
C. The Program Carriage Regime and Standstill Rule 
1. Section 616(a)(3) and (5) 
 
[T]he Communications Act directs the FCC to “establish regulations 
governing program carriage agreements and related practices between cable 
operators or other [MVPDs] and video programming vendors.” 47 U.S.C. § 
536(a). Section 616(a)(3) specifies that such regulations shall [prevent an 
MVPD from “engaging in conduct the effect of which is to unreasonably 
restrain the ability of an unaffiliated video programming vendor to compete 
fairly by discriminating in video programming distribution on the basis of 
affiliation or nonaffiliation of vendors.”]. 
 
Congress enacted these provisions to prevent cable operators from using 
their market power to take unfair advantage of unaffiliated programming 
networks. As the Senate and House Reports indicate, Congress was 
concerned that cable operators were leveraging “their market power derived 
from their de facto exclusive franchises and lack of local competition” to 
require networks to give them “an exclusive right to carry the programming, 
a financial interest, or some other added consideration as a condition of 
carriage on the cable system.” … Congress remained concerned that “in 
certain instances” a cable operator would be able to “abuse its locally-
derived market power to the detriment of programmers.” 
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This concern was exacerbated by pervasive vertical integration in the 
video programming industry. “Vertical integration occurs when a firm 
provides for itself some input that it might otherwise purchase on the 
market.” Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶ 755a. “A vertically integrated cable 
company is a company that owns both the programming and the distribution 
system.” S.Rep. No. 102–92, at 24–25, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
1157–58. In 1992, when the Cable Act was enacted, 39 of the 68 national 
programming networks, or approximately 57%, were vertically integrated 
with cable operators. This vertical integration provided cable operators with 
the incentive and ability to favor their affiliated networks, for example, by 
giving an affiliated network a more desirable channel position than an 
unaffiliated network or by refusing to carry an unaffiliated network 
altogether. Indeed, the Senate Report noted hearing testimony that stated as 
much: 
 
Because of the trend toward vertical integration, cable operators now 
have a clear vested interest in the competitive success of some of the 
programming services seeking access through their conduit. You don't 
need a Ph.D. in Economics to figure out that the guy who controls a 
monopoly conduit is in a unique position to control the flow of 
programming traffic to the advantage of the program services in which 
he has an equity investment and/or in which he is selling advertising 
availabilities, and to the disadvantage of those services ... in which he 
does not have an equity position. 
 
S.Rep. No. 102–92, at 25–26, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1158–
59 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶ 
756b (stating that vertically-integrated monopolist “at one stage of the 
production-distribution process may carry with it the power to affect 
competition in earlier and later stages”). 
 
On the other hand, Congress recognized that vertical integration could 
sometimes promote competition. The Senate Report cited hearing testimony 
recounting how vertical integration had allowed cable operators to 
“stimulate[ ] the development of programming that was necessary to flesh 
out the promise of cable ... when nobody else was really willing to step up 
and put up the money.” S.Rep. No. 102–92, at 27, reprinted in 1992 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1160; see also Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶ 756b (“[V]ertical 
integration by a monopolist may or may not have desirable or adverse 
consequences on economic performance.”). 
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Given these mixed views on the competitive impact of vertical 
integration in the video programming industry, Congress rejected proposals 
to ban vertical integration and instead enacted “legislation bar[ring] cable 
operators from discriminating against unaffiliated programmers” to ensure 
“competitive dealings between programmers and cable operators.” 
 
2. The 1993 FCC Order 
[In October 1993, the FCC released an order establishing a procedural 
framework for addressing § 616(a)(3) discrimination complaints by 
unaffiliated networks against MVPDS. Under the framework, the FCC 
would analyze complaints on a case-by-case basis and balance the need to 
proscribe “behavior prohibited by the specific language of the statute” with 
the need to preserve “the ability of affected parties to engage in legitimate, 
aggressive negotiations.”]. 
 
3. The 2007 FCC Notice of Proposed Rule Making [(“2007 NPRM”)] 
On June 15, 2007, the FCC issued a notice of proposed rule making that 
solicited comments on potential changes to the procedures established in the 
1993 FCC Order. Among other things, the FCC sought comment on the 
need to clarify the elements of a prima facie § 616(a)(3) violation and to 
“adopt rules to address the complaint process itself.” … 
 
4. The 2011 FCC Order 
… The FCC concluded that the record developed in response to the 
2007 NPRM showed that its “current program carriage procedures [were] 
ineffective and in need of reform.” Accordingly, in the 2011 FCC Order, the 
agency stated that it was taking “initial steps to improve [its] procedures for 
addressing program carriage complaints.” Among these steps were two rule 
changes relevant to the petitions for this court's review: (a) pronouncement 
of a new prima facie standard, and (b) creation of a standstill rule. [At issue 
in this case is the 2011 FCC Order.]. 
 
a. Prima Facie Standard 
[Instead of eliminating the prima facie standard, the FCC attempted to 
clarify what was required to establish a prima facie case and codify those 
requirements into FCC rules.]. 
 
Under the revised standard for a prima facie § 616(a)(3) violation, a 
complaining unaffiliated network must show, first, that an MVPD 
discriminated against it “on the basis of affiliation or non-affiliation” in the 
“selection, terms, or conditions for carriage” of the MVPD's video 
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programming. The network can make this showing by reference to either 
direct or circumstantial evidence. [The Court explains the kinds of 
circumstantial evidence that would show an MVPD discriminated against 
an unaffiliated network on the basis of affiliation or non-affiliation.]. 
 
To demonstrate a prima facie violation, a complainant must further 
show that the discrimination had the effect of “unreasonably restraining” its 
ability “to compete fairly.” [Whether discrimination unreasonably restrains 
the complainant’s ability to compete fairly is analyzed on a case-by-case 
basis.]. 
 
*** Standstill rule section omitted 
 
5. Time Warner's First Amendment Challenge 
In releasing the 2011 FCC Order, the agency rejected Time Warner's 
claim, made in response to the 2007 NPRM, that the program carriage 
regime violated the First Amendment. Time Warner had argued that, insofar 
as the program carriage regime required MVPDs to carry certain 
unaffiliated networks on the same terms as affiliated networks, it constituted 
a content-based infringement on MVPDs' editorial determinations of which 
programming networks to provide to their subscribers. As such, it was 
subject to strict scrutiny, which Time Warner maintained it could not 
withstand because increased competition in the MVPD market had deprived 
cable operators of any bottleneck power that might have justified the 
regime's initial creation in 1992. 
 
Construing the program carriage regime as content neutral, the FCC 
applied intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny to Time Warner's First 
Amendment challenge, and concluded that, even with the increased 
competition in the MVPD market, the program carriage regime continued to 
serve important government interests in promoting competition and diverse 
viewpoints. In so concluding, the FCC relied on the program carriage 
discrimination provision of the Cable Act that “directed the Commission to 
assess on a case-by-case basis the impact of anticompetitive conduct on an 
unaffiliated programming vendor's ability to compete.” 
 
The FCC further concluded that case-by-case analysis of unaffiliated 
networks' complaints under the program carriage regime was narrowly 
tailored to promote diversity and competition in the video programming 
industry because it restricted an MVPD's speech only upon proof that the 
MVPD had discriminated on the basis of network affiliation and that such 
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discrimination unreasonably restrained a network's ability to compete fairly. 
 
D. The Current State of the Video Programming Industry 
[The Court describes how the video programming industry has become 
more competitive since 1992. Today, cable operators’ market share is 
smaller than it was in 1992. DBS providers, such as DIRECTV and DISH 
Network, and OVDs now serve a significant portion of the market. 
Additionally, many geographic areas are now served by multiple competing 
MVPDs, usually the local cable operator and two DBS providers. Even 
though competition has increased since 1992, many cable operators 
continue to control significant market share in many areas.]. For example, 
as of mid–2010, Comcast maintained at least a 40% share in 13 of the 20 
largest MVPD markets in the United States, ranging from as low as 43% in 
Houston to as high as 62% in Chicago and 67% in Philadelphia.... 
 
Since 1992, there also has been a decline in vertical integration among 
cable operators and programming networks in the video programming 
industry. At the same time, however, Time Warner maintains an ownership 
interest in four national networks, including MLB Network; Cox 
Communications has an interest in six national networks, including MLB 
Network and the Travel Channel; Cablevision has an ownership in ten, 
including AMC and IFC; and Bright House Networks has an interest in 29, 
including Animal Planet and Discovery Channel. [In addition to owning 
interests in national networks, cable operators own various regional news 
and sports networks.]. 
 
Like Congress in 1992, the FCC continues to view the effects of vertical 
integration on the video programming industry as mixed. While potential 
benefits include “efficiencies in the production, distribution, and marketing 
of video programming, as well as the incentive to expand channel capacity 
and create new programming by lowering the risks associated with program 
production ventures,” possible harms include “unfair methods of 
competition, discriminatory conduct, and exclusive contracts that are the 
result of coercive activity.” 
 
E. The Instant Appeal 
Upon issuance of the 2011 FCC Order, the Cable Companies timely 
filed petitions for judicial review. They argue that the program carriage 
regime violates the First Amendment in light of the current state of the 
MVPD market.... 
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II. Discussion 
A. First Amendment Challenge 
 
The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law ... 
abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const. amend. I. There is no 
question that cable operators and other MVPDs “engage in and transmit 
speech” protected by the First Amendment. … Nor is there any dispute that 
the program carriage regime regulates MVPDs' protected speech by 
restraining their editorial discretion over which programming networks to 
carry and on what terms. … The question here, then, is whether such 
regulation is justified by a countervailing government interest under the 
appropriate level of First Amendment scrutiny. 
 
[T]he Cable Companies contend that the FCC erred when, in issuing the 
2011 FCC Order, it subjected the program carriage regime to intermediate 
scrutiny. The Cable Companies submit that the regime's restrictions are 
content and speaker based, thus requiring strict scrutiny. In any event, the 
Cable Companies argue that the program carriage regime cannot survive 
either strict or intermediate scrutiny. 
 
On de novo review of this constitutional challenge to the 2011 FCC 
Order…we conclude that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate level of 
review and that the FCC program carriage regime satisfies that standard. 
While rapidly increasing competition in the video programming industry 
may undermine that conclusion in the not-too-distant future, that time has 
not yet come. We thus deny the Cable Companies' petitions insofar as they 
challenge the program carriage regime under the First Amendment. 
 
1. The Appropriate Level of Scrutiny 
 “At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person 
should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of 
expression, consideration, and adherence.” Turner I, 512 U.S. at 641. The 
First Amendment thus stands against government “attempts to disfavor 
certain subjects or viewpoints.” Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 
(2010).  “Prohibited, too, are restrictions distinguishing among different 
speakers, allowing speech by some but not others.” Citizens United v. FEC, 
558 U.S. at 340. A content- or speaker-based restriction on protected speech 
is subject to strict scrutiny and will be tolerated only upon a showing that it 
is narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest. On the other hand, 
a regulation of protected speech that is content neutral and that does not 
disfavor certain speakers is reviewed under the less-stringent intermediate 
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level of scrutiny. Courts have consistently reviewed challenges to the Cable 
Act and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto under intermediate 
scrutiny. See, e.g., Turner II, 520 U.S. at 213. Because the program carriage 
regime is content and speaker neutral, it warrants no different treatment. 
 
a. Content Neutrality 
“Deciding whether a particular regulation is content based or content 
neutral is not always a simple task.” Turner I, 512 U.S. at 642. “The 
principal inquiry ... is whether the government has adopted a regulation of 
speech because of agreement or disagreement with the message it conveys.” 
Id. (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). In making this 
determination, “we look to the purpose behind the regulation.” Bartnicki v. 
Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526 (2001). “[T]ypically, government regulation of 
expressive activity is content neutral so long as it is justified without 
reference to the content of the regulated speech.” Id. (emphasis in original; 
alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).... 
 
Applying these principles here, we conclude that § 616(a)(3) and (5) of 
the Cable Act, by its terms, neither favors nor disfavors any particular 
message or view and, indeed, makes no reference to content. See 47 U.S.C. 
§ 536(a)(3), (5). To invoke the protections of that statute, an unaffiliated 
network must establish that a cable operator or other MVPD (1) 
discriminated against it on the basis of affiliation, or more precisely its lack 
of affiliation with the MVPD, and (2) thereby unreasonably restrained its 
ability to compete fairly. See id. § 536(a)(3). The statute thus prohibits only 
discrimination on the basis of affiliation. It confers no protections based on 
the content of an unaffiliated network's programming.... 
 
Moreover, the Cable Companies do not—and, in light of the statute's 
legislative history, cannot—claim that the purpose of § 616(a)(3) and (5) is 
to suppress any particular message or idea. Congress's concern in enacting 
the statute “was not with what a cable operator might say,” but with the 
possibility that, as a result of its bottleneck power and vertical integration 
with affiliated networks, “it might not let others say anything at all in the 
principal medium for reaching much of the public.”   Time Warner Entm't 
Co. v. United States, 211 F.3d at 1317–18. Congress enacted § 616(a)(3) 
and (5) to minimize this threat, not to suppress any particular message or 
viewpoint. Such a purpose is not content based. 
 
We reach the same conclusion with respect to the 2011 FCC Order's 
prima facie standard. Under that standard, an unaffiliated network may 
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show affiliation-based discrimination through (1) direct evidence or (2) 
circumstantial evidence that an MVPD treated it differently than a 
“similarly situated” affiliated network. 47 C.F.R. § 76.1302(d)(3)(iii)(B). In 
determining whether two networks are similarly situated, the FCC 
acknowledges that it examines the content of the networks' programming. 
See id. (stating that FCC considers, among other factors, “genre” and 
“target programming”). In light of this examination, the prima facie 
standard “ ‘might in a formal sense be described as content-based,’ “ but not 
as that term has been employed by the Supreme Court. Cablevision Sys. 
Corp. v. FCC, 649 F.3d at 717 (quoting BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 
58, 69 (D.C.Cir.1998)). Not only is there “absolutely no evidence” that “the 
Commission issued its [prima facie standard] to disfavor certain messages 
or ideas,” but also the Cable Companies point to no specific content that the 
standard disfavors. Id. 
 
That conspicuous omission from their argument is explained by a 
simple fact: the prima facie standard, like § 616(a)(3) under which it was 
promulgated, treats all content equally. Depending on the circumstances of 
a given case, any content may weigh in favor of or against a finding that an 
unaffiliated network is similarly situated to an affiliated network. But the 
standard does not itself favor or disfavor particular content. To illustrate, 
assume that an unaffiliated network devoted to sports files a § 616(a)(3) 
complaint against a cable operator. If the cable operator is affiliated with a 
sports network, the unaffiliated network's sports content will weigh in favor 
of a finding that it is similarly situated. Meanwhile, if the cable operator is 
not affiliated with a sports network, the unaffiliated network is less likely to 
be found similarly situated. In either instance, though, it is the cable 
operator's own content choice, not the government's, that determines 
whether the unaffiliated network's sports content is favored. 
 
Thus, the prima facie standard may favor certain content in one case 
while disfavoring the same content in another case. But neither in its 
adoption nor in its operation does the standard reflect government 
“agreement or disagreement” with any particular ideas or viewpoints.... 
 
Where, as here, the government examines content to determine whether 
a regulation applies, with no indication that the regulation favors or 
disfavors any particular content, the concerns that compel strict scrutiny of 
content-based laws are not present. … The program carriage regime 
expresses no government content preference for particular ideas or 
viewpoints. It simply prohibits MVPDs from discriminating against 
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unaffiliated networks similarly situated to the MVPDs' affiliated networks. 
As such, the regime is properly considered content neutral. 
 
b. Speaker Neutrality 
“[S]peaker-based laws demand strict scrutiny when they reflect the 
Government's preference for the substance of what the favored speakers 
have to say (or aversion to what the disfavored speakers have to say).” 
Turner I, 512 U.S. at 658. But “[s]o long as they are not a subtle means of 
exercising a content preference, speaker distinctions ... are not presumed 
invalid under the First Amendment.” Id. at 645. 
 
Here, the program carriage regime reflected in § 616(a)(3) and (5) of the 
Cable Act and the FCC's prima facie standard does distinguish among 
speakers. Unaffiliated networks are favored because the regime affords 
protections to them that are not afforded to affiliated networks, i.e., it 
prohibits affiliation-based discrimination that unreasonably restrains 
unaffiliated networks' ability to compete fairly.... 
 
In asserting that strict scrutiny is warranted here, the Cable Companies 
contend that all speaker-based regulations, regardless of whether they are 
grounded in a content preference, are presumptively invalid. The Supreme 
Court rejected this argument in Turner I. … Indeed, in that case, the Court 
subjected a speaker-based regulation under the Cable Act to intermediate 




Accordingly, because the program carriage regime is neither content 
based nor impermissibly speaker based, we subject it to intermediate 
scrutiny. 
 
2. Intermediate Scrutiny 
 “[T]he intermediate level of scrutiny [is] applicable to content-neutral 
restrictions that impose an incidental burden on speech.” Turner I, 512 U.S. 
at 662. Such a restriction will be sustained under this standard if it (1) 
“advances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of 
free speech” and (2) “does not burden substantially more speech than 
necessary to further those interests.” Turner II, 520 U.S. at 189 (citing 
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)). The program carriage 
regime satisfies these two requirements. 
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a. Important Government Interests 
The FCC submits that the program carriage regime serves two important 
government interests by promoting (1) fair competition and (2) a diversity 
of information sources in the video programming market. … The 
government's “interest in eliminating restraints on fair competition is always 
substantial, even when the individuals or entities subject to particular 
regulations are engaged in expressive activity protected by the First 
Amendment.” Turner I, 520 U.S. at 664. “Likewise, assuring that the public 
has access to a multiplicity of information sources is a governmental 
purpose of the highest order, for it promotes values central to the First 
Amendment.” Id. at 663.… 
 
… When, as here, “ ‘the government defends a regulation on speech as a 
means to redress past harms or prevent anticipated harms, it must 
demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that 
the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material 
way.’ ” Id. (alterations omitted) (quoting Turner I, 512 U.S. at 664 
(plurality)). Thus, the FCC's determination that the program carriage regime 
protects against unfair competition and promotes diverse video 
programming sources must be based on “ ‘reasonable inferences' “ drawn 
from “ ‘substantial evidence.’ “ Cablevision Sys. Corp. v. FCC, 597 F.3d at 
1311 (quoting Turner I, 512 U.S. at 666 (plurality)).... 
 
Applying these principles here, we begin by noting that the program 
carriage regime calls for a “case-by-case” assessment of the anticompetitive 
effect of an MVPD's purported discrimination against an unaffiliated 
network. 2011 FCC Order ¶ 33. To justify such a regime, the FCC “has no 
obligation to establish that vertically integrated cable companies retain a 
stranglehold on competition nationally.” Cablevision Sys. Corp. v. FCC, 
649 F.3d at 712. Rather, it must show a reasonable basis for concluding that 
some markets exist in which MVPDs have the incentive and ability to harm 
unaffiliated networks and that application of the program carriage regime 
will alleviate that harm. See Turner II, 520 U.S. at 195. The FCC has met 
this burden. 
 
In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful that a law “impos[ing] 
current burdens ... must be justified by current needs.” Shelby County v. 
Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 2622 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
[The Court acknowledged a trend in the video programming industry over 
the past twenty years toward increased competition—especially from DBS 
providers, telephone companies, and OVDs—but noted that this trend has 
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not yet eliminated the need for government regulation of MVPDs’ carriage 
decisions.  The Court recognized that if this trend continues, it may one day 
eliminate the need for government intrusion.  Despite the trend, however, 
the Court concluded that such a day has not yet arrived.]. 
 
The industry's current competitive posture presents “a ‘mixed picture’ 
when considered as a whole.” Cablevision Sys. Corp. v. FCC, 649 F.3d at 
712 (quoting Cablevision Sys. Corp. v. FCC, 597 F.3d at 1314). Cable 
operators may not be as dominant as they were in 1992 when Congress 
enacted the Cable Act. Nevertheless, cable operators continue to hold more 
than 55% of the national MVPD market and to enjoy still higher shares in a 
number of local MVPD markets.... 
 
Indeed, despite the Cable Companies' assertions to the contrary, the 
2011 FCC Order cited substantial record evidence that cable operators 
maintain significant shares in various local markets and that vertical 
integration remains pervasive in the video programming industry. In 
particular, the 2011 FCC Order relied on the 2011 Comcast/NBCU Order, 
which points out that, as of mid–2010, Comcast held a more–than–60% 
share in certain major MVPD markets. Additionally, the 2011 
Comcast/NBCU Order explained that the vertical integration of Comcast, 
the nation's largest cable operator and MVPD, with NBCU, the nation's 
fourth largest owner of programming networks, provides Comcast with an 
increased incentive and ability to harm unaffiliated networks. 
 
From this record evidence, the FCC could reasonably conclude that 
cable operators continue to “have the incentive and ability to favor their 
affiliated programming vendors in individual cases, with the potential to 
unreasonably restrain the ability of an unaffiliated programming vendor to 
compete fairly.” 2011 FCC Order ¶ 33.... 
 
The record also permitted the FCC reasonably to conclude that the 
program carriage regime would ameliorate the anticompetitive harm that 
vertically integrated cable operators pose to unaffiliated networks. Under 
that regime, when anticompetitive conduct is proved in a particular case, the 
FCC has the authority to order remedies appropriate to that case. The 
regime thus directly targets the threatened harm and provides the FCC with 
the means to redress it. In so doing, it promotes important government 
interests in fair competition and diversity of information sources in the 
video programming market. 
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b. Narrow Tailoring 
To show that a regulation is narrowly tailored under intermediate 
scrutiny, the government need not demonstrate that the regulation is “the 
least speech-restrictive means of advancing the Government's interests.” 
Turner I, 512 U.S. at 662. It must, however, show that the “regulation 
promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less 
effectively absent the regulation.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
“Narrow tailoring in this context requires, in other words, that the means 
chosen do not burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further 
the government's legitimate interests.” Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
The program carriage regime is carefully tailored to avoid placing any 
greater burden on MVPDs' editorial discretion than is warranted to promote 
competition and diverse programming sources. The regime prohibits only 
affiliation-based discrimination by MVPDs and only when such 
discrimination is shown to have an anticompetitive effect. It does not 
prohibit an MVPD from declining to carry an unaffiliated network because 
it opposes the views expressed by that network. It does not prohibit MVPDs 
from declining to carry an unaffiliated network for legitimate business 
reasons. … Nor does it necessarily prohibit affiliation-based discrimination 
in competitive markets, where there is a showing that such discrimination 
has beneficial effects that are not anticompetitive. … Moreover, the regime 
requires the FCC to evaluate individual unaffiliated networks' complaints on 
a case-by-case basis, and it demands proof of impermissible affiliation-
based discrimination and anticompetitive effect before any restrictions are 
placed on the MVPD's carriage decision. 
 
The Cable Companies nevertheless argue that the program carriage 
regime is not sufficiently tailored because neither § 616(a)(3) nor the prima 
facie standard established by the 2011 FCC Order explicitly requires an 
unaffiliated network to demonstrate that a purportedly discriminating 
MVPD possesses market power. The FCC responds that proof of market 
power is not necessarily a prerequisite to relief under the regime. … The 
program carriage regime requires an unaffiliated-network complainant to 
make a case-specific showing that an MVPD “unreasonably restrain[ed]” its 
ability to “compete fairly,” 47 U.S.C. § 536(a)(3), and market power is 
generally a “significant consideration” under such a requirement, Leegin 
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885–86 (2007) 
(identifying market power as “significant consideration” in determining 
whether conduct is unreasonable restraint under § 1 of Sherman Act).… 
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Thus, on this facial challenge to the overall program carriage regime, we 
conclude that the regime's “unreasonable restraint” requirement renders it 
narrowly tailored so as not to burden more speech than necessary to 





To summarize, we conclude as follows: 
 
1. Section 616(a)(3) and (5) of the Communications Act of 1934, as 
amended by the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition 
Act of 1992, and the prima facie standard established thereunder by the 
2011 FCC Order, are content and speaker neutral and, thus, petitioners' First 
Amendment challenge warrants intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny. 
The challenged program carriage regime satisfies intermediate scrutiny 
because its case-specific standards for identifying affiliation-based 
discrimination (a) serve important government interests in promoting 
competition and diversity in an industry still posing serious competitive 
risks, and (b) are narrowly tailored not to burden substantially more speech 
than necessary to further those interests. 
 
Accordingly, the petitions for review are DENIED . . . insofar as they 
raise a First Amendment challenge to the program carriage regime . . . .  
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1.  In Comcast, the concurring opinion stated that Section 616 of the Cable 
Act applies “only when a video programming distributor possesses market 
power.” It also stated “[i]n today's highly competitive market, neither 
Comcast nor any other video programming distributor possesses market 
power in the national video programming distribution market.” Does this 
render the Cable Act currently irrelevant?  How should the court’s approach 
to “market power” change with the rise of innovative OVDs like Netflix, if 
it should change at all?  What about the merits of the conclusion that the 
only cable company in town lacks market power because there are 
alternatives that use different technologies (internet, satellite, etc)? 
 
2.  “Net neutrality,” or “internet neutrality,” refers very generally to a 
principle that the internet be open, without undue private restrictions on 
websites, platforms, contents, the types of equipment that can be attached to 
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it.  At a high level of generality the concept is pleasing, but implementation 
has proven to be very difficult, in part because net neutrality can encompass 
so many thing.  Consider these definitions: 
1. Absolute non-discrimination 
 
  “Net Neutrality means that Internet service providers may not 
discriminate between different kinds of content and applications 
online. It guarantees a level playing field for all Web sites and 
Internet technologies.”  
 Network neutrality is best defined as a network design principle. 
The idea is that a maximally useful public information network 
aspires to treat all content, sites, and platforms equally. This allows 
the network to carry every form of information and support every 
kind of application. The principle suggests that information 
networks are often more valuable when they are less specialized – 
when they are a platform for multiple uses, present and future.”  
 “Net neutrality refers to the concept that a broadband network 
should operate without any restrictions on the kinds of equipment 
attached to it, or on the mode of communication allowed.”  
 “a neutral Internet must forward packets [of digital information] on 
a first-come, first served basis, without regard for quality-of-service 
considerations.”  
 
2.    Limited discrimination without Quality of Service tiering (QoS) 
 
 United States lawmakers have introduced bills that would allow 
quality of service discrimination as long as no special fee is charged 
for higher-quality service.  
 
3.    Limited discrimination with tiering 
 
 This approach allows higher fees for QoS as long as there is no 
exclusivity in service contracts. The principle is this: “If I pay to 
connect to the Net with a certain quality of service, and you pay to 
connect with that or greater quality of service, then we can 
communicate at that level.” 
 “This allows higher fees for quality of service as long as there is no 
exclusivity in service contracts. This means that nobody can have 
exclusivity to any site, but each site can pay to have higher qualities 
of service.”  
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Consider the following possibilities: 
1. An Internet subscriber uses an automated system to download 
thousands of videos from the Internet, using 100 times as many 
resources as the average subscriber to that internet service provider’s 
(ISP) system.  The ISP responds by disconnecting the customer, 
placing a limit on the amount of data it can receive in a given time 
period, or charging it a higher price. 
2. An ISP owns a television network or other subsidiary that earns 
money by transmitting video content, or perhaps owns a cable 
television company that transmits video content; it then shuts down 
a website that offers video content, such as Netflix. 
3. An ISP shuts down a website that is relentlessly critical of the ISP’s 
parent company. 
4. In an effort to aid in the United State’s “War on Terror,” an ISP 
refuses to allow costumers with “anti-American” names to access 
websites that actively promote and encourage the destruction of the 
American government.   
5. An ISP charges private universities a higher price to access the 
Internet than it does public universities.   
 
In “Preserving the Open Internet and Broadband Industry Practices,”
3
  
the Federal Communications Commission adopted guidelines for internet 
service providers and other members of the internet industry: 
1. “Transparency. Fixed and mobile broadband providers must disclose 
the network management practices, performance characteristics, and 
terms and conditions of their broadband services;” 
 
a. “A person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access 
service shall publicly disclose accurate information regarding the 
network management practices, performance, and commercial 
terms of its broadband Internet access services sufficient for 
consumers to make informed choices regarding use of such 
services and for content, application, service, and device 
providers to develop, market, and maintain Internet offerings.” 
b. The FCC requires broadband providers to disclose: Congestion 
management practices, application-specific behavior practices, 
device attachment rules, security practices, service description, 
impact of specialized services description, pricing, privacy 
                                                 
3
 Currently available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10-
201A1.pdf. 
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policies, and redress options 
 
2. “No blocking. Fixed broadband providers may not block lawful 
content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices; mobile 
broadband providers may not block lawful websites, or block 
applications that compete with their voice or video telephony 
services; and” 
a. The rule only protects lawful content. This rules entitles users to 
use any device to connect to the network, so long as the device 
does not do any harm to the network. … 
 
3. “No unreasonable discrimination. Fixed broadband providers may 
not unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful network 
traffic.” 
a. “A network management practice is reasonable if it is 
appropriate and tailored to achieving a legitimate network 
management purpose, taking into account the particular network 
architecture and technology of the broadband Internet access 
service.”… 
 
The purpose of these rules are to “ensure the Internet remains an open 
platform— one characterized by free markets and free speech—that enables 
consumer choice, end-user control, competition through low barriers to 
entry, and the freedom to innovate without permission.” 
The FCC concluded that had jurisdiction to establish these rules under 
the Communications Act and the Telecommunications Act of 1996; that the 
rules do not violate the First Amendment (because they are content neutral) 
and do not constitute a Taking under the Fifth Amendment. 
The FCC concluded the benefits of keeping the Internet open far 
exceeds the costs. Internet interference would slow or break the cycle of 
innovation and would cause harms “that may be irreversible or very costly 
to undo.” Internet openness can solve this problem by reducing the risk of 
harm as well as allowing end users unfettered access to information. The 
costs of keeping the Internet open are very small. “Our rules against 
blocking and unreasonable discrimination are subject to reasonable network 
management, and our rules do not prevent broadband providers from 
offering specialized services.” 
The rules apply to “broadband Internet access service.” And apply only 
“to the provision of broadband Internet access service and not to edge 
provider activities, such as the provision of content or applications over the 
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Internet.” The rules do not apply “to dial-up Internet access service because 
telephone service has historically provided the easy ability to switch among 
competing dial-up Internet access services.” Lastly, the rules do not apply to 
coffee shops, Internet cafes, bookstores, or “other entities when they acquire 
Internet service from a broadband provider to enable their patrons to access 
the Internet from their establishments.” 
 
3.  Limits on the FFC’s Power to Enforce Network Neutrality Policy. In 
Comcast Corp. v. Federal Commns. Comm'n 600 F. 3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) the D.C. Circuit imposed significant limits on the FCC’s ability to 
enforce its adopted net neutrality policies. The Communications Act of 
1934 grants the FFC ancillary authority to “perform any and all acts, make 
such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with [the 
Act], as may be necessary in the execution of its functions.” 47 U.S.C. § 
154(i). The FCC may exercise this “ancillary” authority only if it 
demonstrates that its action is “reasonably ancillary to the . . . effective 
performance of its statutorily mandated responsibilities.”  In 2007 several 
subscribers to Comcast's high-speed Internet service discovered that the 
company was interfering with their use of peer-to-peer networking 
applications.  When the FCC intervened  the D.C. Circuit held that the FCC 
lacked the ancillary authority to regulate Comcast’s network management 
policies. The court based its decision on a two-part test for ancillary 
jurisdiction: 
 
The Commission ... may exercise ancillary jurisdiction only 
when two conditions are satisfied: (1) the Commission's 
general jurisdictional grant under Title I [of the 
Communications Act] covers the regulated subject and (2) 
the regulations are reasonably ancillary to the Commission's 
effective performance of its statutorily mandated 
responsibilities. 
 
The court found that the FCC had erroneously relied on statements of its 
own policy which were unable to “anchor the exercise of ancillary 
authority” instead of relying on statutorily mandated duties. Declarations 
that “the policy of the United States . . . [is] to promote the continued 
development of the Internet,” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2), or the FCC’s mandated 
goal of providing “a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and 
radio communication service,” 47 U.S.C. § 151, are able to “shed light on 
any express statutory delegation of authority” but are unable to provide such 
authority on their own. The court further held that, had it allowed the FCC 
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY                         Chapter 8, Page 100 
Hovenkamp                                                               Oct. 2013 
 
to proceed with such regulation in the absence of explicit Congressional 
support, it would have acted to “virtually free the Commission from its 
congressional tether” and that there would then be few regulations that the 
FCC would be “be unable to impose upon Internet service providers.”   
 
Prior to Comcast the courts had generally held that the FCC’s 
ancillary jurisdiction allowed it to pursue basic broadband policies by 
ensuring transparency, protecting consumers’ privacy, ensuring that 
persons with disabilities have access to broadband, protecting against 
cyber-attacks, and preserving the free and open Internet. American 
Library Ass’n, 406 F.3d at 694-96. Now, the FCC’s ancillary authority 
is more limited that previously thought, requiring the Agency to develop 
additional legal frameworks that will comply with the Comcast 
decision. 
 
On the ways available to the FCC control the internet and possible legal 
limitations, see  Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 DUKE L. J. 1841 (2011).  
What if the regulation is of content (such as limiting pornography) rather 
than economic structure?  See Daniel A. Lyons, Virtual Takings: The 
Coming Fifth Amendment Challenge to Net Neutrality Regulation, 86 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 65, 92-114 (2011); Hannibal Travis, The FCC's New 
Theory of the First Amendment, 51 SANTA CLARA L REV 417 (2011). 
 
4.  Unlike general ISPs (internet service providers), mobile service 
providers such as Verizon and AT&T have significant discretion to decide 
whether or not to allow certain mobile applications on their cellular devices. 
At this writing this position is being challenged for “fail[ing] to protect 
wireless users from discrimination, and … let[ting] mobile providers block 
innovative applications with impunity.” Josh Levy, Net Neutrality: What’s 




Does a mobile service provider who allows consumers to access the 
Internet on its devices have an obligation equivalent to that of a traditional 
ISP to provide open access to the Internet? Do you think the same 
underlying consumer protection and open Internet policies will apply in this 
case or will the mobile service provider’s role as the “middle man” be 
enough to allow for greater discretion?   For example, should the maker of a 
Smartphone such as Apple be able to block an internet application such as 
Skype, which might enable a customer to completely bypass the user’s 
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subscription for cellphone minutes when a wi-fi internet connection is 
available?  Would antitrust law be a better way to deal with such problems? 
 
3.  Good writing on the internet as a public forum includes Derek E. 
Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, 79 UNIV. CHI.L.REV. 863 (2012); Brian 
Leiter, "Cleaning Cyber-Cesspools: Google and Free Speech," in SAUL 
LEVMORE AND MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, EDS, THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: 
PRIVACY, SPEECH, AND REPUTATION 155 (2010). 
